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Abstract 
 
The broad objective of the thesis is to analyze the monetary policy transmission and 
relative importance of various shocks in business cycles after considering the financial 
sector structure for both developing and developed countries in three self-contained 
chapters (Chapter 2-4). The thesis contributes both theoretically and empirically to the 
literature relating to monetary policy, financial frictions and competition structure, 
exchange rate pass through and open economy in general, using Structural Vector 
Auto-Regression (SVAR) and Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) 
models. Since the global financial crisis, a growing awareness of the roles of financial 
frictions has led to renewed interests in transmission mechanisms of monetary policy 
and other shocks. Two different financial frictions are incorporated in the DSGE 
models of Chapter 3-4 while Chapter 2 does not explicitly model financial friction and 
uses SVAR model to analyze the research questions.  
The effectiveness of monetary policy and its economy wide transmission mechanism 
are relatively unexplored in Bangladesh where financial sector is still developing. 
Hence, in Chapter 2, I investigate the effectiveness of monetary policy and its 
transmission mechanism with special emphasis on the lending channel. A SVAR 
model for Bangladesh is constructed, taking into account the exchange rate and 
monetary policy regimes in the identification scheme. The estimated model finds 
support for empirical regularities and existence of the bank lending channel. However, 
exchange rate channel appears less effective, reflecting a high degree of market 
intervention by the Bangladesh Bank. 
Frictions complicate the role of the financial sector particularly in the advanced 
financial markets. Therefore, in Chapter 3, I analyze the transmission mechanism of 
investment specific technology (IST) shock in presence of frictions between depositors 
and bankers (a la Gertler and Karadi, 2009) and implications of considering the capital 
quality and the net worth shocks as financial shocks. I use a DSGE framework in 
Chapter 3 as it allows to design and experiment shocks and frictions explicitly. The 
estimated model with a closed economy representation for the US shows that, financial 
v
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friction weakens the impacts of IST shocks in business cycles. Also, the financial 
sector is important not only as amplifier of shocks originating in the real sector, but 
also as an independent source of shocks affecting the real economy substantially.  
Financial sector in many countries are not as competitive as in the US. Therefore, the 
financial friction discussed in Chapter 3 may not be relevant in those countries. Highly 
concentrated structure of the financial sector itself creates frictions affecting bank 
credits in important ways. Thus, in Chapter 4, I construct an open economy DSGE 
model with an oligopolistically competitive banking sector, considering Australia as an 
example. Oligopolistic competition is measured through interest markup which 
depends on the number of competing banks. The number of competitors is determined 
endogenously. The estimated model for Australia finds a strong stock market effect in 
presence of oligopolistic banks after a monetary policy shock making the shock less 
effective and such banks may amplify external shocks. Also, these banks appear to be 
more resilient to financial shocks indicating healthy bank balance sheet positions. 
The big picture projected by the dissertation is, the depth and complexity of the 
financial sector affect the way intermediaries contribute to cyclical fluctuations when 
shocks including monetary policy hit the economy. For example, IST shock's impacts 
on output are weakened by the financial frictions through a bank balance sheet effect 
when intermediaries are highly competitive. However, under oligopolistic bank 
competition, the IST shock may not trigger effective enough balance sheet effects due 
to strategic behavior among the banks, leaving a large role for the shock to play. Policy 
implications of the thesis along with a discussion on future research directions are 
summarized in Chapter 5. 
vi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context and Aim of the thesis
The financial sector plays a central role in economic activity due to its intensive connection
to the agents in modern economies, particularly through credit intermediation activities.
Hence, policymakers need to have a clear understanding of the financial sector. Macroe-
conomic models are effective tools to achieve this understanding. This is demonstrated
by literature. These models guide policymakers in decision making by providing inputs
in terms of implications of shocks, frictions and predictions of future movements of vari-
ables. The choice of macroeconomic model to be used depends on the perception by
policymakers about the way the economy works and the level of theoretical and empirical
coherences among competing models. In the global perspective, the choice of models also
depends on the availability and quality of data. The class of Structural and Bayesian
Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) models and the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) models are widely used in empirical and theoretical macroeconomic research to
understand the transmission mechanisms and the economy wide effects of monetary policy
and other shocks (see Pagan 2003 for a historical overview of macro models). After the
global financial crisis, DSGE models have been expanded substantially to incorporate vari-
ous aspects of the financial sector. Since then academics and policymakers have growing
perceptions that having a monetary authority through a monetary policy rule in the model
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without an explicit financial sector can make the model grossly incomplete.
This thesis, therefore, constructs appropriate models based on the country character-
istics and data availability to analyse the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy and
other shocks in the context of one developing and two developed countries. The literature
on monetary policy transmission mechanism is vast in the context of high income coun-
tries where financial sectors are complex and more market oriented. However, there is a
renewed interest on monetary policy literature in these countries due to increased percep-
tions about financial frictions and importance of these frictions in shock propagations, as
highlighted recently by the global financial crisis. Many empirical studies in this line are
worth re-investigating in the presence of financial frictions to update the knowledge of busi-
ness cycles. The complexity in the nature of the financial sector generates various frictions
that lead researchers to focus on different aspects of the sector when constructing models;
examples include the bank capital dynamics, information asymmetry in lending market or
in deposit market. All these approaches highlight that financial sector deserves special at-
tention when assessing the effectiveness of a policy or impacts of various exogenous events
on the real sector variables such as output and employment as well as inflation.
In contrast, the monetary policy literature is still limited in the context of emerging
developing countries for three main reasons (see Montiel et al. 2010 for review of monetary
policy in developing countries). First, there is lack of financial inclusiveness. Real sector
transactions are not fully conducted through formal financial sector, hence, large part of
economic activities remain unaccounted for. This leaves less room for monetary policy
to interact with the real economy. Also general equilibrium models that assume that
the formal sector accounts for majority of economic transactions become difficult to fit
in. Second, financial variables such as lending rates are often exogenous, rather than
market determined which makes monetary policy blunt. However, the gradual reform
movements towards the market based policy instruments and exchange rate float, make
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monetary policy interesting to investigate, applying popular modelling techniques. Third,
there is lack of sufficient and good quality time series data. Thus, monetary policy and
external shocks in many developing countries remain unexplored in model based analysis.
These facts motivate the thesis to explore the channels of monetary policy in Bangladesh
as a representative of monetary aggregates targeting countries with increasing financial
inclusion in the first substantial chapter. Subsequently, the thesis focuses on investigations
relating to frictions in high income countries where financial markets are advanced and
complicated.
Therefore, the main aims of the thesis are, first, to analyse the effectiveness and channels
of monetary policy for an emerging small economy; second, to analyse the role of financial
sector in presence of frictions in financial and real sectors for advanced financial market
economies by adopting models based on country characteristics and data availability.
In view of the first objective, a structural Vector Auto-Regression (SVAR) model is
constructed for Bangladesh with small open economy features. For the second objective,
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models are constructed for both closed
and open economies set up. Model implications are discussed in terms of dynamics of
variables towards steady states after a shock and contribution of each shock to the overall
variations of a variable in different time horizons. DSGE models are explicit in incorporat-
ing complex relationship among variables as well as uncertainties (exogenous events) and
overcome the Lucas critique. These features make DSGE models very useful for policy
analysis. Thus, the thesis adopts DSGE framework to specify the relationships between
financial and real sector variables explicitly to estimate the importance of financial frictions
and shocks. The popular method in the literature to estimate these models are Bayesian
estimation. The Bayesian estimation enables the model to overcome mis-specifications
problems that are common in macroeconometric models. Therefore, we obtain estimates
of parameters with meaningful structural explanations in DSGE models, unlike the estim-
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ated parameters of the SVAR models that contain little economic sense.
The DSGE models in the thesis containing different financial frictions are estimated for
the US and Australia. First, Chapter 3 contains a closed economy representation of the US
economy and considers stickiness in both output price and nominal wage adjustments and
costs in adjusting the level of investment, in addition to the financial friction. The closed
economy version of the DSGE model is justified in the literature for the US, given the large
size of the US economy. The DSGE model in Chapter 4 is built upon the model in Chapter
3 to represent a small open economy characterised by an oligopolistic financial sectors, such
as Australia. Hence, the DSGE model is extended with standard trade features with rest
of the world economy in Chapter 4. To allow for incomplete exchange rate pass-though,
sluggishness in price adjustment is assumed in trade sectors.
However, estimation of the general equilibrium models are highly data demanding that
can be an obstacle in achieving reliable estimates of such models for the emerging devel-
oping countries where paucity of data is an issue. Also, the relationship between observed
variables in DSGE models can often be summarised in terms of SVAR specifications (Catao
& Pagan 2010). In addition, unlike the VAR specification, the Structural VAR model can
be restricted based on the features of a small open economy. These issues lead me to
construct a SVAR model for Bangladesh in Chapter 2 and estimate the model with short
run restrictions and block exogeneity restrictions. Therefore, the thesis constructs one
SVAR model and two DSGE models and estimates them for Bangladesh, US and Aus-
tralia respectively with a view to analyse monetary policy and roles of various financial
frictions.
1.2 Key research questions and results
The thesis consists of three self-contained chapters and a concluding chapter that
discusses policy implications and outlook for future research implied by the three self-
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contained chapters.
Effective implementation of monetary policy depends on the policymaker’s clear per-
ception of the channels through which policy gets transmitted. These channels remain
relatively unexplored in Bangladesh. The monetary policy framework of Bangladesh Bank
is monetary aggregates targeting type, using market based tools such as Repo1 and reverse-
Repo since 2002-2003. The exchange rate was officially floated in 2003. However, trans-
mission mechanism of monetary policy was not properly explored for this period in the
literature. Hence, Chapter 2 investigates how monetary policy shocks affect the price level
and other key macro variables of the country, particularly in the period of market based
monetary policy instruments. This question is analysed with especial emphasis on the
bank lending channel since Montiel et al. (2010) suggest that bank lending channel of
monetary policy transmission is likely to be dominant in transmission mechanism in low
income countries. In addition, the chapter investigates how the central bank and the real
economy respond to a private credit shock and other external shocks commonly faced by
a small open economy? To investigate the research questions, a structural VAR model is
constructed based on the economy wide features of Bangladesh which incorporates various
domestic and external shocks. The choice of SVAR approach in Chapter 2 is due to its
wide applicability in monetary policy research in both developed and developing countries.
Another main reason for using SVAR rather than general equilibrium model is the paucity
of data for Bangladesh. National income accounts data are mostly available in annual
frequency. Since the study period starts from 2003, the limited number of observations
of several key variables do not allow us to estimate any big structural model. This fact,
in addition to the comparison between DSGE and SVAR models in Section 1.1, suggest
that SVAR model is an appropriate choice to analyse monetary policy of Bangladesh with
reliable estimates.
1Repo is Repurchase agreements. Repo and reverse Repo are ways for short term borrowings-lendings
of dealer banks using mainly government securities.
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The key results in Chapter 2 are: the current monetary policy framework is able to
affect price level significantly and the bank lending channel plays a non-trivial role in policy
transmission. A positive credit shock can be inflationary and the monetary authority re-
sponds by increasing policy interest rates. In addition, the chapter finds that developments
in the rest of the world cause substantial variations in domestic price and other variables.
The thesis takes Bangladesh as an example of country groups with monetary aggregates
targeting monetary policy frameworks. Hence, the findings and implications are important
not just for Bangladesh but for other similar countries as well.
Financial frictions have been known to influence the impacts of economy wide shocks.
Hence, in Chapter 3 the role of financial frictions in shock transmission mechanism and
implications of financial shock specification have been discussed in an estimated DSGE
model. Chapter 3 deals with a bank liability side friction, proposed by Gertler & Karadi
(2011) in their calibrated DSGE model. The friction arises due to a moral hazard problem
between banks and depositors in a perfectly competitive banking sector. Chapter 3 studies
the role of financial sector both as an accelerator of shocks originated in the real economy
and as an independent source of shocks that can affect the rest of the economy. The
main research questions in this chapter are: what is the transmission mechanism (or role)
of investment specific technology shock in presence of bankers-depositors type financial
friction and financial shocks when we consider both output and labour price rigidities?
Business cycles literature (Justiniano et al. 2010 for example) has emphasised investment
specific technology shock as one of the main contributor to output fluctuations and the
importance of price and wage rigidities in the process. In addition, this chapter seeks to
find the relative importance between capital quality and bank net worth shocks, in terms
of their abilities to explain variations in output and interest spread. Capital quality shock
is an exogenous variation in the quality of productive capital which is a novel feature in
Gertler & Karadi (2011) to capture the housing market collapse in the US in 2007.
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The research issues in Chapter 3 are interesting in two important dimensions. The
first relates to the treatment of financial shock in the model. Although capital quality
shock is perceived as a financial shock, the event originates in the real sector. The shock
affects bank balance sheet through changing collateral valuations and it is called financial
shock because of the balance sheet identity between bank asset and liability. However,
the way this shock is constructed does not distinguish between physical destruction and
valuation deterioration of capital. Chapter 3 expands on this issue further by including a
purely financial shock such as a bank net worth shock in the model. The second dimension
of interest relates to the role of nominal wage rigidities in investment specific technology
(IST) shock transmission in presence of financial frictions. The chapter analyses the net
effect of two opposing forces on output fluctuations: nominal wage rigidities that amplify
the shock impacts, and financial frictions that neutralise the shock impacts through asset
price channel.
The calibrated model of Gertler & Karadi (2011) is extended with nominal wage ri-
gidities and time varying stochastic survival probability of banks. The extended DSGE
model is estimated with US data and the main findings are: investment specific technology
shock is attenuated greatly overtime in presence of a liability side financial friction. So
the chapter suggests that investment specific technology shock may not be as important
as claimed by the previous business cycles literature, depending on the role of the finan-
cial sector and frictions therein. Second, the type of finance shock we consider - asset
or liability side - in the model has different quantitative impacts. The estimated model
suggests that there are benefits of disentangling capital quality shock and bank net worth
shock when we analyse financial shocks within such liability side friction. Capital quality
is a shock that originates in the real sector by construction and affects interest spread by
deteriorating intermediaries’ asset side of balance sheet through collateral channel. Net
worth shock, in contrary, originates within the financial sector which belongs to the liab-
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ility side of balance sheet. Benefits of disentangling these two shocks relate to the model’s
ability to replicate moments and other business cycles properties. The net worth shock
works better to replicate data moments in this study.
The financial sector in Chapter 3 is assumed to be perfectly competitive. However,
in many countries the financial sector is dominated by only few banks. The strategic
behaviour among few banks possessing large market share can lead them to be characterised
as oligopolistic. The thesis moves on to investigate the market competition structure of
financial sector and associated impacts on business cycles in Chapter 4. Bank concentration
ratio provides important information about the nature of competition structure among
banks and a high concentration ratio implies strategic behaviour by the banks. The impacts
of such strategic behaviour among banks on business cycles have not been sufficiently
studied. Considering the importance of high bank concentration for Australia and similar
other countries, Chapter 4 deals with the particular aspect of financial frictions arising from
imperfect competition in bank industry. Therefore, the main objective of this chapter is
to construct a small open-economy DSGE model with a financial sector incorporating
oligopolistic competition among banks; and determine how such imperfect competition
affects various shock transmissions and dynamics of macro aggregates of a small open
economy. In order to strengthen the analysis further, a benchmark model is constructed
where banks are perfectly competitive with no frictions. The issue is analysed further by
comparing baseline results with those from the competitive bank sector model.
Chapter 4 extends the DSGE model of Chapter 3 with imports, exports and households
savings/borrowings from rest of the world. It considers Australia as an example of country
characterised by a highly concentrated banking sector and estimate the model with Aus-
tralian data over its inflation targeting regime. The imperfect competition in bank industry
is measured through mark ups in lending rates. The mark up depends on the elasticity
in loan demand as well as the number of competing banks. To endogenize the number of
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competing banks, it is assumed that bank entry or exit is subject to an entry cost. Bank
entry continues until the value of bank is equal to the cost of entry. The main results
from the estimated model is that oligopolistic competition with endogenous bank entry
produces a procyclical mass of banks and countercyclical mark ups but the magnitudes are
smaller for Australia. For monetary policy shock, counter cyclical interest mark up tends
to amplify the shock impacts but a strong stock market effect (Gavin 1989) works in the
opposite direction. The net effect of monetary policy on aggregate demand is small. For
neutral technology shock, oligopolistic banks amplify the shock effects through the bank
entry channel. The bank balance sheet effect of collateral valuation on the real economy
is weaker due to strategic behaviour among banks. Thus, investment technology shock is
no longer attenuated by such financial sector. Thus, presence of oligopolistic competition
suggests a different transmission mechanism that may amplify or neutralise various shocks
depending on the type of shocks that hit the economy.
In terms of methodology the thesis makes important contributions. In Chapter 2 the
model uses an unified approach to monetary policy literature and Exchange Rate Pass
Through (ERPT) literature in identifying the SVAR model. This allows to incorporate
the exchange rate policy of Bangladesh which is an heavily managed float in practice.
Chapter 3 shows that the type of financial shock included— asset or liability side— has
important implications in the estimated model and discusses the identification strategy
of the two types of shocks in detail. The methodological contribution in Chapter 4 is
that it provides a framework to analyse whether oligopolistic banks act as amplifiers or
neutralisers to external shocks that are commonly faced by a small open economy like
Australia. Another methodological contribution is, the bank entry condition in Chapter
4 is designed in a way that neutral technology shock affects the entry costs of banks
inversely. Since neutral technology shock affects both goods production and banking firms
production, it is effectively an economy wide shock. Finally, general equilibrium models
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with endogenous firm entry are mostly calibrated. Instead of following this tradition, the
model is estimated with Bayesian technique for Australian data to draw inferences.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
The thesis has five chapters in total. Chapters 2-4 contain the core research of the
thesis. Chapter 2 builds up SVAR model for a small open economy to analyse the monetary
policy transmission mechanism. Chapter 3 discusses the role of financial sector and frictions
therein and their impacts on post war US business cycles using an estimated DSGE model.
Chapter 4 analyses the role of oligopolistic bank competition in the business cycles using
an estimated DSGE model for a small open economy. Finally, Chapter 5 summarises the
findings and implications of the thesis and future research avenues based on these chapters.
Chapter 2
Monetary policy transmission in
Bangladesh: exploring the lending
channel
Abstract
The monetary policy transmission mechanism of Bangladesh, especially the lending and
exchange rate channels remain largely unexplored during the period of market based monet-
ary policy instruments and the managed float exchange rate regime. This chapter analyses
these transmission channels and finds that the monetary aggregates targeting framework
is still effective in influencing price level. Bank lending plays a non-trivial role, while the
exchange rate channel is less effective in the transmission process, suggesting a high degree
of intervention in the foreign exchange market. External shocks appear important for the
macro aggregates and domestic credit boom appear inflationary, in which the central bank
plays a stabilizing role.
2.1 Introduction
The crucial role played by credit in economic activity was vividly highlighted during the
financial crisis of 2007-2010. In normal times, bank credit availability is endogenous to
the monetary policy process (Lown & Morgan 2002) and its connection with the real
economy depends on the level of financial penetration of an economy. It is the role of
credit extension that makes the banking sector a potential source of financial friction in
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the transmission mechanism of monetary policy (Gambacorta & Marques-Ibanez 2011).
Credit is an important macroeconomic variable that boosts real economic activity and it
is usually viewed through the lens of the traditional ‘bank lending’ channel. However, the
broader ‘credit channel’ reveals that credit itself depends on the level of economic activity.
This implies the existence of a large formal sector in the economy that depends on the
financial sector for various transactions. That is why in the context of the developed
financial markets, so many studies investigating the interrelationship between the bank
credit and monetary policy are available.
The monetary transmission literature on advanced financial market economies is vast
but the same literature on developing economies is lacking, both quantitatively and qualita-
tively. The successful implementation of a monetary policy stance depends on the monetary
authority’s clear perception about the active monetary transmission channels of the econ-
omy. Monetary policy influences the real sector through its effects on the financial sector.
Hence the size and development of the financial sector, and how widely it is integrated
with the real sector, determine the transmission of a policy stance to the real economy.
In a comprehensive review of the structure of the financial sector and monetary policy of
countries with various income groups, Montiel et al. (2010) state that the bank lending
channel is likely to be dominant for low income countries. The study investigates their ob-
servations, along with other empirical regularities of monetary transmission mechanism, by
studying Bangladesh’s monetary policy and credit market as example of an emerging de-
veloping countries. Given Bangladesh’s nascent secondary bond market and smaller stock
market capacity, non-financial firms usually rely on banks for finances. The growing size
of the Bangladesh’s banking sector and the bank competition indices, reported in Section
2.4 indicate that the bank lending channel for Bangladesh is an interesting case to study.
The strength of the credit channel, a debated issue prior to the global credit crisis,
has been effectively demonstrated, especially in countries with highly complex financial
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systems. However, Bangladesh’s bank credit attracted very few studies to date and none
have employed an economy-wide model to investigate the simultaneous relationship be-
tween monetary policy, credit and the real economy. Of the studies available, Ahmed
& Islam (2006) find weak a evidence, and Younus (2004) finds no evidence of the bank
lending channel in Bangladesh. Although Structural Vector Auto-Regression (SVAR) is
one of the most commonly used modeling techniques in quantitative macroeconomics that
incorporates theory and country specific features, few empirical studies apply this tech-
nique to Bangladesh’s economy. Some examples of the monetary transmission literature
on developing countries will be reviewed in next section.
Since a thorough exploration of a distinct bank credit channel in Bangladesh’s economy
is yet to be conducted, the main goal of this study is to analyze the impact of credit and
monetary policy shocks on both price and the real economy, with particular emphasis on
the credit channel. We cannot analyze such shocks using simple VAR methodology as VAR
does not allow us to impose structural features of Bangladesh, a small semi open econ-
omy, in the model. Therefore, the chapter estimates a Structural VAR (SVAR) model for
Bangladesh’s economy to explicitly model and analyze shocks including those emanating
from the external sector. The SVAR approach is particularly relevant in monetary policy
analysis for countries with shorter time series. In this context, the SVAR methodology
has advantages over large structural models such as Dynamic Stochastic General Equilib-
rium (DSGE) models. For example, Dungey & Pagan (2000a) observe that many DSGE
models have a SVAR representation in terms of all the variables but in reality some of
these variables are unobserved. Hence, the representation in terms of observed variables
is typically a structural vector autoregressive moving average process. Catao & Pagan
(2010) observe that some structural features of emerging and developing economies are
often ignored in the new Keynesian DSGE models. Also the Bayesian estimation tech-
nique, commonly used for DSGE model estimation, uses strong priors about parameters
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and hence, empirical investigation through this is less about ‘discovery’ than quantifying
the parameters of some prescribed model. So, they state that DSGE models are often best
used as a macroeconomic skeleton to allow investigators to organize data, rather than to
be imposed upon them.
Against this backdrop, this study contributes to the existing literature by constructing
a block recursive SVAR model for Bangladesh’s economy over the period 2003 to 2013 to
address two principal research questions. First, how do monetary policy shocks affect ag-
gregate price and other real variables through their impacts on bank credit in Bangladesh’s
economy (lending channel)? Second, how do the central bank and the real economy re-
spond to a private credit shock? In addition to finding answers to these questions, this
model analyzes the responses of the economy to various external shocks.
This study, thus, contributes to the monetary policy literature on emerging and devel-
oping economies in general, by examining the monetary policy transmission mechanism of
the small semi-open economy of Bangladesh and in particular it explores the credit channel
and the role of credit in the economy. Second, this study adopts a unified approach to
the monetary policy literature and the Exchange Rate Pass Through (ERPT) literature
while identifying the SVAR model for Bangladesh. This enables to include the exchange
rate regime of the economy in the model. Third, the identification adopted in this model
within the recursive structure is free of empirical anomalies such as the price puzzle, liq-
uidity puzzle and exchange rate puzzle that some earlier studies encountered while using
the recursive SVAR. Finally, the economy-wide SVAR model with country-specific char-
acteristics aims to provide reliable evidence on the existence of a credit channel (in the
narrow sense) in Bangladesh that the earlier literature appears to have missed.
The study therefore sheds new light on the monetary transmission channels of Bangladesh.
The main results are that: (i) monetary policy affects the domestic price level significantly
and the bank credit channel plays a non-trivial role in monetary transmission; (ii) a positive
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shock to credit can be inflationary and the central bank plays a stabilizing role by raising
its policy rate; and (iii) external shocks are important in the movement of domestic macro
aggregates. The findings are important in the context of increased challenges faced by
the Bangladesh Bank and the demand for gradual financial openness of the Bangladesh’s
economy.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 contains a review of
the existing empirical work. The already documented evidence and the gaps that motivate
the current study are presented in this section. The stylized facts of the monetary trans-
mission mechanism observed in advanced financial markets are briefly discussed in Section
2.3. A description of the financial environment of Bangladesh is presented in Section 2.4.
It provides information that helps interpret the results in this chapter. The methodology
and data issues are discussed in Section 2.5. The estimation results and tests for their ro-
bustness are presented in Section 2.6 and Section 2.7 respectively. Finally, the implications
drawn from the results are presented in Section 2.8.
2.2 Literature
Some of the earliest works on the effects of monetary policy shocks on the real economy have
been conducted by Bernanke & Blinder (1992), Sims (1992) and Christiano et al. (1998) for
the US economy. Since then vector auto-regression (VAR) has been introduced as a useful
tool to analyse monetary policy effects. One influential study in monetary policy literature
is that by Kim & Roubini (2000), for six industrialized countries. Their estimated SVAR
model solves empirical anomalies such as the liquidity puzzle, price puzzle, exchange rate
puzzle and forward discount bias puzzle, all found in earlier VAR studies. Using VAR as
well as structural models, Angeloni et al. (2003) in their comprehensive study on the Euro
area, find evidence of broad credit channels for many of the Euro area countries. The
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monetary policy model developed by Kim & Roubini (2000) and its subsequent literature
allow exchange rates to be contemporaneously affected by all variables in the model. This
assumption relates to the floating exchange rate regime of advanced economies.
Dungey & Pagan (2000a, 2009a) developed an eleven-variable model for the Australian
economy, with special emphasis on monetary policy impacts using a block recursive SVAR
approach. However, they do not include bank credit variables in their models. Berkelmans
(2005) examines the endogenous relationship between credit and monetary policy of the
Australian economy using an SVAR approach, with similar exchange rate assumptions to
those proposed by Kim & Roubini (2000). The findings in Berkelmans (2005) suggest
that a positive shock to policy interest rate lowers both inflation and credit, whereas the
monetary policy plays a stabilizing role in response to a credit shock. This chapter follows
the block recursive approach of Dungey & Pagan (2000a, 2009a); considering the small
nature of Bangladesh’s economy.
The monetary transmission literature on developing countries finds mixed evidence for
the effectiveness of monetary policy and bank lending in influencing price and the real
sector of an economy. Aleem (2010) finds that the banking sector plays a dominant role in
transmitting monetary policy to the real sector in India while Disyatat & Vongsinsirikul
(2003) find a weak bank lending channel for Thailand, in spite of the banks being prime
sources of business finances there. For Brazil and Chile, Catao & Pagan (2010) find that
interest rate changes have a swifter effect on output and prices compared to advanced
economies, and exchange rate dynamics play an important role in monetary transmission
mechanisms. These two countries have floating exchange rates and considerable levels of
capital account openness. Hence, the active roles of interest rate and exchange rate in
monetary policy transmissions are as expected. Catao & Pagan (2010) also find a typical
size of a credit shock to have large effects on output and inflation in both economies, but
greater in Chile where bank penetration is higher. Given the current level of bank penetra-
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tion in Bangladesh, this chapter also examines the impact of credit shock on Bangladesh’s
economy.
However, there are problems in adopting the SVAR structures of the developed and
commodity exporting countries mentioned above for the case of Bangladesh. For example,
the floating nature of exchange rate regimes in the US and Australia may not always be
appropriate for developing countries, such as Bangladesh, where exchange rates are either
pegged or follow a managed float. The exchange rate in a developing economy may con-
temporaneously affects other variables, including monetary policy and real sector variables,
but is not itself affected contemporaneously by those variables. In addition to having a
monetary policy, the central bank can have separate foreign exchange market interven-
tion policy to stabilize the exchange rates. So, for Bangladesh, we cannot allow exchange
rate to be contemporaneously affected by the other variables of the model. Another dif-
ficulty is, Australia, Brazil and Chile are all commodity exporters and the US is a large
open developed economy while Bangladesh is a small open economy and mainly a com-
modity importer. So the model variables and the SVAR identification scheme applied for
Bangladesh in this study are different from those countries.
Another strand of literature that stands in contrast to that developed by Kim & Roubini
(2000) is the Exchange Rate Pass Through (ERPT) literature. The ERPT literature,
dominated by McCarthy (1999), follows the recursive SVAR approach with Cholesky or-
thogonalisation. In a small open economy, optimal monetary policy may be affected by
the extent of the exchange rate pass through (Adolfson 2001, Devereux 2001, Smets &
Wouters 2002, Monacelli 2005). The order of variables in the original ERPT literature
is oil price, output gap, exchange rate, import price inflation, and finally wholesale and
consumer price inflation. Here the ordering is such that, the consumer price, instead of
the exchange rate, is contemporaneously affected by all foreign and domestic variables.
This reflects the managed nature of exchange rate regimes, commonly found in developing
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and emerging countries. The work of Ito & Sato (2008) incorporates the monetary policy
variable in the ERPT framework in order to analyse the impacts of exchange rate changes
on inflation in post-crisis Asian economies.
While focusing on the endogenous relationship between credit and monetary policy
variables, the model needs to account for the role of the exchange rate in the system. For
Bangladesh, Chowdhury & Siddique (2006) find exchange rate fluctuation has no significant
impacts on CPI, while Akhtaruzzaman (2005) finds depreciation plays a significant role in
the inflationary process. Thus, the proposed SVAR model for Bangladesh’s economy in
this chapter treats the conventional monetary policy and the ERPT literature in a unified
manner during identification, similar to the identification scheme of Bhattacharya et al.
(2011) for India. Bhattacharya et al. (2011) assume that the exchange rate of a small
economy is not allowed to move contemporaneously with other macro variables; rather,
price is affected by exchange rate and other variables. The ordering seems more sensible
in the context of the heavily intervened foreign exchange markets. However, the structural
vector error correction model of Bhattacharya et al. (2011) does not include bank credit.
The early monetary policy literature on Bangladesh such as Chowdhury (1986), Chow-
dhury et al. (1995) does not include credit variables. The vector auto-regression (VAR)
study of Chowdhury et al. (1995) suggests that the inflationary process of Bangladesh
cannot be explained exclusively by monetarist and structuralist views. During their study
period, Bangladesh had a fixed exchange rate system (Bangladesh Bank adopted the float-
ing regime in 2003) and the recursive VAR methodologies applied to those studies are not
sufficient to capture the dynamic interactions between foreign and domestic variables.
Younus (2004) examines the bank lending channel of Bangladesh over the period 1975
to 2000, using the monetary base as the central bank’s policy variable and concludes that
the bank lending channel in Bangladesh is non-existent because of the excess reserve in the
banking sector. During this period (1975-2000) the central bank did not use market-based
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instruments to conduct monetary policy. In order to facilitate the liquidity management
afterward, the Bangladesh Bank introduced market-based instruments (Repurchase agree-
ment (Repo) in 2002) and the auction of short-term government securities. The existence of
the bank-lending channel in Bangladesh remains largely unexplored in the changed policy
environment.
Ahmed & Islam (2006) include private sector advance to analyse the monetary trans-
mission channels of Bangladesh employing the unrestricted VAR approach for the period
1979 to 2005 and find weak evidence of lending and exchange rate channels. Ahmed &
Islam (2006) order the variables as reserve money, total deposits, private sector advance,
CPI and real GDP. Reserve money is considered as the monetary policy variable, similar to
Younus (2004). There is a separate model for the exchange rate channel, which uses reserve
money, CPI, nominal exchange rate, export, import and real GDP; however, it does not
capture the interaction between credit and exchange rate. The exchange rate channel of
monetary policy should not be operative before 2003. The New Open Economy Macroeco-
nomics (NOEM) literature implies that monetary policy affects the real economy through
interest rate and exchange rate channels. If the exchange rate is fixed then there is limited
scope for an exchange rate channel to operate. Also the dynamic response of economic
variables to a monetary policy shock becomes misleading in the absence of relevant foreign
variables in the model.
In a six-variable Near VARmodel for Bangladesh, Younus (2009) includes India’s money
supply to account for the open economy nature of Bangladesh and finds no significant
impact of Indian money supply on domestic CPI. However, innovations to the Indian
money supply can explain almost 50 per cent of the forecast error variance in lending
rates. Bhuiyan (2012) estimates a nine-variable non-recursive SVAR model, containing
separate domestic and foreign blocks to better capture the interaction between variables
to monetary policy shocks but not bank credit for Bangladesh, using a Bayesian approach.
20 Chapter 2. Monetary policy transmission in Bangladesh: exploring the lending channel
Further, the model does not account for important policy changes in the financial sector
during the period of analysis (1994-2009).
In sum, the review of literature on Bangladesh shows gaps that the credit channel
of monetary transmission policy of Bangladesh during the managed float regime has not
been explored thoroughly. Thus, the whole monetary policy transmission mechanism in
Bangladesh remains vague to some extent and deserves attention.
2.3 The transmission mechanism
When a central bank intervenes in the short-term Treasury Bills (T-bills) market then
short run expected inflation remains unchanged because of the sticky price and rational
expectation assumptions. Thus, changes in interest rates in the Treasury bills market
actually change the short-term real interest rates, which affect households’ intertemporal
choice of consumption, hence, the aggregate demand. This effect is part of the broader
interest rate channel that depends on the rate of intertemporal substitution of consumption
and the prevalence of credit rationing (Montiel et al. 2010).
The bank lending channel, on the other hand, arises due to two facts: one relates to the
asset side of the bank balance sheet (the imperfect substitutability between bank lending
and bonds) and the other relates to the liability side (difficulty in attracting resources other
than deposits). When a central bank buys short-term government securities (commercial
banks themselves are often the sellers), this increases the amount of free reserves or deposits
in the commercial banks. Theoretically, the increase in deposits increases the supply of
loanable funds. The increase in loanable funds along with competition among banks would
lower the lending rates. Thus, bank dependent agents enjoy more loan facilities, increase
their expenditure and therefore, boost aggregate expenditures. In practice, the lending
activities also depend on the overall investment scenario and the health of the banking
sector.
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Similarly, during periods of tight monetary policy, banks are forced to reduce their
loan portfolio due to a decline in total reservable bank deposits. This implies that the
effectiveness of the bank lending channel depends on the extent to which an increase in
free reserves in commercial banks increases the supply of loans, and how much it reduces the
lending rate. The broader credit channel includes the balance sheet effects of the borrowers
due to monetary policy shock. Here the financial circumstances of the households and
firms affect the demand for credit which further exacerbates the economic situation (see
Bernanke & Gertler 1995 for detail).
There are other channels that are activated at this point as a result of the change in
policy rate, e.g the exchange rate channel. Under the floating exchange rate and perfect
capital mobility, the arbitrage between domestic and foreign interest rates should induce
capital flows. Uncovered interest parity (UIP) implies that nominal exchange rates will
change to restore the equilibrium. The price stickiness implies that in the short run,
exchange rates will change to induce the ‘expenditure switching effect’ between domestic
and foreign (imported) goods, which is likely to influence the aggregate price level of the
economy.
2.4 The financial environment of Bangladesh
Although the growing trend is to move towards an inflation targeting regime, a consider-
able number of countries, including Bangladesh, continue to follow the monetary aggregates
targeting framework for conducting monetary policy operations, and the stabilized arrange-
ment (or peg) for exchange rates management (International Monetary Fund 2014). As
exchange rate is highly interactive with credit and policy rate, the exchange rate channel
may be impaired if the exchange rate regime is not fully floating. Saxena (2008) finds that
nine out of thirteen Asian and Latin American emerging countries opt for foreign exchange
22 Chapter 2. Monetary policy transmission in Bangladesh: exploring the lending channel
intervention to complement their monetary policy actions.
In the first stage of the transmission mechanism, the change in the monetary policy
rate changes the interbank money market rate. In Fig.2.1, Bangladesh’s 91 day T-bill rate,
which is used as a proxy for the monetary policy rate in this study, seasonally adjusted
interbank money market rates and commercial bank lending rates are plotted in monthly
frequency. The drop in T-bill rates after 2008, and rise after 2009, are shadowed by
the interbank money market rate (also known as call money rates). The change in the
interbank rate is the first stage of monetary policy transmission, then in the next stage,
the interbank money market rate should affect the commercial banks lending rates, and
therefore, the equilibrium level of credit is determined. In commercial lending rates, we
see a considerable degree of stickiness.
Figure 2.1: Bangladesh’s T-bill rates,
interbank money market rates and com-
mercial bank lending rates (Years 2004-
2014).
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Source: Bangladesh Bank.
Figure 2.2: Bangladesh’s NEER and
CPI, in logarithm and de-trended (Years
2003-2014).
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Source: Bangladesh Bank.
The stickiness in the commercial lending rate can arise because of the fact that any
increase in lending rates may not necessarily increase banks’ earnings due to information
asymmetry (Lowe & Rohling 1992). Further, there may be rigidities among customers,
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e.g, borrowers may find it costly to switch to other banks that offer better rates, can also
create stickiness in loan rates. These facts restrain banks from changing retail lending
rates frequently. Also, because of the usual high noise in the money market and the
costs associated with rate changes, banks change retail lending rates only if they believe
the money market rate change will be persistent Disyatat & Vongsinsirikul (2003). In
Bangladesh, the central bank does not control the commercial banks’ lending rates, except
for an indicative rate ceiling for lending in agriculture and SME sectors.
The cyclical pattern of the historical data reveals important background information,
and also indicates the relevance of the variables included in the model. Thus, from Fig.2.2
to Fig.2.6, I present time plots of select variables to show the essential information in
the data used to estimate the model. Fig.2.2 shows the cyclical movements in Nominal
Effective Exchange Rates (NEER) and the CPI, both in logarithm which, however, does
not reveal any clear co-movements.
Figure 2.3: Bangladesh Bank’s foreign
exchange buy-sale over M2 money (Years
2003-2014).
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Figure 2.4: Changes in CPI and nomi-
nal exchange rates of Bangladesh (Years
2003-2014).
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Next, I present the information on exchange market intervention by the central bank
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measured in terms of the net buy of foreign exchange over broad money (M2 measure) in
Fig.2.3. Negative values indicate net foreign currency sales to the market. This figure pro-
vides evidence that the Bangladesh Bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market quite
frequently. This supports the conjecture that although official regime is a managed float,
the Bangladesh Bank intervenes the foreign exchange market substantially and frequently
that makes the regime close to a pegged system. Fig.2.4 shows the changes in nominal
exchange rates and changes in CPI, indicating that the changes in nominal exchange rate
are smoother than those in the CPI. This again supports my earlier conjecture on foreign
exchange market intervention by Bangladesh Bank.
Figure 2.5: Bangladesh’s M2 money
and private sector credit (de-trended) for
Years 2003-2014.
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Figure 2.6: CPI of Bangladesh and CPI
of import partner countries (de-trended)
for Years 2003-2014.
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Bangladesh’s broad money (M2 measure) and the level of commercial bank credit are
presented in Fig.2.5, and the import weighted CPI of Bangladesh’s major import partner
countries along with own CPI are plotted in Fig.2.6. From Fig.2.5 we observe that money
and credit follows each other closely. We also observe some cyclical co-movements between
the domestic CPI and foreign CPI in Fig.2.6, hence, trading partners price is an important
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foreign variable to be included in the model. Next, I present a comparative scenario of
Bangladesh’s financial environment in Table 2.1.
The size of the banking sector is important for the effectiveness of the interest rate and
the bank lending channels of monetary policy transmission. Table 2.1 shows a dynamic
picture of measures of the financial sector size, the bank concentration ratio, the net interest
rate margin and the stock market capitalization as a share of GDP for Bangladesh and
three income groups.
Table 2.1: Financial environment indicators of Bangladesh and other countries
Year Country Groups DMB
assets/GDP
(Size of
banking
sector)
Bank
concentration
Net
interest
margin
Stock market
capitaliza-
tion/GDP
Advanced 1.24 0.67 0.02 0.90
2005 Emerging 0.63 0.57 0.05 0.82
LIC 0.32 0.73 0.06 0.27
Bangladesh 0.49 0.77 0.02 0.046
2015 Bangladesh 0.59 0.29 0.023 0.15*
Source: The ratios for different income groups are from Montiel et al. (2010) and the ratios for
Bangladesh are from the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD 2017). * Latest available
is for 2012.
The 2005 statistics for the three income groups are from Montiel et al. (2010), and
I extend the table for Bangladesh using data from the Global Financial Development
Database (GFDD 2017) to compare the financial environment of Bangladesh and various
income group countries. The growing banking sector, measured by the Deposit Money
Bank (DMB) assets over GDP, indicates a wider connection between the real and the
financial sectors. The bank concentration ratio, based on the three largest commercial
banks assets, of Bangladesh has decreased substantially from 2005 to 2015 due to growing
number of domestic banks. Observing the stock market capitalization for a country relates
to the importance of the asset price channel of monetary policy transmission. In Table
2.1, we see that the size of Bangladesh’s stock market is too small to be important. But
the ratio has increased almost three times in 2015 compared to 2005. The interest margin
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in Bangladesh’s financial sector has remained almost unchanged, as indicated in the same
table. If the number of financial market participants is high, and the capability of extending
assets is competitive, then overall competition should be high and the concentration ratio
should be low. Similarly, competition among intermediaries should result in a lower interest
margin. In case of Bangladesh, we see that although the concentration ratio is decreasing,
the interest rate margin increases slightly or remains unchanged.
Next I briefly discuss the monetary policy framework of Bangladesh Bank, which is
simple and traditional. In monetary aggregates targeting, a required or safe limit of mon-
etary expansion or broad money growth on the demand side is estimated based on the
estimated growth of GDP, CPI and income velocity of money demand. After determin-
ing the monetary growth, the Bangladesh Bank clears the money market by changing M2
money (M2=money multiplier * reserve money). The relation between M2 and reserve
money allows the latter to be used as an operating target (Taslim 2001, Ahmed & Islam
2006). The instruments to maintain the targeted broad money growth are Repo, reverse
Repo, and T-bill auctions. Repo and reverse Repo rates are the policy rates that change
from time to time. Other less frequently used tools are the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) and
Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR).
A stable money demand function is an important pre-requisite for money targeting
monetary policy rule. Also the degree of capital flow restriction is important. A policy
paper by the IMF (2014) finds that over the period 1990-2012, countries using money
as an intermediate target have limited control of the money supply, and the unstable
money demand has potentially altered the co-movements between monetary aggregates
and inflation or the real economy. This raises the following question: Is the Bangladesh
Bank able to influence domestic price movements through its money targeting monetary
policy? Empirical works by Ahmed & Islam (2006) and Narayan et al. (2009) suggest that
Bangladesh’s money demand function is stable, in contrast to the IMF’s general findings
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for countries with similar monetary policy frameworks. Also the country’s capital account
is still mostly closed.
2.5 Methodology and data
This section describes the methodology and importance of the model’s variables, iden-
tification structure and the data issues. This chapter follows the block recursive SVAR
approach of Dungey & Pagan (2000a) and Dungey & Pagan (2009a) to build a SVAR
model of Bangladesh’s economy in order to analyze the monetary policy. In the next sub-
section, I discuss the SVAR methodology briefly and then the relevance of the variables.
2.5.1 The SVAR methodology
The VAR model assumes that Bangladesh’s economy can be represented by the following
structural equation:
A (L)Yt + α (L)Xt = εt, (2.1)
where, Yt is an n× 1 vector of endogenous variables and Xt is a k× 1 vector of exogenous
foreign variables. A(L) is an (n×n) and α(L) is a (k×k) matrix polynomial lag operator.
εt is an (n×1) vector of structural disturbances with zero mean. It is assumed that shocks
are mutually uncorrelated. The reduced form of the structural model in Eq.(2.1) can be
written with p lags as
Yt = A1Yt−1 +A2Yt−2 + · · · +ApYt−p + αXt + et, (2.2)
where, α is a (n × k) matrix and et is a (n × 1) VAR residuals. In the first stage, the
reduced form VAR(p) in Eq.(2.2) is estimated; next, we estimate the parameters in the
structural equation in several ways. The reduced form error and the structural shocks are
related by
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et = Bεt, (2.3)
where B is a non-singular (n × n) matrix that relates the VAR residuals (et) with the
structural shocks (εt). Multiplying both sides of Eq.(2.2) by B−1 yields
B−1Yt = D1Yt−1 +D2Yt−2 + · · ·+DpYt−p +B−1αXt + εt. (2.4)
Here, Dl = B−1Al for all l = 1, . . . . . . , p.
Adding (In −B−1)Yt to both sides of Eq.(2.4) yields
Yt = (In −B−1)Yt +D1Yt−1 +D2Yt−2 + · · ·+DpYt−p +B−1αXt + εt, (2.5)
where, I is an (n×n) identity matrix. In a recursive VAR, the B matrix is lower triangular
and its diagonal elements are one.
The parametric restriction approach is applied in the SVAR model. Following Dungey
& Pagan (2000a), the restrictions placed upon the system are of two types: First, we
assume the system as a whole is block recursive. As a small open economy, Bangladesh is
affected by various foreign variables such as international prices, but Bangladesh cannot
affect international prices. So, there are two blocks in the model: the first block contains
foreign variables that are important for Bangladesh, and the second block contains domestic
variables. The foreign block is placed ahead of the domestic block to ensure that the latter
does not enter the equations of the first block. Second, the recursive structure is assumed
inside each of the blocks. Finally, to ensure block exogeneity completely, following Zha
(1999) and Dungey & Pagan (2000a), I restrict the domestic variables to affect the foreign
variables dynamically (in lag). I do not impose any other restriction in the lagged matrix,
unlike Dungey & Pagan (2000a) who also restrict some parameters in the lagged matrix.
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Foreign block
Next, I discuss the relevance of the model variables separated into two blocks. The purpose
of using a foreign block is to explain movements in domestic variables and not the vice
versa. To be parsimonious with the available length of domestic time series, only two foreign
variables are included in the model. So the foreign block is represented as Y f = (opw, pw)′
, where opw is the international oil price and pw is the CPI of Bangladesh’s major import
partner countries. Oil price is a commonly used variable in the monetary policy literature
and is considered a proxy for negative and inflationary supply shock (Kim & Roubini
2000), which also contains important business cycle information. Since Bangladesh is a
small economy, the CPI of other countries from where Bangladesh imports is assumed to
be important in determining domestic price movements. For example, the inflation rate in
India, one of Bangladesh’s largest trade partners, has correlations with the inflation rate
in Bangladesh (Bangladesh Bank 2014). In this study, the aggregate CPI for Bangladesh’s
nine major import partners has been considered based on their weights in total imports
over the entire period of study (2003-2014) and included as the foreign price variable. The
calculations of weights for each of the import partner countries are given in the Appendix
Table A4. The international oil price (opw) represents the supply side, and the foreign CPI
(pw) contains information on prices that Bangladesh’s exporters receive from Bangladesh’s
major trading partners. Hence, pw is an important component of foreign demand.
Domestic block
Given, the short period of study, deciding which domestic variables to include is a balance
between degrees of freedom and correct model specification. The commonly used variables
such as nominal interest rate (i), M2 money (m), nominal effective exchange rate (neer),
and output (y) are all included in the model. Deposit Money Bank (DMB) credit to the
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private sector is considered as the bank lending variable (cr) and the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) as the aggregate price (p) variable. Other important candidates, such as import price
and export price indices, are not included in the model due to their unavailability in the
required frequency for the entire period of study. The model also does not include any
variable relating to the asset price channel, such as the share price index or house price
index. The stock market index appear less important for Bangladesh, as can be seen from
statistics in Table 2.1 and the economy-wide house price index is not available for the entire
period in the required frequency. These facts, along with the shorter time span, lead the
inclusion of six domestic variables mentioned above in the model.
The main objectives of the Bangladesh Bank as a monetary authority are to maintain
the stability of price, exchange rate and the overall financial system of Bangladesh, - this
provides the room for frequent intervention in the foreign exchange market. The argument
put forward by the ERPT literature on emerging economies is that macroeconomic vari-
ables have little explanatory power for exchange rates in the medium to short run (Zorzi
et al. 2007). For the baseline model I follow the structure provided by Zorzi et al. (2007)
and Bhattacharya et al. (2011) to order similar variables in the domestic block.
The order of the variables in the domestic block is as follows: Y d = (neer, i,m, cr, y, p)′ .
This ordering implies that the exchange rate captures the international effect first and
translates to all other variables including monetary policy rate. I place neer ahead of i,
assuming that the monetary policy decision is contemporaneously affected by exchange
rate but the policy rate cannot contemporaneously affect the exchange rate. The model
also assumes that domestic price is affected by external as well as all domestic variables.
Bhattacharya et al. (2011) use similar reasoning in ordering their SVECM model on the
Indian economy. This ordering also implies that financial sector variables affect real sector
variables contemporaneously, but not the other way around. The next subsection contains
identification structure.
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2.5.2 Identification
The contemporaneous matrix of the SVAR model following the block recursive approach
of Dungey & Pagan (2000a) is given in Table 2.2. Apart from the zero restrictions, the co-
efficients representing contemporaneous relations between variables are denote by the stars
(∗). This structure deviates slightly from the pure recursive SVAR in the sense that the
monetary policy reaction function is not contemporaneously affected by the foreign price.
It is assumed that the monetary authority does not know the current domestic price nor
the foreign price while fixing the monetary policy rate. This information delay assumption
is similar to that of Kim & Roubini (2000). I place the domestic money demand (m) after
the nominal interest rate (i) assuming that domestic money demand is contemporaneously
affected by domestic variables only such as domestic interest rate and nominal exchange
rate. Variables in foreign block do not affect money demand contemporaneously. The
money demand function estimated by Narayan et al. (2009) also includes these two vari-
ables, along with output and foreign interest rate. However, I assume that output affects
money demand only dynamically, not contemporaneously.
Table 2.2: Identification: contemporaneous relation matrix
opw pw neer i m cr y p
Dependent variables
Foreign
block
Oil price, opw 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Foreign price, pw * 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Domestic
block
Nominal effective exchange rate, neer * * 1 0 0 0 0 0
Interest rate, i * 0 * 1 0 0 0 0
Money, m 0 0 * * 1 0 0 0
Credit, cr * 0 * * * 1 0 0
Output, y * 0 * * * * 1 0
Price, p * * * * * * * *
The next equation of the SVAR model is the bank credit equation. From the supply
perspective we see that the supply of bank loans is contemporaneously affected by oil price,
nominal exchange rate, interest rate and money. The performance of the real sector such as
price and output will affect bank credit in the next period. This is understandable from the
32 Chapter 2. Monetary policy transmission in Bangladesh: exploring the lending channel
real world scenario: during good economic condition, firms’ earnings usually increase and,
therefore, the probability of default decreases, and better recovery of loans at the end of the
current period affect a bank’s supply of loans in the next period. The reason I put credit
ahead of output is because of the assumption of a quick pass through of credit to aggregate
demand, following the models of Safaei & Cameron (2003) and Berkelmans (2005). Given
the costs of borrowing, firms will be quick to utilize bank credit, which can affect output
immediately. The output equation, next to credit, assumes that all variables, except the
foreign and domestic prices, contemporaneously affect output. The price equation shows
that domestic price is contemporaneously affected by all variables in the two blocks. The
contemporaneous response of price to output fluctuation is in contrast to Kim & Roubini
(2000) and Bhuiyan (2012) for Bangladesh’s economy. However it is similar to many other
studies such as Bernanke & Blinder (1992), Dungey & Pagan (2000a) and Berkelmans
(2005). In addition, the block exogeneity restriction, discussed in Subsection 2.5.1, is
employed.
2.5.3 Data
Events such as the introduction of the Repo (in 2002) and reverse Repo (in 2003) and the
adoption of the floating exchange rate in May, 2003 restrict the time span of this study
from June 2003 to February 2014. Because the intention of the study is to analyze the
monetary policy channels during the period of market based monetary policy instruments
and the floating exchange regime. The monthly data have been collected from various
sources, (see Appendix Table A10).
In this study, the 91 day T-bill rate is used, as the short term nominal interest rate and
the industrial production index is used as the proxy for output as GDP data is not available
in monthly frequency. This data limitation needs to be kept in mind throughout the study
because industrial production represents only a small part of GDP (less than 28 percent
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of GDP on average) in Bangladesh and no other good proxy for output is available. Hence
the impulse response may deviate from what is theoretically expected from the output
variable. I use Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER) in this model as the exchange
rate variable. Exchange rate is defined in a way that an increase in NEER implies an
appreciation of domestic currency against the weighted basket of currency of Bangladesh’s
trading partners.
The descriptive statistics of the variables is in Table A5, and stationarity properties and
break points are in Table A7 in Appendix. All the data used in the estimation process are
in logarithm and seasonally adjusted except the 91 day T-bill rate. Following the general
trend of the VAR literature I estimate the model in levels, rather than first differenced
variables. By differencing the variables may lose important information in the data, as
argued by Sims (1980), Sims et al. (1990) and Sims (1992). However, all the series were
de-trended before estimating the model, following the reasons mentioned by Dungey &
Pagan (2000a). Thus this study focuses on cyclical components only. In order to separate
the trend and the cyclical component from the data, I use the Butterworth filter, as it has
some advantages e.g, it can retain important data properties.
2.6 Estimation results
Before performing the estimation, I check the information criteria for lag length selection
(see Appendix Table A6). Both the SBC and the Hannan-Quinn criteria select lag 1; and
AIC, FPE and LR criteria select lag 4 and 8. Because it is an eight variable SVAR model
with 129 initial observations, in order to conserve the degrees of freedom and to allow for
sufficient dynamics in the model, I choose lag 2 to estimate the model. Another important
aspect to check is the stability of the underlying VAR system, before deriving the structural
shocks of the SVAR model. I estimate a VAR with two exogenous variables and find that
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all the Eigen values lie within the unit circle. This indicates that the VAR satisfies the
stability condition and it is safe to go for the Impulse Response Function analysis of the
structural model. The contemporaneous relation matrix described in the previous section
shows that the SVAR model is over-identified. Thus, we need to check the over-identifying
restriction test to test the validity of the identifying restrictions imposed in the model.
LR test of identifying restrictions: χ2 (5) = 3.398, P rob > χ2 = 0.639
The likelihood ratio test shows that the identifying restrictions are valid. In the next
subsection, I discuss applications of the estimated model i.e. impulse responses and vari-
ance decomposition to various innovations.
2.6.1 Impulse responses
Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) provide a summary of relationships between the en-
dogenous variables given by the estimated coefficients of the VAR system. The impact of a
shock to any variable on the rest of the variables can be found from the estimated model,
but for brevity I report only IRF plots of monetary policy, credit and external shocks on
rest of the economy here.
2.6.1.1 Monetary policy shock
Fig.2.7 presents impulses responses to a one standard deviation shock to the interest rate
along with the 68 percent (dotted line) and the 95 percent (marked line) confidence bands.
In response to an increase in the interest rate, CPI decreases immediately which is signifi-
cant at 68% level. After a slight recovery, the price falls again and reaches the minimum
significantly by an amount less than 0.1 percent at around period four and then increases
gradually and returns back to the baseline level within 10 months.
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Figure 2.7: Interest rate shock IRFs with 68% (dotted line) and 95% (marked line) confi-
dence bands.
This delayed but significant response pattern of price is theoretically consistent and is
similar to that of Bhuiyan (2012) but the timing of response is more rapid. The interest
rate shock shows some persistence as it takes almost 10 months to return to the baseline.
When there is an increase in interest rate, theoretically the exchange rate is expected to
appreciate under the condition of a floating exchange regime and perfect capital mobility.
Since the Bangladesh Bank implements a separate foreign exchange intervention policy
and the capital account is largely closed, we cannot expect the response of exchange rate
to be the same as predicted by theory. The NEER is almost unresponsive to an interest
rate shock, implying that the uncovered interest parity (UIP) channel is not working. This
is an indication that the exchange rate channel of monetary policy is weak in Bangladesh.
As noted, the demand for money decreases by 0.1 percent immediately after an increase
in interest rate which is significant at 68% level. After reaching the minimum, money
demand gradually returns to the baseline within nine months. Monetary policy affects
aggregate output and credit through two channels (Catao & Pagan 2010). The first is
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the intertemporal effect of monetary policy in which a shock to the central bank’s policy
rate increases the spread between lending and deposit rates, resulting in a fall in credit.
The second is the intratemporal effect in which domestic currency appreciation, due to a
tightening monetary policy, improves the balance sheets of firms with high foreign currency
denominated debt. Also, currency appreciation makes the relative price favorable to the
non-tradable sectors. Hence, the intratemporal effect should boost the domestic credit.
However, the latter effect depends on the size of the foreign currency denominated debt
of the firms, and the size of the bank dependent non-tradable sector. In this study, we
find the intertemporal effect dominates. The credit drops in response to an interest rate
shock, although it returns to the base line quickly. Then, we see a slight increase in credit
above the steady state – the intratemporal effect – which again gradually returns to the
baseline within eight months. This is understandable given the presence of a separate
foreign exchange intervention policy that suppresses the NEER, preventing it from rising
freely as a result of monetary policy shock. Overall, the credit channel plays a nontrivial
role in monetary policy transmission and contributes to the falling price level.
This gradual decline of the private credit in response to a rise in the interest rate is
similar to that of many empirical studies. For example, Bernanke & Blinder (1992) for
the US, and Garretsen & Swank (1998) for Netherlands find a lagged response of credit to
an interest rate shock, while Safaei & Cameron (2003) for Canada and Berkelmans (2005)
for Australia find immediate responses by credit. Although response of credit is mostly
insignificant, only the maximum response is significant at 68% level. The industrial output
shows a volatile response and initially moves in opposite direction (although insignificantly)
than our theoretical expectations.1 This does not give a complete picture of how GDP
reacts to an interest rate shock since we do not have monthly (or, even quarterly) data for
1
A possible explanation can be, the price elasticity of demand for industrial product is higher than the
interest (cost) elasticity of industrial production in Bangladesh. The hypothesis is, however, subject to
data availability and further tests.
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GDP. Before concluding this as a sharp contrast to New Keynesian macro prediction, we
should keep in mind the data limitation that also was mentioned in Subsection 2.5.3. The
impulse responses to a positive interest rate shock generate no price puzzle, liquidity puzzle
or exchange rate puzzle, highlighting the correct identification of the model. In sum, the
responses to a monetary policy shock appear quick which is, however, not unique, and,
overall the system returns to the steady state within a year. For example, the adjustment
time of output gap, inflation and real exchange rates to a monetary policy shock in the
study by Catao & Pagan (2010) is less than 5 quarters or roughly a year for Chile, which
is much faster than the evidence found for developed countries. Although the magnitudes
of responses in the current study is different, the response patterns are consistent with
several other countries’ experiences.
2.6.1.2 Credit shock
Figure 2.8: Credit shock IRFs with 68% (dotted line) and 95% (marked line) confidence
bands.
Fig.2.8 presents the impulse responses to a credit shock and confidence bands similar to
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Fig.2.7. We find some interesting response patterns for exchange rate, price and the central
bank. First, credit shock itself is transitory compared to a monetary policy shock, returning
to the base level within two to three months. The transitory nature of credit shock is similar
to Catao & Pagan (2010) for Brazil and Chile. In response to a sudden credit boom, the
central bank responds by increasing the policy rate, which is understandable given its goal
of maintaining stability. The initial interest rate response is significant at both 68% and
95% levels. Then, exchange rate starts to respond with a lag by appreciating to a small
extent but the response is not significant. Monetary authority may not necessarily respond
directly to credit movements; rather, endogenous changes in monetary policy may be due
to the movements of other endogenous variables in the system (Berkelmans 2005). The
credit shock elicits more demand for money, which is expected. This reflects the fact that
firms may demand more cash for businesses as more loans are sanctioned on their behalf.
The positive response of M2 found in this study is empirically consistent.
Finally, the increase in credit results in some inflationary pressure on the economy as
the price level starts to rise, however, the magnitude is not high and only the maximum
response is high at 68% level. Even though the central bank increases interest rate, higher
credit availability generates greater money demand and a surge in price. The industrial
output becomes more volatile and initially rises. Overall, the responses of price, interest
rate, and output to a credit shock are similar to those found by Catao & Pagan (2010)
for Brazil and Chile and Berkelmans (2005) for Australia. The short-lived responses of
the variables are especially similar to the findings of Catao & Pagan (2010), who also find
transitory impacts of the credit shock on other variables, although a monetary aggregate
is not included in their model. Thus, in this study the responses of variables to a credit
shock are theoretically consistent and have similarities to those for other emerging and
developed countries.
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2.6.1.3 External shock (Oil price shock)
An oil price hike is one of the major sources of macroeconomic fluctuations and can affect
many economies simultaneously; hence economists regard this as a global shock (Blanchard
& Gali 2010). Fig.2.9 presents impulse responses to a rise in the international oil price. A
sufficient rise in the oil price is stagflationary, and increases domestic inflation by raising
production costs, which is detrimental to economic growth. In Fig.2.9, we see that the
domestic CPI rises immediately after an oil price shock, then continues to rise significantly
and reaches a maximum by the fourth period. Price, then starts to drop; later there is a
deflationary impact by 10th period and then the price gradually comes back to the baseline.
Figure 2.9: Oil price shock IRFs with 68% (dotted line) and 95% (marked line) confidence
bands.
A rise in oil price increases the costs of imports, and, hence demand for foreign exchange
is likely to increase. This should have a depreciating impact on the domestic currency. This
theoretically expected pattern is visible in the impulse response of NEER. The nominal
exchange rate does not respond instantaneously to a rise in oil price, rather it is a lagged
response and it takes almost a year to return to the baseline.
Since the rise in oil price affects growth negatively, a central bank with multiple ob-
jectives rather than only price stability, is likely to be less harsh in its action. Although
40 Chapter 2. Monetary policy transmission in Bangladesh: exploring the lending channel
there is a possibility of domestic price rise, we see that the nominal interest rate does not
rise immediately; rather it decreases gradually for the first few months after the shock.
This reaction by the nominal interest rate appears consistent with the Bangladesh Bank’s
objectives of promoting economic growth. The interest rate starts to rise afterwards, in
response to the price pressure and rises by 0.1 percentage points in approximately eight
months. It returns to the original level by 15 months after the shock.
The demand for domestic money does not respond instantly. It rises slowly by a
maximum of 0.1 percent by the fifth period, then gradually returns to the original level.
Because of the rising costs of production, firms initially may demand more bank credit.
The positive response of bank credit can be considered as demand induced. The initial
accommodating behavior by the central bank after an oil price shock can also induce credit
rise. Credit starts to fall six months after the shock and gradually returns to the baseline
level. The maximum responses of CPI, interest rate and NEER to an oil price shock
are all significant at both 68% and 95% levels. The maximum responses of money and
credit are, however, significant only at 68% level. There is a striking difference between
the responses to an oil price shock and responses to the two domestic aggregate demand
shocks: the impact of the oil price shock on the economy is more persistent in general, than
the impacts of the aggregate demand side shocks. This feature of the responses is consistent
with the theory that the supply shocks are longer lasting than the demand shocks. This
theoretical consistency supports the validity of the identification of the SVAR model in
this study.
2.6.2 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Another application of the estimated SVAR model is the Forecast Error Variance Decom-
position (FEVD), which shows the variance in the forecast error for each variable due to
innovations to all variables in the system. In Table 2.3, the structural FEVDs of each of the
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domestic variables for innovations in both foreign and domestic variables are reported for
a month, a quarter, two quarters and a year. In Table 2.3, each column is for one domestic
variable and throughout a column summation of the variations due to innovations in the
model variables for a particular forecast horizon is hundred (except the rounding errors).
Table 2.3: Variance decomposition (in percent)
Innovations Proportion of forecast error variance
neer i m2 cr y p
Oil price
(opw)
1 0.1 0.23 0.0 0.1 0.19 4.1
4 5.9 3.2 0.21 4.5 0.95 26*
8 21* 7.2 2.9 10.4 1.1 26*
12 22* 14 3.9 13 1.3 26*
Foreign
price (pw)
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3
4 1.8 6.1 3.1 7.2 1.8 1.6
8 3.8 9 3.9 8.4 1.9 2.5
12 4.6 8.5 3.8 8.2 1.9 2.9
Nominal
Effective
Exchange
Rate (neer)
1 99.9* 0.37 12* 5.2 0.1 0.0
4 79* 1.2 12* 5.7 1 1.1
8 62* 4.2 11 5.3 1.3 1.2
12 61* 3.9 11 5.2 1.4 1.2
Nominal
interest
rate (i)
1 0.0 99* 2.2 0.0 0.0 1.5
4 0.0 74* 5.4 1 1.4 3.3
8 0.0 61* 5.4 1.1 1.4 4.4
12 0.1 56* 5.3 1.1 1.4 4.4
Broad
money
(m2)
1 0.0 0.0 85* 36* 2.9 0.41
4 1.9 6 73* 36* 16* 0.75
8 2 7.3 68* 33* 16* 1.1
12 2 7.1 68* 32* 16* 1.2
Domestic
credit (cr)
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 59* 0.0 0.02
4 0.4 3.7 1.7 40.4* 4.7 1.6
8 0.4 3.1 1.6 36* 4.6 1.4
12 0.4 2.8 1.6 35* 4.6 1.4
Output (y)
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 97* 0.3
4 10 0.18 5.2 4.4 74* 1
8 8.2 2.2 6.3 4.7 73* 1.1
12 8 2.4 6.3 4.6 73 1.2
CPI (p)
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 91*
4 1.4 5.5 0.2 1 0.0 70*
8 2.2 6.1 0.66 1 0.1 62*
12 2.3 5.7 0.67 1 0.1 62*
Note: * denotes significant, comparing with the standard errors for the respective point
estimates. A point is considered significant if it is at least twice as big as the standard
error.
The short term nominal interest rate does not appear to have significant explanatory
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power for the variations in the other variables in a given forecast horizon, except for its own
variation and for approximately five percent of variations in M2 and CPI. In the longer
horizon, both oil price and foreign CPI substantially contribute to the variation in the
interest rates movements. The nominal effective exchange rate has significant explanatory
power for movements in M2 and for itself. It contributes around five percent of variation
in credit, but has no sizable impact on price variation. This is similar to Chowdhury &
Siddique (2006) but is in contrast to Akhtaruzzaman (2005) for Bangladesh who finds
exchange rates have a significant explanatory power for CPI movements. The nominal
interest rate has almost no explanatory power in NEERmovements which is understandable
from the current exchange rate management of the Bangladesh Bank, and CPI also has
no explanatory power for any variables but itself. Oil price and foreign price appear
important for the variation in the credit variable in the longer horizon and broad money
(M2) is attributable to more than thirty per cent of variations in the credit throughout the
time horizons reported. FEVDCs for the sub-sample 2003-2008 and sub-sample 2009-2013
are also reported in the Appendix Table A8 and Table A9. Analyzing the FEVDs, it is
clear that foreign factors play important roles in the variation of domestic variables.
2.7 Robustness check
The stability of the VAR model, discussed in Section 2.6, indicates the reliability of the
impulse responses to some extent. The SVAR can be quite sensitive to the model’s as-
sumptions and sample length. Thus, common ways to check robustness for an estimated
SVAR model are: 1) to estimate the model with alternative assumptions; and 2) the break
point test where the series is divided into two parts and the model is estimated in each sub-
sample. To confirm the validity of the base model, first I estimate a model with alternative
assumptions; and second, I split the sample into two parts – 2003-2008 and 2009-2013 – in
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order to estimate the base model in each of these sub-samples.
The first alternative model is where the interest rate is placed ahead of the exchange
rate, thus allowing for NEER to be contemporaneously affected by the monetary policy.
This implies that a rise in interest rate makes the investment in domestic currency more
attractive, and hence the demand for domestic currency rises leading the currency to
appreciate against the USD. Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock and a credit
shock with this ordering can be found in the Appendix Fig.A10 and Fig.A11. With this
ordering, the responses of all variables to the monetary policy shock is qualitatively similar
to the baseline model, with the exception of the response of the exchange rate. Instead of
appreciating, the exchange rate depreciates in small magnitude instantly – this is called
the ‘exchange rate puzzle’ in empirical literature. However it quickly returns to the steady
state level. This result from the alternative ordering validates the identification of the
baseline model. The impulse responses to a credit shock in this alternative model, in
Fig.A11, appear similar to the responses found in the baseline model.
Next we re-estimate the model using the two sub-samples. The first sub-sample (2003-
2008) is the period before the global financial crisis and the second sub-sample (2009-2013)
is the post-crisis period. Impulse responses to a positive interest rate shock in the two sub-
samples can be found in the Appendix Fig.??. And impulse responses to a positive credit
shock in the two sub-samples are presented in the Appendix Fig.??. In both figures, the
black lines (circle marked) represent IRFs for the first sub-sample and blue lines (square
marked) represent IRFs for the second sub-sample. In the first sub-sample, a rise in interest
rate (tightening monetary policy) has broadly similar impacts on the domestic variables
and there appears to be no empirical puzzles. Regarding the magnitude of the response,
the initial exchange rate appreciation is now greater than the baseline model. CPI shows
a delayed, but directionally the same, response as the base model and the downward effect
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becomes significant during the fourth period. In the second sub-sample, monetary policy
shock reduces price significantly from the second to the fourth period. Credit and money
demand also decline significantly in response to an interest rate shock. NEER initially
fluctuates around zero and then depreciates. However, in the second sub-sample, the
overall NEER response is insignificant throughout the horizons.
Now I analyze credit shock in the two sub-samples. One interesting finding is that credit
shock appears less persistent in the first sample – similar to the full sample model, but it is
more persistent during the post-crisis period. Monetary policy reaction is contractionary
– similar to the base model; however, the response is insignificant in the post crisis period.
There are positive effects on industrial output which becomes significant with lag. The
price variable responds positively to a sudden credit boom, similar to the base model. The
response of NEER appears different in the two sub-samples. In the first sample, exchange
rate depreciates and in the second sample, it appreciates. The response in the first sample
has wider confidence intervals, while the maximum response is significant in the second
sub-sample, similar to the base model. Overall, the conclusion of the model using the two
sub-samples differs little from the base model.
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter I have investigated Bangladesh’s monetary policy transmission channels
with special emphasis on the credit channel during the managed float exchange rate period
using monthly data. I have also analyzed the impact of a credit boom and external shocks
within the SVAR framework. The impulse responses and the variance decomposition anal-
ysis show that the responses of macro aggregates to a monetary policy shock are similar
to the empirical regularities found in emerging economies. The model finds that the ex-
change rate channel is not effective in transmitting monetary policy in order to affect the
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price level. This is to be expected in the context of Bangladesh’s highly intervened foreign
exchange market. However, monetary policy has a significant role in influencing the do-
mestic price level, and bank credit plays a non-trivial role in the process. The credit shock,
on the other hand, influences output and inflation; however, the responses are short-lived
compared to the monetary policy shock. The central bank plays a stabilizing role in its
responses to a credit shock by raising interest rates to reduce the impact of a credit shock.
The study also finds that external factors are important drivers in the movements of the
domestic macro aggregates. This study is a preliminary investigation based on a relatively
short span of time. Therefore, further research based on a longer time frame can reveal
more reliable evidence on the monetary transmission channels of Bangladesh. In sum, the
current monetary aggregates targeting framework works effectively in influencing the do-
mestic price level, and this chapter shows explicitly the channels through which monetary
policy affects the aggregate price level in Bangladesh.
In contrary to the growing nature of financial sector of Bangladesh, financial sectors
in advanced countries are complex and deeply interrelated with the real sectors. The
frictions associated with these complexities of the financial sector deserve special attention
in analysing the transmission mechanisms of shocks for these countries. Therefore, the
critical role played by bank credit in the dynamics of real economy is analysed further
in the next chapter in terms of financial frictions and shocks in a general equilibrium
framework as this model is capable of working with complex frictions explicitly. The
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) framework adopted in the next chapter
discusses financial sector’s role as an independent source of shocks as well as amplifier of
shocks originating in the real sector in the context of advanced financial markets.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Output
Table A4: Weights for CPI of major import partner countries of Bangladesh based on
imports, 2003-2013.
Countries Weights
China 0.28
India 0.23
EU 0.12
Singapore 0.10
Japan 0.07
Malaysia 0.07
Hong Kong 0.05
Thailand 0.04
Indonesia 0.04
Total 1
Note: Author’s own calculations using data from sources in Table A10.
Table A5: Descriptive statistics of data (period: 2003 June - 2014 February)
opw pw neer i m in
USD
cr in
USD
y p
Mean 4.25 4.56 4.22 6.74 10.56 10.26 4.49 4.49
Median 4.28 4.55 4.21 7.40 10.56 10.27 4.47 4.49
Maximum 4.80 4.74 4.47 11.37 11.37 11.03 5.04 4.89
Minimum 3.28 4.42 4.01 1.26 9.88 9.50 3.97 4.08
Std. Dev. 0.41 0.09 0.11 2.35 0.45 0.47 0.29 0.23
Skewness -0.66 0.24 0.44 -0.36 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.03
Kurtosis 2.47 1.78 2.51 2.86 1.65 1.60 1.93 1.75
Jarque-Bera 10.90 9.33 5.51 2.87 9.91 10.52 6.41 8.40
Probability (0.00) (0.01) (0.06) (0.24) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
Sum 548.03 588.85 544.31 869.09 1362.40 1323.63 578.77 578.70
Sum Sq. Dev. 21.18 1.15 1.65 707.21 26.36 28.48 10.56 7.07
Observations 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 129
Note: All variables are in logarithm except the 91 day T-bills rate.
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Table A6: Lag length selection criteria
lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 1672.23 3. 4e-20 -27.8023 -27.6316 -27.3819
1 1897.69 450.91 36 0.000 1. 4e-21 -30.9864 -30.4743* -29.7253*
2 1943.71 92.049 36 0.000 1. 2e-21 -31.1549 -30.3014 -29.053
3 1980.96 74.497 36 0.000 1. 2e-21 -31.1758 -29.9809 -28.2332
4 2020.15 78.371 36 0.000 1. 2e-21* -31.2294* -29.6931 -27.446
5 2047.7 55.095 36 0.022 1. 4e-21 -31.0873 -29.2096 -26.4632
6 2090.99 86.581 36 0.000 1. 3e-21 -31.2099 -28.9908 -25.745
7 2118.99 56.015 36 0.018 1. 6e-21 -31.0755 -28.515 -24.7699
8 2153.82 69.661 36 0.001 1. 9e-21 -31.0559 -28.154 -23.9095
9 2196.53 85.421 36 0.000 2. 0e-21 -31.1687 -27.9254 -23.1816
10 2233.44 73.816* 36 0.000 2. 4e-21 -31.1839 -27.5992 -22.3561
Endogenous variables: neer, i,m2, cr, y, p Exogenous variables: opw, pw
Note: Log likelihood (LL), Likelihood ratio (LR), Final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s informa-
tion criterion (AIC), the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC), and Schwarz’s Bayesian
information criterion (SBIC). Number of observations = 119.
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Table A7: Unit root tests
Variables are
in
ADF Phillips-Perron Zivot Andrews
logarithm,
except i
Level 1st dif-
ference
Level 1st
difference
Decision Level 1st difference Decision
i (C) -2.29 -4.58** -1.99 -7.77** I(1) -3.37(2009:2) -4.67*(2009:12) I(1)
cr (C&T) -1.77 -13.94** -2.74 -14.01** I(1) -2.93 (2007:10) -5.59**(2011:3) I(1)
m (C&T -2.18 -12.48** -2.22 -12.41** I(1) -2.93 (2011:01) -
13.53**(2011:04)
I(1)
p (C&T) -2.94 -10.69** -3.15* -10.74** I(0) -4.32 (2010:10) -
11.05**(2008:08)
I(1)
neer (C) -2.15 -8.51** -2.15 -8.38** I(1) -3.10 (2009:01) -8.94**(2009:09) I(1)
y (C&T) -4.3** -13.23** -10.4** -84.1** I(0) -4.97*
(200810)
-8.31**(2010:03) I(0)
opw (C) -2.28 -8.61** -2.19 -8.79** I(1) -
4.70*(2008:10)
-6.27**(2009:03) I(0)
pw (C) -1.89 -9.026** -2.11 -9.29** I(1) -3.43 (2005:03) -6.36**(2009:07) I(1)
Note: ** is 1% and * is 10% significance levels. C & T denotes constant and trend. Zivot Andrews test break points are in parenthesis, critical values: C: 1%
5.34, 5% 4.80, 10% 4.58 and C,T: 1% 5.57, 5% 5.08, 10% 4.82.
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Table A8: FEVDC during 2003-2008 (in percent)
Innovations Proportion of forecast error variance
neer i m2 cr y p
Oil price
(opw)
1 0.06 0.43 0.03 0.31 1.19 6.12
4 8.01 4.08 0.25 10.13 5.37 33.62
8 30.59 32.73 4.70 23.50 5.58 38.33
12 32.05 53.17 5.91 27.65 6.86 38.95
Foreign
price (pw)
1 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 4.59
4 0.99 5.96 2.00 5.50 3.40 2.14
8 1.77 12.45 2.87 6.59 3.54 3.21
12 1.92 9.33 2.85 6.24 3.57 3.98
Nominal
Effective
Exchange
Rate (neer)
1 99.87 0.56 48.95 12.81 0.50 0.40
4 73.01 7.96 43.97 8.99 4.03 0.70
8 53.19 6.56 41.17 7.35 4.00 1.31
12 51.82 4.46 40.62 7.01 3.97 1.43
Nominal
interest
rate (i)
1 0.00 99.02 0.02 0.69 2.23 0.27
4 3.15 72.95 0.95 3.89 2.84 0.89
8 2.29 36.60 1.04 3.71 3.34 2.93
12 2.25 24.85 1.07 3.52 3.31 2.85
Broad
money
(m2)
1 0.00 0.00 50.96 25.59 0.94 1.09
4 2.07 1.96 46.51 20.90 10.36 2.18
8 1.63 2.18 43.54 17.06 10.12 2.04
12 1.59 1.61 42.95 16.08 10.00 2.03
Domestic
credit (cr)
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 60.60 0.23 0.14
4 2.64 3.56 0.09 42.46 8.70 0.50
8 2.18 2.32 0.12 34.99 9.19 0.47
12 2.13 1.64 0.12 32.96 9.06 0.49
Output (y)
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 94.91 0.94
4 5.92 0.66 4.54 4.02 64.75 7.86
8 4.61 2.23 4.57 3.39 63.01 6.78
12 4.53 1.57 4.52 3.24 62.02 6.70
CPI (p)
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 86.47
4 4.21 2.88 1.70 4.10 0.55 52.11
8 3.75 4.93 1.98 3.41 1.22 44.93
12 3.70 3.38 1.96 3.30 1.22 43.55
Note: The row and column descriptions are same as in Table 2.3.
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Table A9: FEVDC during 2009-2013 (in percent)
Innovations Proportion of forecast error variance
neer i m2 cr y p
Oil price
(opw)
1 2.28 2.54 1.06 0.05 0.00 0.96
4 2.43 4.47 1.00 1.62 0.08 6.88
8 10.86 4.81 0.96 1.60 0.47 7.13
12 11.46 5.73 1.06 1.59 0.49 9.14
Foreign
price (pw)
1 0.85 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.49
4 6.57 11.78 4.07 10.38 3.91 5.41
8 9.69 10.62 3.90 11.04 4.15 8.35
12 12.63 10.13 3.81 11.18 4.35 8.18
Nominal
Effective
Exchange
Rate (neer)
1 96.87 4.97 1.36 0.09 0.52 0.65
4 70.38 1.99 1.67 1.13 1.33 3.57
8 50.84 2.53 2.23 1.29 2.04 5.43
12 48.20 2.38 2.16 1.39 2.06 5.12
Nominal
interest
rate (i)
1 0.00 92.44 17.78 14.13 0.61 2.87
4 0.23 56.40 19.92 10.16 6.98 11.68
8 0.60 46.19 21.33 10.53 7.27 14.47
12 0.62 44.45 21.17 10.41 7.26 13.81
Broad
money
(m2)
1 0.00 0.00 79.79 50.98 22.90 0.15
4 0.34 18.45 59.81 32.98 27.94 4.25
8 2.63 26.35 55.06 28.57 27.47 6.42
12 2.62 27.66 54.36 28.14 27.35 6.84
Domestic
credit (cr)
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 34.75 0.89 0.11
4 1.50 0.57 8.52 39.28 7.02 4.80
8 9.85 1.82 10.67 40.84 8.88 9.59
12 9.53 2.05 11.07 40.43 8.87 10.45
Output (y)
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 75.08 0.19
4 16.29 0.19 2.33 2.12 52.64 0.63
8 12.39 2.61 3.11 2.15 49.44 1.54
12 11.82 2.79 3.24 2.13 49.20 1.83
CPI (p)
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 93.59
4 2.27 6.15 2.68 2.33 0.11 62.76
8 3.15 5.06 2.75 3.97 0.26 47.07
12 3.12 4.80 3.13 4.73 0.43 44.63
Note: The row and column descriptions are same as in Table 2.3.
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Figure A10: IRFs to interest rate shock with 95% (broken lines) and
68% (dotted lines) confidence bands in alternative specification.
Figure A11: IRFs to credit shock with 95% (broken lines) and 68%
(dotted lines) confidence bands in alternative specification.
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Figure A12: Interest rate shock in two sub-samples 2003-2008(s1) and 2009-2013(s2):
broken lines are 95% and dotted lines are 68% confidence bands.
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Figure A13: Credit shock in two sub-samples 2003-2008(s1) and 2009-2013(s2): broken
lines are 95% and dotted lines are 68% confidence bands.
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2.A.2 Data sources
Table A10: Data Sources
Variables Sources
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (neer) Bangladesh Bank
91day T-bills rate (i) Bangladesh Bank
Broad money (M2) (m) International Financial Statistics (IFS)
Bank (DMB) credit to private sector (cr) CEIC global database
Industrial production index (y) IFS
CPI of Bangladesh (p) IFS
International oil price (opw) Index Mundi and World Bank
CPI of nine countries (pw) IFS and CEIC database
Import (fob) values of nine countries IFS
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Chapter 3
The role of financial shocks in
business cycles with a liability side
financial friction
Abstract
The chapter investigates the role of investment specific technology shock within the par-
ticular type of financial friction of Gertler and Karadi (2011) and the impact of direct
financial shock into this, such as a net worth shock, using US data. The chapter explicitly
shows how the bank balance sheet effect of counter cyclical movement of capital price at-
tenuates such investment shocks and the extent depends on the type of financial shocks
included in the model. Because of the construction of capital quality shock in such financial
friction model, we need to incorporate a direct net worth shock while analysing the role
of financial shock. This highlights finance sector as a fundamental source of shocks apart
from amplifier of shocks originating in elsewhere of the economy.
3.1 Introduction
One of the most central questions of modern macroeconomics is, what are the prime sources
of business cycles? and economists have not reached any consensus yet on the answers.
Neoclassical theories often consider neutral technology shock as the main driver of output
movement (King & Rebelo 1999). The seminal work of (Smets & Wouters 2007) concludes
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that two ‘supply shocks’ – neutral technology, and wage markup shocks– are the primary
sources of variation in output. From the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-09, it be-
came vividly apparent that any shocks originating in the financial sector can be disastrous
to both financial and real sector variables through a balance sheet channel. The finan-
cial friction proposed by Gertler & Karadi (2011) is one among various attempts in the
literature to design the real world financial frictions. Gertler & Karadi (2011) introduce
an agency problem between bankers and depositors in a way that bankers may divert a
fraction of the funds to the households bankers belong to. The introduction of such moral
hazard problem is to bring an elegant technique that would put a limit on intermediaries’
ability to expand assets infinitely. This creates an endogenous constraint on the interme-
diaries’ leverage ratios which ties the overall credit supplies to the equity capital of the
intermediaries. In order to analyse the financial crisis scenario, Gertler & Karadi (2011)
incorporate a capital quality shock, which is a novel feature of their model.
In this chapter, I incorporate the financial friction proposed by Gertler & Karadi (2011)
into the otherwise standard New Keynesian DSGE model in order to empirically analyse
US business cycles and the roles of financial and investment specific technology (IST) or
Marginal Efficiency of Investment (MEI) shocks. Hence the main research question is,
what is the mechanism (hence, role) of investment specific technology or MEI shock in
presence of a banker-depositor type financial friction and financial shocks, such as the net
worth and capital quality shocks, when the model contains both output and labour price
rigidities? In addition, the chapter seeks the relative importance of capital quality and
bank net worth shocks, in terms of their ability to explain variations in output and interest
spread. The latter part is closely related to the former because it shows which finance
based shock is important to be included in the model to identify the true role of MEI and
others shocks at business cycles. For this, identification strategy for disentangling the two
financial shocks is crucial.
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The research questions are interesting in two main dimensions. Since the chapter in-
vestigates the balance sheet impacts of financial frictions and shocks on the transmission
mechanism of MEI shock, the first dimension relates to the treatment of financial shocks
within Gertler & Karadi (2011)’s framework. In their model, capital quality shock enters
through the physical capital accumulation process which originates in the non-financial
sector (e.g housing sector) and affects the asset side of bank balance sheets through the
change in collateral value. The shock is categorised as financial because of the balance
sheet identity between the assets and the liabilities. Here, banks play amplification roles
for the shock that originates elsewhere in the economy. The amplification role of banks is
well known in the literature and a number of literature suggests that the degree of amp-
lification resulting from credit constraints is empirically limited outside the crisis period
(Kocherlakota 2000, Cordoba & Ripoll 2004). The way the capital quality shock is con-
structed in Gertler & Karadi (2011)’s framework does not rule out the possibility of any
physical destruction of capital machineries (including housing). Whether a ‘qualitative’
destruction or a ‘physical’ destruction of capital, the shock is directly related to the phys-
ical capital stock of the economy which can affect both bank dependent and less dependent
agents strongly. Therefore, this shock is different from any exogenous changes in bank net
worth arising directly within the financial sector. Examples of such events can be a sec-
toral tax on financial intermediation, an increase in the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR),
an increase in the central bank’s requirements for minimum equity capital, a change in the
classification of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, or any other events not explicitly included in
the model but affect the share price (equity) of the banks. So, I assess and quantify the
impacts of bank net worth shock within Gertler & Karadi (2011)’s financial friction along
with capital quality shock. Because bank’s role as an independent source of fluctuations
deserves separate treatment from the role as amplifier of shocks originating in elsewhere
of the economy when estimating financial shocks. The net worth shock, in contrary to
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capital quality shock, will compress the profit in the finance sector relative to the broader
economy, especially compared to the sector distant from financial intermediation and debt
(see Fornari & Stracca 2013 for example).
The second dimension relates to the role of nominal wage rigidities as the calibrated
model of Gertler & Karadi (2011) does not incorporate any labour market imperfections.
The work of Justiniano et al. (2010) shows the importance of MEI shock in the movements
of output in a model without any financial sector. Sanjani (2014) estimated Gertler &
Karadi (2011)’s model without labour market imperfections for the US data and found the
largest role for capital quality shock while a negligible role for the MEI shock in output
variations. Justiniano et al. (2010) argue that ignoring imperfections in the product and
labour market is one reason that some early neoclassical studies do not find any significant
role played by MEI shock in the business cycles. Due to nominal frictions in the goods and
the labour markets, the efficiency condition becomes µ
(
L−
)
MRS
(
C
+
, L
+
)
= MPL
(
L−
)
,
where C is consumption and L is labour hours (Justiniano et al. 2010). The equation is
different from the neoclassical benchmark because of the presence of an endogenous markup
term, µ, which is a summation of the price and the wage markups. Thus, µ creates a wedge
in the efficiency condition between the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between C
and L and the marginal product of L (MPL). When µ is ignored, as in earlier neoclassical
models, C has to decrease if L increases, to maintain the efficiency condition. With µ, when
a positive investment shock hits the economy, the equilibrium L can increase without any
decrease in C, as both the price and wage markups drop, generating a positive shift in
labour demand (see Justiniano et al. 2010 for more). Thus, labour market imperfections
and nominal wage rigidities have important role in analysing the impact of MEI shock in
a financial friction model.
What is new in my study is that I analyse the transmission mechanism of investment
(MEI) shock within a financial friction (Gertler & Karadi 2011) model in presence of
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various shocks including financial, and show explicitly what role nominal wage rigidities
play in it during the post war period in the US. Most importantly, I show the type of
financial shock included in the model has important implications in identifying the role
of investment specific shock. Second, I present a comparative analysis whether finance
sector is merely an amplification device for collapse of assets value that originate in non-
finance sector or, other (fundamental) shock in finance sector, is independently important.
Finally, the chapter identifies shock that is the main driver of fluctuations in a bank’s net
worth and spread. Thus, the chapter contributes to the literature by revisiting the factors
contributing to the the US business cycles.
Although a number of literature (Meh & Moran 2010, Gerali et al. 2010, Chen 2001,
for example) has analysed the role of bank net worth shock, this chapter highlights the
need to disentangle net worth shock from capital quality shock as a finance based shock
within the Gertler & Karadi (2011)’s framework and quantify their relative impacts. Meh
& Moran (2010) identify the financial shock as a direct exogenous change in bank net
worth (such as tax on bank capital). Fornari & Stracca (2013) suggest that bank capital is
a key tool of financial intermediaries’ debt production capacity, therefore, the shock may
have wider consequences for financing conditions and the real economy. Other studies,
apart from Sanjani (2014), have estimated the financial friction model of Gertler & Karadi
(2011), however, not all of them estimate the net worth shock and if they do, they find no
substantial impact of the net worth shock. For example, Villa & Yang (2011) analyse the
empirical properties of the model without labour market heterogeneity with UK data, and
find no substantial role for the net worth shock. Another study, Villa (2013), compares
the performances of three models (Smets & Wouters 2007, Bernanke et al. 1999b and
Gertler & Karadi 2011) while replicating the Euro area business cycles and finds that
the Gertler & Karadi (2011)’s model outperforms the other two models in fitting the
Euro area data. In order to make the three models comparable, Villa (2013) modifies
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the Gertler & Karadi (2011) version and includes only the MEI shock, not the capital
quality shock. However, Villa (2014) estimates both MEI and capital quality shocks for
the Euro area and the US but not financial net worth shock. Another study containing
similar financial frictions is by Görtz & Tsoukalas (2012), who construct a two sectors real
economy following Huffman & Wynne (1999), which analyses the impacts of financial news
shocks in sectoral and aggregate fluctuations. These gaps in the literature and better fit
of Gertler & Karadi (2011)’s model to actual data found in previous estimation examples,
along with the interesting facts discussed above, motivate further work with this financial
friction.
The main results are that investment specific technology shock is weakened in the long
run when the model includes financial friction and the type of finance base shock we include
has implications in quantifying this impact. There appears to have benefits in disentangling
the net worth and capital quality shock in terms of model’s ability to replicate moments
and other business cycle properties, in which net worth shock provides better fit.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: The model description is in Section 3.2.
The properties of the data, estimation and identification issues are available in Section
3.3. Next, Section 3.4 discusses the estimated parameters, and Section 3.5 analyses fit
of the estimated model. Section 3.6 contains the application of the estimated model and
Section 3.7 shows the robustness of the baseline estimates. Finally, Section 3.8 concludes
the discussion.
3.2 Model
This section contains only brief features of the model and some explanatory notes on
transmission mechanisms where needed. A detailed model description and mathematical
derivation are skipped where they are well known and same as in the cited literature. All
model equations and their log-linearized version are listed in the Appendix Section 3.A.
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3.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households of measure unity, same as in Gertler & Karadi (2011),
except the fact that there is labour market friction in the current model. I include labour
market heterogeneity and nominal wage rigidity, following the assumptions of Erceg et al.
(2000), for the reasons discussed in introductory section. Households are assumed to
be identical with respect to all characteristics except the labour services they supply to
the production sector. Households choose consumption (Ct), set wages (Wt(l)) for the
labour supply (Nt(l)) where l is a particular labour type. Households save a fraction of
their income as bank deposits or invest in interest bearing assets (Bt) , pay taxes (Tt) and
receive transfers (net-transfer) from the ownerships of firms. The household utility function
is standard and consists of consumption with habit (b) formation and labour supply. In
Gertler & Karadi (2011), each period, (1− f) fraction of household members are workers
and the remaining f are bankers. The probability that a banker stays a banker in the
next period is θ. So a total measure of (1 − θ)f bankers randomly become workers. A
representative household’s preferences are denoted by the following utility function:
MaxEt
∞∑
s=0
βs%t+s
[
ln(Ct+s − bCt+s−1)− ψNt+s(l)
1+η
1 + η
]
. (3.1)
Households maximise utility subject to
Wt(l)
Pt
Nt(l) +Rt+1Bt −Bt+1 + nettransfert − Ct − Tt = 0 (3.2)
and a downward sloping demand for their labour supply from the employment agency.
Here, I include %t as the inter-temporal preference shock that affects the marginal utility
of consumption and marginal dis-utility of labour. We assume this shock follows a mean
zero AR(1) process, log%t = ρ%log%t−1 + ε%,t with ε%,t:i.i.d(0, σ2%). Pt is the general price
level. Deposits and government securities are perfect substitutes which earn gross real
interest rate Rt. Here, ψ is the coefficient of leisure and η is the inverse Frisch elasticity
parameter. In each period, there is (1 − φw) probability that a household can adjust
its wage. If it cannot, then it indexes the wage to the lagged inflation at ςw∈(0,1). The
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importance of nominal wage rigidities is not only for generating hump shaped impulse
responses of the macro variables (Christiano et al. 2005a), but also for its inherent slug-
gishness in the US economy. Strong micro level evidence on nominal wage rigidity in the
US is provided by Barattieri et al. (2014), based on the Survey of Income and Program
Participation data. Nominal wage is very sticky after correcting for measurement errors;
and the probability of a wage change is positively correlated with the unemployment rate
and consumer price inflation (see Barattieri et al. 2014 for details). The model assumes
a time varying wage mark-up, ww−1µ
w
t , where w > 1 is the wage elasticity and µwt is the
time varying AR(1) process with persistence ρw and a serially uncorrelated shock, εw,t
such that εw,t ∼ iid(0, σ2w). Thus wage mark-up shock is the only representative of the
labour market shocks.
3.2.2 Financial intermediaries
For detail construction of the financial friction, I refer interested readers to Gertler &
Karadi (2011). Here, I present a brief overview of the friction and the net worth shock
within such friction. Financial intermediaries consist of the entire banking sector. Bank
receives deposits (Bt) from households and invests them in financial claims (St), issued
by the intermediate goods sector. There is an agency problem that bankers may shift a
fraction, λd, of total bank assets to their own households in the forms of higher bonuses and
dividends. The financial claims, are equivalent to the value of physical capital (Kt) these
firms require into goods production. Bank pays real interest payment Rt+1 on deposits at
time t + 1 and earns return Rk,t+1 on assets. Overtime the bank balance sheet condition
implies the growth in equity (Et) as,
Ej,t+1 = Rt+1Ej,t + (Rk,t+1 −Rt+1)QtSjt. (3.3)
Here, efpt+1 = (Rk,t+1−Rt+1), is the external finance premium. Different from Gertler &
Karadi (2011), I assume that the intermediaries face a time varying, instead of a constant,
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stochastic survival probability (θt) from one period to the next. The assumption suits
the empirically observed exogenous events in the finance sector, listed in Section 4.1 for
examples, which can affect bank net worth directly. This provides a simple way to bring
direct exogenous source of variation to the bank equity capital without much modification
to the endogenous balance sheet constraint of Gertler & Karadi (2011). In the model of
Nishiyama et al. (2012), the Lehman Brothers collapse is considered as an aggregate net
worth shock that affects bank sector’s balance sheets directly. They design both the cor-
porate and financial sectors’ net worth shocks by assuming different time varying survival
rates for the entrepreneurs to assess and quantify the role of Lehman shock as a bank-
ing sector net worth shock. Thus, the model in this chapter adopts this by assuming a
time varying stochastic θt which follows an AR(1) process to account for direct exogenous
variation in bank net worth. In this financial friction, a negative net worth shock is an
increase in the probability that bankers exit. By forcing bankers to exit sooner, when they
make profit on average, this shock will reduce the bank share value. When a bank has
low franchise value, it requires the bank to reduce leverage in order to satisfy the incentive
constraint: terminal value of bank ≥ fraction of divertable assets. In Gertler & Karadi
(2011)’s original set up, the dynamics of Et and the terminal wealth, Vt, depend on the
endogenously determined return from lending (Rk,t) . But now the model allows variations
in net worth exogenously. The banker’s problem is to maximise the expected terminal
wealth
Vj,t = maxEt
∞∑
i=0
(1− θt+1) θitβi+1Λt,t+1+i (Ejt+1+i) , (3.4)
where, βiΛt,t+i is the stochastic discount factor. As long as βi+1Λt,t+1+i(Rk,t+1+i−Rt+1+i)
is positive, the intermediary will want to expand its assets indefinitely by borrowing from
the households. In order to limit this, the model introduces the moral hazard (or costly en-
forcement problem) problem. The maximum terminal wealth Eq.(3.4) along with Eq.(3.3)
64Chapter 3. The role of financial shocks in business cycles with a liability side financial friction
show that in response to any negative shock that directly affect Et, the premium that a
bank can charge must decrease given the asset value. Intuitively, for a given collateral
value, in this situation the bank cannot charge a higher premium on its loan. This should
raise the demand for loan and asset price; on the other hand, the effect of endogenous
balance sheet constraint works in the opposite direction. This later effect surpasses the
former effect soon and bank must deleverage as a consequence. When bank starts to de-
leverage, the premium rises, demand for new assets declines and eventually, Qt declines.
Summarising across all intermediaries total banking assets can be written as, QtSt = φtEt,
where φt is the banking sector leverage. If government intermediates a fraction, γt, of total
assets in the market during a crisis, then government assets can be written as,
QtSt = φtEt + γtQtSt = φctEt, (3.5)
where, φct = 11−γtφt.
3.2.3 Production sector and the retailers
There is no friction in the process of non-financial firms obtaining funds from banks. The
intermediate goods sector issues financial claims, St, to finance capital accumulation and
the return Rk,t is determined endogenously within this sector. The arbitrage condition
implies that QtSt = QtKt+1.1 Following Gertler & Karadi (2011), the production function
is
Ym,t = At(UtξtKt)
αN1−αt , (3.6)
where, At is the total factor productivity or neutral technology and ξt is the quality of
capital. Gertler & Karadi (2011) describe ξt as providing a source of exogenous variations
1Bank loan remains an important source of finance for the non-financial firms. The lengthy continuation
of the US quantitative easing from 2008 till 2014 – aimed at affecting the credit conditions for the households
and businesses – is an indication of this fact. The retained earnings or cash flows in non-financial firms
are often used as precautionary balances to meet unexpected business expenses, instead of investing in
new investment projects. Also, firms with imperfect access to the formal credit institutions usually rely on
cash inflows for new investments; see Gertler & Karadi (2011), Acharya et al. (2010), Sufi (2009) and Yun
(2009). An alternative specification can be QtSt = ΘQtKt+1, implying that firms borrow only a fraction,
Θ, of the total capital cost from the banks. This parameter (Θ) will then affect the return on assets, Rk,t,
which is endogenously determined.
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in the quality of capital; this corresponds to an economic depreciation or an obsolescence
of capital. It is assumed that both At and ξt follow AR(1) processes with persistence
coefficients, ρa and ρξ and serially uncorrelated shocks such that they are iid(0, σ2a), and
iid(0, σ2ξ ) respectively. The nominal wage rate to hire Nt is W
P
t . Along with Rk,t, the
capital utilisation rate (Ut) is also determined here. I keep the capital depreciation rate
(δt) variable with utilisation (Ut), as in Sanjani (2014) in the following form :
δ(Ut) = δss +
b1
1 + ζ
U1+ζt ; (3.7)
where δss is the steady state fixed depreciation rate and ζ is the elasticity of utilisation
cost. The intermediate sector is a price taker in its output market. If output price is Pm,t
then firm’s optimising behaviour shows that the return to the capital is affected by the
exogenous variation in quality of capital:
Rk,t+1 =
Pm,t+1α
Ym,t+1
Kt+1
+ (Qt+1 − δ(Ut+1)) ξt+1
Qt
. (3.8)
A separate retail sector is introduced to bring the nominal price rigidities in the output
market following Christiano et al. (2005a). The description of this sector is same as in the
standard DSGE literature. Final output price is set on a staggered basis (similar to Calvo
1983). Thus, Pm,t is similar to the marginal cost of production in the retail sector. There
is (1 − φp) probability that a retailer can adjust its price in a period. If it cannot, then
it indexes price to the lagged inflation (Πt) at ςp∈(0,1). Final output is a CES aggregate
of all retailers output and the price elasticity of demand is p > 1. The optimal pricing
condition of retailers in terms of re-set price inflation
(
Π#t
)
is in Appendix. Similar to
wage markup, the gross price markup, Mp,t, is defined as Mp,t =
p
p−1µ
p
t where, µ
p
t is the
time-varying component that follows an AR(1) process with persistence coefficient, ρp, and
a serially uncorrelated shock, εp,t such that εp,t ∼ iid(0, σ2p).
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3.2.4 Capital goods producers
The capital producing firms buy used capital from the intermediate sector and repair the
depreciated capital. Competitive capital producing firms also produce new capital and sell
the new and refurbished capital to the intermediate firms. Capital price Qt is determined
by the optimising behaviour of the capital producing firms.
Kt+1 = Zt
(
1− τ
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2)
It + ξt (1− δ (Ut))Kt. (3.9)
In Eq.(3.9), Zt, based on the arguments of Justiniano et al. (2010), is the source of exogen-
ous variations in the efficiency with which investment goods are transformed into installed
physical capital. The variation in Zt arises from either technological factors specific to the
production of investment goods or disturbances to the process by which these investment
goods are transformed into installed capital (see Greenwood et al. 1996). In this model,
Zt is the marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) shock that follow AR(1) processes with
persistent coefficients ρZ and serially uncorrelated shocks εz,t such that i.i.d(0, σ2z). Here,
τ is the inverse elasticity of net investment parameter in quadratic capital adjustment cost.
Capital producers maximise the following discounted profit:
Max
< It >
{
Et
∞∑
i=t
βi
λt+i
λt
{
QiZi
[(
1− τ
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2)
It
]
− Ii − (Q¯i −Qi)Ki
}}
.
(3.10)
The optimal condition of capital producer (Eq.(A54) or its linearised version Eq.(A78)) in
Appendix, shows that any negative shock to Zt will raise the asset price. The profit max-
imising behaviour of the capital producers implies that any negative shock to the process
of transforming investment goods into installed capital will require the producers to charge
higher price. Thus, Qt is expected to be counter-cyclical to the MEI shock. An increase
in Qt affects the intermediaries’ balance sheets through a positive change in the collateral
valuation, which strengthens the balance sheet conditions and may increase the banks’
appetites for more financial assets. On the other hand, the linearised capital accumula-
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tion (Eq.(A79)) shows that a negative shock to Zt affects the future capital accumulation
process negatively. Thus, the shock has negative impacts on the availability of installed
capital in the subsequent periods. Therefore, the two opposing effects make the aggregate
impacts of a MEI shock weak while affecting the aggregate output in the presence of this
type of financial friction. In contrast, Qt is expected to be pro-cyclical to the capital qual-
ity shock. A negative capital quality shock (or expectation of one) reduces Qt by reducing
the effective quantity of capital (ξtKt). This affects the valuation of collaterals negatively
and the net worth position of intermediaries’ deteriorates. Since, the demand for assets
is constrained by net worth, bank’s demand for new assets decreases during a financial
crisis. The high leverage ratio in the financial sector can add to the already worsening
credit condition and banks are then forced to de-leverage and the required return on loan
increases. The rising spread decreases investment expenditures.
3.2.5 Government and the Monetary authority
Government finances its expenditure, Gt, by lump-sum tax, Tt. Thus, the government
budget constraint is Gt = Tt. Government spending is subject to a stochastic shock. We
can write Gt = ω
g
t Yt where,
logωgt = (1− ρg)logωg + ρglogωgt−1 + εg,t, (3.11)
and ωg is the steady state level of government spending to GDP ratio. The central bank
is responsible for monetary policy and the policy is described by the Taylor rule as,
it = (1− ρi)i+ ρiit−1 + (1− ρi)(φpi(pit − pi) + φy(lnYt − lnYt−1)) + εi,t (3.12)
where, it is the net nominal interest rate and ρi is the interest smoothing parameter. The
monetary policy shock is εi,t:i.i.dN(0, 1). In absence of a severe financial crisis, this
interest rate rule is sufficient to influence market interest rates. But during a financial
crisis, the government may involve itself in direct intermediation. The Gertler & Karadi
(2011) model defines the feedback rule for such unconventional monetary policy as follows:
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γt = γ+κEt [(logRkt+1 − logRt+1)− (logRk − logR)] , where, γ is the steady state fraction
of total intermediated assets and κ is the positive feedback parameter.
3.2.6 Aggregation
Aggregating across all retailer’s output and price,
Yt = Ym,t ∗ νpt . (3.13)
where, νpt is the price dispersion term. Finally aggregate resource constraint can be
written as,
Yt = Ct + It +Gt +
τ
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
It. (3.14)
Thus, Section 3.2 completes the brief model description in this chapter.
3.3 Data and estimation
While estimating the model, I observe the US data for seven variables: output, con-
sumption, investment, inflation, nominal interest rate, hours worked and spread for the
period 1962:Q2 -2014:Q4. The baseline estimations are done for the period 1962:Q2 -
2007:Q1 and a robustness check is done for 1962:Q2 -2014:Q4. Description of these series
and sources can be found in Appendix Section 3.A.4. In my estimation, durable consump-
tion expenditure is separated from the total consumption expenditure and is included in the
investment expenditure. This is due to the reasons argued by Justiniano et al. (2010) that
including the durable consumption expenditures into investment generates more reliable
results on the sources of fluctuations than their inclusion in consumption expenditures (e.g
Smets & Wouters 2007). Unlike Sanjani (2014), I includes financial data such as interest
spread in the estimation. Observing financial variables in estimation has implications for
the estimated impacts of the financial shocks.
In the model there are nine structural shocks and all of them, except the monetary
policy shock, follow AR(1) processes. As labour market data are inherently noisy and
poorly measured (see Justiniano et al. 2013 for an example), I include measurement error
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with hours worked. The measurement error appears in the observation equation only,
hence, I do not define any separate process for it. All series are in logarithm. Following
literature such as Born & Pfeifer (2014), Jiang (2016), these series are de-trended using
the one-sided HP-filter before taking them into estimation. The filtering ensures that all
series are mean zero. By such transformation, we directly observe the model variables,
hence specifying the observation equations will be redundant.
ConsideringM as the basic model with six structural shocks, such as neutral technology,
monetary policy, preference, government expenditure and wage and price markup shocks,
I estimate three main versions of M for the period 1962-2007. First, I estimate Mθz where
M is extended to allow for net worth and MEI shocks, indicated by the subscript. Second, I
estimate Mξz where M is extended for capital quality and MEI shocks. Finally, I estimate
Mθξz with all shocks. These estimates can be compared to know which financial shock
is important to be included in the model and how they affect MEI shock. In addition, I
estimate several other versions of M such as, Mθ,Mξ Mθξ and Mz as experiments and the
results are reported in the Appendix Table A8 for interested readers.
The chapter follows the Bayesian estimation technique described by An & Schorfheide
(2007) and Fernández-Villaverde (2009) to estimate the non-calibrated parameters. This
technique is described as a bridge between calibration and maximum likelihood. In brief,
the process begins with providing prior assumptions about the distribution of the para-
meters. Given the model, the likelihood function is calculated using the Kalman filter from
the observed data. The prior information on parameters act as weights on the likelihood
function. Next, the posterior kernel is obtained by combining the likelihood function with
the priors. By maximizing the posterior kernel, which is a nonlinear and complicated func-
tion, with respect to the parameters, we obtain the approximation of the posterior modes.
Using these modes, posterior mean for each of the parameters is calculated. A sampling
based technique, the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm (also called Monte Carlo Markov
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Chain (MCMC)), is used to get the posterior distributions. Assuming asymptotic normal-
ity for each of the parameter spaces, the MH algorithm simulate the posterior kernel. The
posterior modes are used as the starting values in the simulation process. The sampling
process generates draws from the posterior density which is unknown at the outset, and
updates the parameters after each draw. After sufficient draws in each of the parallel MH
chains, the posterior density function and the mean and variance of the distribution are
obtained.
3.3.1 Calibration and priors
While a range of parameters is estimated, several parameters of the model are fixed. The
decision as to which parameters to keep fixed is governed by the model and identification
test. Since the model include no trend technology, I estimate parameters that govern
cycles, not the parameters that govern long-run path.
The list of calibrated parameters and steady state values are given in Table 3.1. The
discount factor (β) is 0.99 which implies a quarterly real interest rate of one percent.
Capital income share (α) is 0.33 and the relative weight of labour (ψ) is 3.409. Elasticity
of substitution in the goods market (p) and in the labour market (w) is assumed 4.167
which implies a markup of 1.32 approximately in each sector. These parameters are almost
same as in Gertler & Karadi (2011).
Table 3.1: Calibrated parameters
Description Parameters Value
Discount factor β 0.99
Capital income share α 0.33
Relative utility weight of labor ψ 3.409
Elasticity of substitution in goods market p 4.167
Elasticity of substitution in labor supply w 4.167
Proportion of funds given to the new bankers Ω 0.002
Bankers average survival rate θss 0.972
Fund divert rate λd 0.381
Steady state fixed depreciation rate δss 0.02
Government spending-output ratio ωgss 0.2
Credit policy feedback parameter κ 0
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Financial sector parameters, such as time varying survival rate of bankers in the next
period (θss) the fraction of funds given to the new entrant bankers by households (Ω) and
the fraction of funds that bankers may divert
(
λd
)
are set to achieve the target steady state
values for spread, leverage and average horizon of bankers same as in Gertler & Karadi
(2011). The steady state fixed depreciation rate is 0.02 and the steady state government
spending over GDP ratio (ωgss), is 0.2. The feedback parameter for credit policy or un-
conventional monetary policy (κ) is set to 0 in the base line model. An experiment of a
moderate level of unconventional monetary policy (with κ = 10) for period 1962-2014 has
been done. Result is skipped but available upon request. The remaining parameters are
estimated.
The prior distributions of the estimated parameters are described in Table 3.2. I define
most of them along the same line as has been done in the other works on the US economy.
The persistence coefficients of the AR(1) processes in the model follow beta distributions
and the mean and standard deviations (S.D) are 0.5 and 0.2 respectively. The standard
deviations of shocks follow inverse gamma distributions with mean 0.1 and a standard
deviation of 2, except for the net worth shock. Following the work of Nishiyama et al.
(2012) that also estimate the same shock, I assume a slightly strict prior for net worth
shock with mean and standard deviation 0.5 and 1, respectively. I treat the measurement
error the same as the other standard errors in the model for reasons explained earlier,
containing the same prior information. The remainder are the structural parameters.
The consumption habit (b) parameter has a beta distribution with mean 0.7 and S.D.
0.1. The inverse labour elasticity parameter (η) follows normal distribution with mean 0.33
and a S.D. 0.1, whereas the elasticity parameter for capital utilization (ζ) follows a gamma
distribution with mean 7.2 and a S.D. 0.5. The mean and S.D are 1.73 and 0.1 respectively
for the investment adjustment cost parameter (τ) which follows gamma distribution. In
Taylor rule, the coefficient of the output growth and the coefficient of inflation follow a
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normal distribution. The output growth (φy) and inflation coefficient (φpi) are assumed to
have mean 0.125 with a S.D. 0.1 and mean 1.7 with S.D. 0.3 respectively. This completes
the description of prior about the parameters for their Bayesian estimation.
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Table 3.2: Prior distributions and Posteriors
Parameters Distribution Prior mean (S.D) Posterior mean and 90% highest posterior density interval
(1) (2) (3) (4) Mθz (5) Mξz (6) Mθξz
Taylor rule: interest smoothing (ρi) B 0.6 (0.1) 0.53[0.48, 0.59] 0.59 [0.53, 0.65] 0.54 [0.49, 0.60]
Technology (ρa) B 0.5 (0.2) 0.70[0.64, 0.76] 0.84 [0.73, 1.00] 0.71 [0.64, 0.78]
MEI (ρz) B 0.5 (0.2) 0.16 [0.05, 0.28] 0.06 [0.01, 0.12] 0.11 [0.02, 0.19]
Net-worth (ρθ) B 0.5 (0.2) 0.95 [0.90, 0.99] - 0.85[0.75, 0.98]
Capital quality (ρξ) B 0.5 (0.2) - 0.76 [0.67, 0.86] 0.81 [0.40, 0.98]
Preference (ρ%) B 0.5 (0.2) 0.41 [0.26, 0.55] 0.49 [0.19, 0.72] 0.44 [0.28, 0.59]
Govt. expenditure (ρg) B 0.5 (0.2) 0.65 [0.54, 0.77] 0.68 [0.55, 0.82] 0.66 [0.55, 0.78]
Wage mark-up (ρw) B 0.5 (0.2) 0.80 [0.67, 0.93] 0.80 [0.68, 0.93] 0.81[0.69, 0.94]
Price mark-up (ρp) B 0.5 (0.2) 0.15 [0.03, 0.27] 0.13 [0.02, 0.23] 0.14 [0.02, 0.24]
S.D MP (σi) IG 0.1 (2) 0.24 [0.21, 0.26] 0.23[0.20, 0.25] 0.23 [0.21, 0.25]
S.D technology (σa) IG 0.1 (2) 0.47 [0.43, 0.52] 0.51 [0.44, 0.57] 0.47 [0.43, 0.52]
S.D MEI (σz) IG 0.1 (2) 2.53 [2.18, 2.88] 2.76 [2.4, 3.13] 2.36 [2.01, 2.72]
S.D net worth (σθ) IG 0.5 (1) 0.12 [0.10, 0.14] - 0.13 [0.10, 0.16]
S.D capital quality (σξ) IG 0.1 (2) - 0.22 [0.16, 0.27] 0.06 [0.03, 0.08]
S.D preference (σ%) IG 0.1 (2) 1.27 [0.91, 1.61] 1.09 [0.78, 1.41] 1.22 [0.88, 1.54]
S.D Govt. expenditure (σg) IG 0.1 (2) 1.70 [1.55, 1.85] 1.71[1.56, 1.87] 1.71 [1.55, 1.85]
S.D wage markup (σw) IG 0.1 (2) 1.26 [0.63, 1.89] 1.38 [0.67, 2.06] 1.33 [0.67, 1.93]
S.D price markup (σp) IG 0.1 (2) 0.57 [0.45, 0.70] 0.56 [0.42, 0.70] 0.55 [0.44, 0.67]
S.D N_ME (σNME ) IG 0.1 (2) 0.08 [0.02, 0.14] 0.12 [0.03, 0.25] 0.07 [0.02, 0.14]
Habit (b) B 0.7 (0.1) 0.67 [0.58, 0.77] 0.62 [0.49, 0.76] 0.66 [0.56, 0.75]
Inverse of Frisch elasticity (η) G 0.33(0.15) 0.42 [0.16, 0.66] 0.48 [0.15, 0.77] 0.44 [0.18, 0.70]
Elasticity K utilization cost (ζ) G 7.2 (0.5) 7.06 [6.24, 7.88] 6.98 [6.16, 7.79] 7.04 [6.19, 7.87]
Investment adj. cost (τ) G 1.73 (0.1) 1.69 [1.53, 1.84] 1.66 [1.51, 1.81] 1.64 [1.48, 1.80]
Calvo price (φp) B 0.5 (0.1) 0.71 [0.67, 0.75] 0.71 [0.67, 0.76] 0.71 [0.67, 0.75]
Calvo wage (φw) B 0.5 (0.1) 0.57 [0.42, 0.72] 0.42 [0.28, 0.56] 0.55 [0.40, 0.70]
Price indexation (ζp) B 0.5 (0.1) 0.31 [0.19, 0.42] 0.30 [0.18, 0.42] 0.30 [0.18, 0.41]
Wage indexation (ζw) B 0.5 (0.1) 0.49 [0.33, 0.66] 0.49 [0.33, 0.66] 0.50 [0.34, 0.66]
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Table 3.2: Prior distributions and Posteriors
Taylor rule: output growth (φy) N 0.125 (0.1) 0.29 [0.20, 0.37] 0.32 [0.20, 0.45] 0.29 [0.20, 0.38]
Taylor rule: inflation (φpi) N 1.70 (0.3) 1.72 [1.54, 1.89] 1.83 [1.61, 2.05] 1.71 [1.54, 1.87]
Note: B denotes Beta, IG denotes Inverse Gamma, N denotes Normal, and G denotes Gamma distributions. S.D in parenthesis in column (3) denotes prior
standard deviation. NME is the measurement error. Posterior mean estimates in column (4) to (6) are with respective 5 and 95 percentiles in square brackets.
3.3. Data and estimation 75
3.3.2 Identification and estimation
Before discussing the formal identification test results in statistical sense, I present an
economic interpretation of the identification of the net worth and capital quality shocks
based on impulse responses, as the rest of the shocks in the model are conventional. For
this, first, I refer back to the discussion in Section 3.1 that capital quality shock, by design,
can be either a valuation shock or a direct loss of capital machineries. Thus, in response to
a negative (positive) capital quality shock, we expect an instantaneous decline (increase)
of the physical capital stock (Kt) , similar to the responses to MEI shock. The MEI shock
is a shock to the production process of capital goods from investment, and therefore, has
an instantaneous impact on Kt. In addition, as Eq.(A78) shows, in response to a negative
MEI shock we expect Qt to rise. In contrast, there is no reason to believe that Kt will
decline (increase) instantaneously when there is a negative (positive) shock to bank net
worth. Because bank net worth shock affects capital accumulation process only gradually
overtime through bank’s lending activities of financing capital expenditures in production.
The decreased capitalization in banking sector reduces this sector’s capacity to arrange
funds for the entrepreneurs (see Meh & Moran 2010 for example). Thus, we expect only a
gradual (hump shape) decline, not instantaneous, from Kt in response to a bank net worth
shock.
Both the necessary and sufficient conditions of parameter identification are met in the
models. The top panel of Fig.3.1 shows the identification strength of each of the parameters
at prior mean of the model containing both capital quality and net worth shocks. Along the
x-axis, the parameters are ranked in increasing order of their identification strength. The
lower panel of the same figure contains the sensitivity plot, which shows that all the para-
meters have non-negligible effects on the moments. Both the necessary and the sufficient
conditions for identification as discussed by Iskrev (2010), imply that all the parameters
are identified in the model and in the moments for the entire prior space. The identification
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test was done using the identification routine available in Dynare which strengthens our
theoretical expectations about identification. The details of the identification toolbox and
the test criteria are described by Ratto & Iskrev (2011) and Iskrev (2010).
Figure 3.1: Identification strength (upper panel) and sensitivity component (lower panel)
with asymptotic information matrix (log-scale).
Note: The black and white bars denote measures relative to parameter value and relative to prior
standard deviation respectively.
Dynare’s Monte-Carlo based optimisation routine is used to get the posterior modes.
For results in the MH stage, 300,000 draws were obtained in each of the three chains.
The scale parameter in the jumping distribution was adjusted to ensure the acceptance
rate in chains between 25-35% in various model specifications. During estimation, both
the univariate and the multivariate convergence diagnostics ensured that convergence was
achieved in each case. Brooks & Gelman (1998)’s multivariate convergence diagnostics for
model Mθξz is reported in Fig.A8 and the rests are skipped but available upon request.
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3.4 Results
The posterior mean and corresponding 90 percent Highest Posterior Density (HPD)
obtained in the MH algorithm are reported in the last three columns of Table 3.2 for all
the three model specifications – Mθz, Mξz and Mθξz. Results for model Mθz are presented
in column (4) where HPD’s are in square bracket with respective estimates. Similarly
column (5) and (6) contain results of models Mξz and Mθξz respectively. A number of
observations regarding the exogenous shock processes are worth mentioning.
Data used in the estimation appear quite informative for the parameters including
the shock processes. Among the shock persistent coefficients, technology (ρa) and wage
markup (ρw) shocks have considerable level of persistence across the three models while
MEI shock (ρz) turns out less persistent. A closer look shows that ρa (0.84) is higher
and ρz is much lower (0.06) in Mξz compared to models with net-worth shock. Both net
worth and capital quality shocks are highly persistent in all specifications, however, ρθ
appears more persistent in Mθz than models with capital quality shock. The estimated
mean of the standard deviations for shocks are at reasonable level and consistent among
three specifications. The MEI shock appears highly volatile (σz) and slightly more so in
Mξz compared to the models with net worth shock. The higher persistence coefficients and
the lower mean standard deviations for the technology and financial shocks imply that in
the long horizons, they are likely to be the strong drivers of business cycles.
The dominance of the wage mark-up and technology shocks in this study is in contrast
to Villa (2014) but similar to the findings of Smets & Wouters (2007) and many other
estimates in the previous literature on the US. The result for the MEI shock is in contrast
to the findings of Justiniano et al. (2010), especially, in the long run. The interesting point
to note is, the low persistence and high volatility of MEI shock in all model specifications
provide empirical support for the theoretical discussions on the possible replacement of MEI
shock by the financial shocks. The persistence and volatility estimates of other shocks are
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not much different between models.
The estimates of behavioural parameters —habit (b), inverse elasticity of labour supply
(η) , elasticity of K utilization (ζ), and investment adjustment costs (τ) are similar across
the three models and not much different than the specified prior mean. Exceptions are
the Calvo parameters. A considerable degree of sluggishness in price and nominal wage
adjustments is found in this study and price stickiness is higher than the nominal wage
stickiness. The estimated Calvo price stickiness (φp = 0.71) in all models implies that firms
re-optimize the prices of their products in more than three quarters approximately, similar
to the findings of Smets & Wouters (2007) but slightly smaller than Villa (2014). The
estimated wage stickiness (φw = 0.57) inMθz andMθξz imply that the average duration of
a nominal wage contract is above two quarters, which is, however, less than the estimate
for the US reported by Barattieri et al. (2014) who find five quarters. The wage stickiness
in Mξz is much less than the estimates of the other two models. The estimates of the two
Calvo parameters show that both the price and the wage adjustments occur within a year.
Estimates of indexation parameters are similar across three models. Estimated ζp
(around 0.30) is lower than its prior value and closer to the estimates of Villa (2014), Smets
& Wouters (2007) while ζw (around 0.49) is higher than Villa (2014) and closer to Smets
& Wouters (2007) for the US. The higher value of ζw than ζp implies that the endogenous
persistence in the labour market is higher relative to the goods market. Among monetary
policy parameters, interest rate smoothing and reaction to inflation are slightly higher
in Mξz than in Mθξz and Mθz and closer to their prior mean. Central bank’s reaction
to output growth is higher than the prior mean but consistent across models. This is
also higher than the estimates of Villa (2014). This indicates that monetary authority is
sensitive not only to inflation fluctuations, but also to the output gap.
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3.5 Model fit
The common approaches to check the fit of the estimated DSGE model are to compare
the log data densities of the competing models and to compare the theoretical moments of
the estimated model to those of the actual data (An & Schorfheide 2007). In this study I
check model fit using both approaches.
3.5.1 Relative fit of alternative specifications: Bayes factor
Comparison of posterior odds between the baseline model and other competing models
is widely used to check model fit. It has been shown that the posterior odds, under
various regularity conditions, favour the DSGE model that is closest to the true data
generating process (Phillips 1996, Fernandez-Villaverde & Francisco Rubio-Ramirez 2004,
An & Schorfheide 2007).
Table 3.3: Bayes factor comparison
Model Log marginal
data densities
(lnp (Y | M))
Bayes factor
Mθξz : with all shocks −534.96 1
Mθz: net-worth and MEI shocks −535.73 2.16
Mξz: capital quality and MEI shocks −556.17 1.63× 109
Mz: MEI shocks −629.22 8.64× 1040
Mθξ: net worth and capital quality shocks −593.20 1.96× 1025
Note: The log marginal data densities were calculated using modified harmonic mean (MHM)
approximation, described by Geweke (1998). Bayes factor comparison between Mθξz and others.
The list of observables used in estimation are same across different models.
In terms of marginal data density in Table 3.3, model Mθξz is clearly preferred than
other model, however,Mθz is not less preferred thanMθξz2. It implies that model including
net worth shock that arises within the financial sector can represent a better fit of the US
economy compared to models that include only capital quality as a financial shock. It is
also interesting to note that model that includes both net worth and capital quality shocks
2Kass & Raftery (1995) suggest a reference scale to weigh the strength of the evidence in favour of an
alternative model with respect to the model in null hypothesis. In this scale, a Bayes factor between ‘1
to 3’ is ‘not worth more than a bare mention’, ‘3 to 20’ denotes positive and ‘20 to 125’ denotes strong
evidence, while a factor greater than 150 is very strong evidence in favour of one of the two models.
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(Mθξz) performs better than the model (Mξz) considering only capital quality as finance
shock.
The respective Bayes factors compared to Mθξz are calculated in the last column of
Table 3.3. The Bayes factor strongly supports Mθξz and also Mθz over Mξz and other
model specifications including models with no financial shocks (Mz) and model with no
MEI shock (Mθξ) . Comparing the log marginal data densities of various experimental
models in Table A8 to Table 3.3, we see that the three models in the baseline analysis are
still preferred.
3.5.2 Absolute fit: moments comparison
In Table 3.4, I present the posterior predictive analysis in which the moments in model
generated artificial data are compared to those in actual data. The standard deviations
(S.D) and the autocorrelations (AC) of order 1 to 2 reported here are their median values
and actual data moments for the period 1962:Q2 -2007:Q1 are in bold face.
The standard deviations of the models show mixed performances. ModelMθz performs
quite satisfactorily in replicating the volatility of output (Yt), consumption (Ct), inflation
(pit) , nominal interest rate (it), hours worked (Nt) but moderately over predicts for in-
vestment (It) and spread (efpt) . The model’s weak capacity to replicate the volatility of
the components of national income accounts is a common problem in the DSGE literature
(for example, see von Heideken 2009 on the US). The assumption about the inter-temporal
elasticity of substitution parameter (σ = 1 in this study) also affects the volatility of these
variables.
The fit of volatility of model Mθξz is closer to model Mθz. Compared to Mξz, we see
that models with net worth shock provides better fit of the data. If we look at the relative
volatility in the lower panel of Table 3.4, we see that the model performs satisfactorily in
replicating the relative volatility of all variables.
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Table 3.4: Moments comparison: posterior predictive analysis
S.DMθz S.DMξz S.DMθξz S.Da AC(1)Mθz AC(1)MθξzAC(1)a AC(2)Mθz AC(2)MθξzAC(2)a
Yt 1.87 3.37 2.19 1.54 0.93 0.95 0.90 0.86 0.89 0.76
Ct 1.46 3.34 2.04 0.91 0.96 0.98 0.90 0.91 0.94 0.76
It 6.33 8.52 6.73 4.14 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.87 0.87 0.79
pit 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.26 0.53 0.59 0.60 0.24 0.31 0.41
it 0.35 0.43 0.40 0.39 0.62 0.67 0.86 0.33 0.41 0.66
efpt 0.25 0.32 0.28 0.10 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.72 0.68 0.60
Nt 1.76 2.52 1.83 1.82 0.82 0.83 0.94 0.66 0.67 0.81
Relative
S.DMθz
Relative
S.DMξz
Relative
S.DMθξz
Relative
S.Da
Yt 1.00 1 1.00 1.00
Ct 0.78 0.99 0.93 0.59
It 3.39 2.53 3.07 2.69
pit 0.15 0.09 0.14 0.17
it 0.19 0.13 0.18 0.25
efpt 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.06
Nt 0.94 0.75 0.84 1.18
Note: Standard deviations (S.D) for all models and autocorrelations (AC) of order 1 and 2 for Mθz and Mθξz are presented where the superscripts denote
respective models and superscript a denotes the actual data statistics. The moments are their median values. Relative S.D means S.D relative to output.
82Chapter 3. The role of financial shocks in business cycles with a liability side financial friction
Since the likelihood-based estimator matches the entire covariance matrix of the data,
we need to check the other moments, such as the autocorrelations. The autocorrelation
coefficients up to order two are reported forMθz andMθξz, whileMξz is skipped for brevity.
Except for it, the models replicate the persistence in data very closely for both the financial
and the national income account variables. For it, both Mθz and Mθξz under-predict the
autocorrelation. Overall, the predicted moments generated by the baseline models are
good match for the moments in the actual data.
3.6 Drivers of business cycles
Since the model fits the US macroeconomic data at a reasonable level, next I analyse the
main driving forces for the variation in output and other variables through forecast error
variance decompositions and the mean impulse responses to the exogenous shocks. These
will enable us to revisit the driving forces of the business cycles as well as an empirical
evaluation of the transmission process of the financial shocks.
3.6.1 Variance decomposition analysis
In Table 3.5, I report the forecast error variance decompositions (in %) for output (Yt),
investment (It), spread (efpt) and hours worked (Nt) over the horizons of one quarter,
one year and two years for three models. The unconditional or stationary variance (UV)
decompositions are reported in the last row for each of the variables. During the estimation,
neutral technology (ea), MEI (ez), capital quality (eξ) and net worth (eθ) shocks were
defined in a way to produce recessionary situations for an amount of one standard deviation
shock. The first point to emphasise is that in the presence of an explicit financial friction,
MEI shock (ez) is attenuated in the long run when financial shocks play stronger roles in
Yt variation, although ez can be important in short run.
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Table 3.5: Variance decomposition (in %)
Shocks ei ea ez eθ eξ ep ew e% eg
Mθz Y 1 5.89 9.17 20.63 0.59 5.32 2.30 12.71 43.39
4 10.00 28.18 14.90 1.22 10.5 10.05 7.34 17.80
8 11.25 32.84 10.46 1.09 10.67 16.90 5.32 11.40
UV 10.00 20.38 5.11 32.71 8.35 14.34 3.46 5.63
I 1 12.84 13.55 52.85 1.51 10.55 3.01 4.54 1.15
4 18.31 26.8 19.50 1.54 16.00 8.02 8.11 1.71
8 20.13 28.59 11.83 1.59 16.34 11.7 8.17 1.67
UV 15.00 19.23 8.77 29.30 11.74 9.44 5.44 1.11
efp 1 18.38 16.48 0.0 36.8 11.83 2.02 10.32 4.08
4 21.17 15.44 1.40 33.44 13.8 2.55 9.14 3.05
8 23.34 14.67 3.08 30.31 15.18 2.68 8.08 2.66
UV 22.52 13.18 4.03 33.65 14.63 2.48 7.16 2.35
N 1 5.03 22.43 17.65 0.50 4.34 2.13 10.71 37.20
4 11.71 13.62 15.48 1.42 12.16 12.83 9.56 23.22
8 12.84 16.47 11.39 1.33 12.31 21.71 7.22 16.74
UV 11.28 13.56 8.71 16.53 10.17 22.00 5.49 12.26
Mθξz Y 1 8.28 11.33 14.92 0.68 1.92 5.20 1.80 12.71 43.17
4 12.48 31.78 8.97 1.03 6.67 9.14 7.12 6.63 16.2
8 12.65 34.51 5.78 1.01 12.00 8.52 11.25 4.58 9.7
UV 10.11 19.71 2.52 16.56 28.58 6.00 9.35 2.82 4.35
I 1 18.00 16.72 39.25 1.25 5.26 10.39 2.33 5.48 1.33
4 21.65 28.48 11.37 1.02 8.62 13.35 5.36 8.43 1.73
8 22.12 28.9 6.52 2.62 10.00 12.8 7.46 8.00 1.60
UV 18.29 21.79 5.22 20.21 10.43 10.09 6.91 5.89 1.17
efp 1 17.20 13.43 0.00 44.00 5.00 7.82 1.05 8.25 3.08
4 21.49 13.74 0.73 35.70 6.49 9.89 1.45 7.98 2.53
8 24.32 13.44 1.57 31.25 7.14 11.19 1.57 7.25 2.26
UV 24.09 12.38 2.05 33.39 6.88 11.05 1.50 6.59 2.06
N 1 7.17 24.09 12.9 0.58 1.09 4.29 1.68 10.83 37.38
4 15.80 14.82 10.08 1.28 4.64 11.42 9.81 9.33 22.81
8 16.30 18.02 7.12 1.36 7.20 11.02 16.24 6.86 16.24
UV 14.48 15.29 5.49 11.28 9.44 9.22 17.54 5.37 11.89
Mξz Y 1 6.62 19.13 14.96 14.29 3.07 6.92 3.67 31.34
4 5.59 36.93 4.88 26.13 3.15 15.06 1.11 7.14
8 4.25 38.41 2.44 31.76 2.23 16.7 0.81 3.4
UV 3.25 43.67 1.07 37.65 1.48 10.69 0.68 1.51
I 1 10.79 17.06 33.79 22.61 4.61 7.33 2.7 1.12
4 11.43 29.49 7.6 27.3 5.23 13.67 3.96 1.32
8 10.9 34.03 4.2 24.93 4.7 16.31 3.78 1.16
UV 9.34 45.64 3.63 20.18 3.84 13.21 3.29 0.89
efp 1 16.3 16.88 0.17 45.72 5.45 6.04 5.69 3.76
4 17.16 15.36 1.14 46.59 5.84 6.46 4.8 2.66
8 18.06 14.59 2 46.57 6.15 6.28 4.12 2.23
UV 18.51 14.18 2.55 46.38 6.28 6.11 3.88 2.10
N 1 7.02 19.3 16.21 7.77 3.17 8.49 3.77 34.27
4 9.86 12.52 7.71 18.84 5.49 29.29 2.09 14.2
8 7.98 18.87 4.49 20.02 4.22 34.81 1.47 8.15
UV 6.23 37.76 3.20 16.10 3.13 26.87 1.21 5.51
Note: The reported variances are the mean responses of unconditional or stationary variances (UV)
and the conditional variances at horizon 1, 4 and 8 quarters.
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The UV decomposition shows that the contribution of MEI shock in Yt variation de-
creases from 5% in Mθz to 2.52% and 1% in Mθξz and Mξz respectively. This can be
understood from the fact that both ez and eξ shocks enter into the model through the
capital accumulation process and eξ captures the larger portion of output variations when
present in the model. In the long run, the contribution of ez decreases substantially due
to the feedback effect from the financial to real sector resulting from the counter cyclical
movement of Qt. The UV decomposition of Yt also shows that eθ can explain 33% of
variations in model Mθz and around 17% in Mθξz whereas capital quality shock (eξ) can
explain 29% in model Mθξz and 38% in Mξz, implying the importance of these shocks in
output fluctuations. Wage markup shock (ew) turns out to be important in the long run,
as shown by the UV decompositions, similar to Smets & Wouters (2007) who also find ew
to be important for the US output variation. Demand side shock such as preference (e%)
and government expenditure (eg) shocks have substantial roles in output variation in short
run which are robust across models.
For investment (It) variations, ez has the highest explanatory power in all models,
however in the short run only. Rapid dissemination of investment techniques in today’s
world helps to perceive the fact that gains (losses) can be ripped off quickly. This role of
ez for variations in It is weakened gradually from model Mθz to Mθξz to Mξz in various
horizons, while eξ takes the opposite role from model Mθξz to Mξz. The highly muted role
of MEI shock together with the absence of net worth shock in Mξz assign larger roles to
technology (34%) and capital quality (25%) shocks. Another interesting observation is, UV
decompositions show that eθ can explain substantial part of It variations, 29% in Mθz and
20% inMθξz. However, this may not be so in the short run, as indicated by the conditional
variance decompositions in both models. Monetary policy shock (ei) is also important for
the US investment variations and more so in the models with net worth shock.
For spread (efpt), we see that eθ and ei explain the majority part of variations in all
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horizons across the models. When we do not estimate the pure financial shock separately
from the capital quality shock (model Mξz) then eξ alone explains up to 46% of variation
in spread. Since net worth shock is explained as a direct shock within the financial sector,
the percent variations of efpt due to eθ in modelsMθz andMθξz are expected. Technology
shock also has a substantial role to play in efpt variation.
For hours worked (Nt), government expenditure shock, (eg), is an important short run
source of fluctuations, demonstrated across the three models. However, overall the wage
markup shock (ew) is the most important driver in the employment sector beyond a year,
as expected. In model Mθz, eθ also appears very important, followed by technology shock.
As we include eξ in the model, the role of net worth shock decreases and greater variations
are explained by neutral technology shock. In Mξz, the two most important shocks, based
on UV decomposition of Nt, are ea (38 %) and ew (27%). Capital quality shock also
has a substantial impact (20% in two years horizon) in labour market. The nature of eξ
shock can give some explanations in this regard. The capital quality shock can include
physical as well as valuation change in the capital stock and in case its a physical change
in Kt, eξ will certainly have a big effect on Nt as dictated by the production function.
MEI shock is also important for Nt variations and the highest impact of this is in Mθz.
Overall, the experiment with various model specifications thus highlights the importance
of disentangling eξ and eθ shocks to assign true roles to MEI shocks.
It would be interesting to compare these results with Villa (2014) who estimated the
same financial friction for the US without estimating any bank net worth shock. The UV
decomposition reported in Villa (2014) shows that capital quality shock alone explains 92%
of output variation, making it the sole important factor for the US output variation. In
contrast, estimating the bank net worth shock distinctly as a finance based shock, such as in
this study, shows that although financial shocks (eθ, eξ inMθξz) account for more than 45%
of Yt variations, other shocks such as technology, monetary policy and wage mark-up can
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explain a considerable portion of Yt variations. This is empirically more consistent. The
UV decomposition in model Mξz in this study appears qualitatively similar to the findings
of Sanjani (2014) regarding the dominant roles of ea and eξ but differs quantitatively for
ez. Adding labour market heterogeneity into the model increases the role of MEI shock in
Yt variation, supporting the transmission mechanism of MEI shock explained in Justiniano
et al. (2010). However, the MEI shock still remains less important for output and labour
market variations especially in longer horizon in such financial friction model.
The historical shock decompositions for output (Yt) and bank net worth (Et) over
period 1962-2007 in model Mθξz are presented in the Appendix Fig.A10 and Fig.A11 with
associated colour codes for various shocks. In the financial friction of Gertler & Karadi
(2011), the crucial variable in amplifying the feedback effects from the financial sector to
the real economy is the bank leverage. The smoothed leverage series generated by models
Mθz and Mθξz are plotted along with the US recession bar in the Appendix Fig.A9.
3.6.2 Impulse responses
The Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) show the future paths of the endogenous variables
in response to an exogenous shock occurring at period one. Overall, the qualitative patterns
of the IRFs derived from the estimated models of this study are theoretically sensible and
similar to many empirical studies, but the response quantities vary.
3.6.2.1 Impulse responses of physical capital
The impulse responses of capital (Kt) is particularly interesting as it is linked to the
separate identifiability of financial shocks in the model discussed in Subsection 3.3.2. In
Fig.3.2, the impulse responses of Kt and asset price (Qt) to net worth, capital quality
and MEI shocks are presented for the three model specifications. Although net worth and
capital quality shocks affect finance sector’s leverage in the same way, they are different
due to their origins and propagation mechanisms which need to be disentangled.
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Figure 3.2: IRFS to net worth, MEI and K quality shocks.
Note: Column 1 to 3 represent models Mθz, Mθξz and Mξz respectively.
Figure 3.3: Comparison between flexible and sticky wages.
Note: Titles with MEI and net worth show responses of the
variables to those shocks respectively in model Mθξz.
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The first row of Fig.3.2 clearly depicts the economic intuition behind identification of
financial shock. In response to negative net worth shock (black solid line), Kt, in bothMθz
and Mθξz, remains unresponsiveness initially and moves down gradually afterwards. On
the other hand, in response to a negative capital quality shock (grey marked line) of same
magnitude, Kt, in both Mθξz and Mξz, falls instantaneously. The fall in Kt due to capital
quality shock is deeper inMξz compared toMθξz and similar to the instantaneous response
to MEI shocks (blue broken line). This pattern validates the statistical identification
of shock parameters (persistence and standard errors) presented earlier. The maximum
decline of Kt is much higher in response to a capital quality shock than the other two
shocks as it captures both amplification effect by banks and the direct impacts originating
in the real sector.
The second row of Fig.3.2 shows the response of capital price, Qt, to MEI and finan-
cial shocks. The key point of the hypothesis that MEI shock is attenuated in presence of
financial friction is the counter cyclical movement of asset price in response to MEI shock
and pro-cyclical movement in response to financial shocks and we see that Qt, shows such
responses. In response to a negative MEI shock (blue broken line), Qt, jumps up which
affects the bank balance sheet positively through higher collateral valuations. This fact
eases credit conditions by lowering the required risk premium on loans which favours in-
vestment decisions. Therefore, the balance sheet channel neutralises the negative effects
of the MEI shock on output in the medium run, even if it is not so in the short run. In
response to net worth shock, although Qt, jumps up but returns back quickly and stays
below the steady state level for a while before adjusting back to the steady state. The fall
in Qt, is more pronounced for capital quality shock.
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3.6.2.2 Comparison between sticky wage and perfectly flexible wage
In order to assess the role played by nominal wage rigidity, I re-estimate the model with all
shocks, Mθξz, with fully flexible wage (except the wage markup shock). Fig.3.3 juxtaposes
the IRFs of variables Yt, Nt, efpt and Et to MEI shock (in upper row) and net worth
shock (in lower row) only for brevity. Here, the black solid lines are the IRFs of model with
perfectly flexible wage and the broken lines are for the rigid wage case (the baseline). Fig.3.3
clearly shows that if there is no imperfection and rigidity in labour market, adjustment
processes after a shock are quicker in most of the cases. In response to a negative MEI
shock, the drop in Yt under flexible wage is much less and adjustment to steady state
is quicker than wage rigidity case. Thus, it validates the arguments of Justiniano et al.
(2010) that nominal wage and price rigidities indeed have important roles to play in shock
transmission mechanism. However, the depressed efpt for prolonged time at the same
time provides evidence that MEI shock is attenuated by financial friction because financial
spread moves pro-cyclically in response. In lower row of Fig.3.3, we see the impacts of
net worth shock on Yt and Et are much higher under nominal wage rigidity than under
flexible wage. The response of efpt to net worth shock in rigid wage case shows that
it drops initially, but returns quickly and remains over the steady state till 25 quarter.
The gap between the IRFs under two different labour market assumptions clearly shows
the importance of modelling labour market heterogeneity and nominal wage stickiness, as
emphasised by Christiano et al. (2005b).
3.6.2.3 Impulse responses to various shocks in model Mθξz
Fig.3.4 contains IRFs to MEI, net worth, neutral technology, wage markup and capital
quality shocks from the first to the fifth rows respectively for select variables in models
Mθξz. The shaded regions are 95 percent error bands. In the first row, we find that Yt,
It and Nt, decline in response to a MEI shock which is a one standard deviation negative
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innovation in the process of transforming investment into installed capital. Due to counter
cyclical movements in assets price, banks net worth, Et, increases and required spread,
efpt, decreases.
Figure 3.4: IRFs to MEI, net worth, technology, wage markup and capital quality shocks
in Mθξz .
Note: The thick black lines are the IRFs and the shaded regions are 95 % error bands in model
Mθξz. The first variable title in every row contains the name of the shock for all variables of that
row.
IRFs to a negative net worth shock, in the second row, appear more persistent com-
pared to those for MEI shock. Although efpt declines initially after the net worth shock,
rises above the steady state level shortly and remains slightly above the steady state for
prolonged time. The maximum decline in Yt occurs in response to neutral technology shock
and the impact is also persistent.
The impacts of the technology shock on Nt and the associated impacts in the US
business cycles are debated issues. For example, Gali (1999) and Francis & Ramey (2005)
argue that because of the factors such as habit, nominal price rigidities and investment
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adjustment costs, the impact of a positive technology shock is an immediate fall in Nt.
In contrast, based on a VAR based specification, Christiano et al. (2003) argue that the
response of Nt to a technology shock is not robust and there is some evidence in favour of
positive impact. In Smets & Wouters (2007), we see an immediate fall in Nt in response
to a positive technology shock, and this becomes positive only after two years. In this
chapter, Nt increases instantly but its not persistent. It goes down below the steady state
very quickly and takes time to rise back to the steady state. Therefore, the result is broadly
consistent with the arguments of Gali (1999). In response to wage markup shock, on the
other hand, Nt declines sharply and returns back to steady state by thirty quarters. In
response to a negative innovation in the quality of capital, both Yt and Nt decline; and Et
declines and efpt rises due to the loss of collateral valuation, depicted in the last row.
3.6.2.4 Impulse responses to various shocks in models Mθz and Mξz
Figure 3.5: IRFs in Mθz and Mξz to MEI, net worth, technology, wage markup and capital
quality shocks.
Note: The solid (black) lines are IRFs in Mθz and the broken (blue) lines are IRFs in Mξz. The
first variable title in every row contains the name of the shock for all variables of that row.
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Impulse responses for the same list of shocks in modelMθz andMξz are presented together
in Fig.3.5 where solid (black) lines are IRFs in Mθz and broken (blue) lines are IRFs in
Mξz. In the first row we see the decline in Yt to MEI shock is slightly higher in Mθz,
compared to Mξz. Over all the responses to MEI shock in the two specifications are not
much different. The quantitative difference in responses between two models are more
pronounced for technology shock in the second row where Yt, It and Nt decline to greater
magnitudes and are more persistent in model Mξz.
In response to wage markup shock, these variables decline slightly more in Mξz than in
Mθz. The fourth row depicts responses to net worth shock inMθz only which are not much
different than the responses to net worth shock in Fig.3.4. The responses to capital quality
shock in Mξz are presented in the last row which are not much different than the same
responses in Fig.3.4. Impulse responses to monetary policy, government expenditures,
preference and price markup shocks in different models can be found in the Appendix
Fig.A12 and Fig.A13.
3.7 Robustness of the model
3.7.1 Results with extended time period
The baseline analysis does not include global financial crisis period. Since the zero lower
bound can bias the estimates (Gali et al. 2012), I re-estimate all three models for an
extended period, 1962:Q2 -2014:Q4. Impulse responses of Yt, efpt and Et in the the
extended time estimation are presented in Fig.3.6 for neutral technology, MEI, net worth
and capital quality shocks. If we compare Fig.3.6 to IRFs in Subsection 3.6.2, we see the
magnitudes are not very different between the two sample periods.
The response pattern in extended period is broadly similar to the pattern in pre-global
financial criss period. In new sample, Yt and Et decline slightly more inMθz in response to
a net worth shock, denoted by the grey marked lines. The same is true for capital quality
shock in both models Mθξz (solid lines) and Mξz (broken lines).
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Figure 3.6: IRFs for extended period (1962-2014) to MEI, net worth and capital quality
shocks.
Table 3.6: Moments and log data density for the extended period (1962-2014).
Yt Ct It inflt intt efpt Nt Log (MDD)
S.DMθz 2.51 1.97 7.81 0.28 0.35 0.28 2.25 −613.35
S.DMθξz 2.56 2.36 7.14 0.28 0.35 0.25 2.32 −609.82
S.DMξz 3.23 3.13 8.16 0.29 0.37 0.31 2.58 −634.36
S.Da 1.54 0.94 4.61 0.25 0.38 0.11 1.94
I also present volatility (S.D) and log data density in Table 3.6 to compare between
three model specifications for the extended period. In extended data set, the ability ofMθz
and Mθξz to fit data remains superior to Mξz, same as in the baseline period. However,
all model specifications now relatively over-predict the volatility of national accounts data.
The fit is reasonably good for financial and labour market data. In terms of log marginal
data density, model Mθξz, and also Mθz, are preferable to model Mξz, supporting the
robustness of baseline analysis.
3.7.2 Sensitivity to the leverage ratio
The importance of the value of leverage ratio is emphasised in many studies, e.g. Jordà
et al. (2011) and Bernanke et al. (1999b), and, of course, Gertler & Karadi (2011). It
is important to check the sensitivity of the estimation results to changes in the steady
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state value of the leverage ratio. Gertler & Karadi (2011) find that the calibration of the
leverage ratio is tricky. Following their calibration, leverage ratio was four in my baseline
estimation. To check the sensitivity of the estimated results to various leverage ratios, I
re-estimate model Mθξz and present the log marginal data densities for various leverages
in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7: Sensitivity to leverage ratio
Leverage ratio 3 3.5 4 5
Marginal data density (MDD) −442.68 −480.53 −534.96 −637.15
Note: MDD are calculated using the Modified Harmonic Mean estimator in Mθξz specification.
Table 3.7 also shows that the marginal data densities change from low to high leverages
in terms of over all fit but the impulse responses are qualitatively not different. The IRFs to
neutral technology shock with various leverage ratios in Mθξz are also presented in Fig.3.7.
Figure 3.7: IRFs to neutral technology shocks at various leverages in model Mθξz.
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The IRFs to a negative technology shock with leverage ratios 4 (black solid line), 3
(blue broken line) and 5 (grey marked line) show that response patterns are qualitatively
same but slightly different quantitatively, especially for the financial sector variables. For
example, the spread (efpt) rises more to a negative technology shock when the financial
sector leverage is higher and the associated decline in net worth (Et) is also higher. The
differences in IRFs for real sector variables are less pronounced than the financial sector
variables. The adjustment timing to steady states are robust across various leverage ratios.
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3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter I have analysed the roles of financial frictions in the liability side of a
balance sheet, a la Gertler & Karadi (2011) and finance shocks in light of their ability to
influence the transmission mechanism of investment specific technology (MEI) and other
shocks in driving business cycles with all common forms real and nominal frictions. The
analysis also offers an experiment on financial shocks by comparing the bank net worth
shock and the capital quality shock. The analysis is strengthened by the experiment of
including one financial shock at a time before applying both.
My empirical analysis shows that financial friction indeed replaces the marginal effi-
ciency of investment shock through the bank balance sheet effect of the counter cyclical
movement of stock market price of capital. Including nominal price and wage rigidity im-
proves the role of MEI shock but the balance sheet effect is strong enough to weaken the
impacts of this shock on output variations in the long run. The MEI shock is muted to a
greater extent if only capital quality shock is included as a finance based shock. The result
is robust across different model specifications; and for pre and post global financial crisis
periods.
When comparing between the bank net worth and capital quality shocks, I find that
considering the former as a financial shock or both together in the model can improve the
models ability to fit data rather than considering capital quality shock only. To validate
the claim I present detail identification mechanism of the two finance based shocks which
also shows the importance of disentangling them in the model. This provides an important
outlook that designing a shock that reflects exogenous variation in capital price only, rather
than the quantity as is the present case for capital quality shock, can be an interesting
work.
The business cycles implications of financial frictions are discussed under the assump-
tions of perfect competition in the financial sector in a closed economy representation. In
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practice the financial sectors of many countries are not very competitive as in the US,
hence, the financial frictions discussed in this chapter may not be suitable for those coun-
tries. This fact raises the following questions: What is the role of imperfectly competitive
financial sector in business cycles when we observe high concentration in the bank in-
dustry? How does a highly concentrated financial sector affect an economy’s responses to
the exogenous events in the rest of the world? Answers to these questions are discussed
in the next chapter where I investigate a different type of financial friction arising out of
high concentration in bank industry for a small open economy using a DSGE model.
3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Output
Figure A8: Brooks and Gelman’s mul-
tivariate convergence diagnostic in base
model Mθξz.
Figure A9: Smoothed leverage variable in
Mθξz and Mθz along with the US recession
bars for years 1962-2007.
3.A
.
A
ppendix
97
Figure A10: Y - historical shock decomposition in Mθξz for 1962-
2007 data.
Figure A11: E - historical shock decomposition in Mθξz for 1962-
2007 data.
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Figure A12: IRFs with 95% error bands to monetary policy, preference, price markup, and
government expenditure shocks in Mθξz for 1962-2007.
Figure A13: IRFs to monetary policy, preference, price markup, and government expendit-
ure shocks in Mθz and Mξz for 1962-2007.
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Table A8: Estimates from the model versions Mθ, Mξ, Mz,
and Mθ,ξ
Parameters Distribution Prior mean (S.D) Posterior mean and 5 and 95 percentiles
(1) (2) (3) (4) Mθ (5) Mξ (6)Mz (7) Mθ,ξ
ρi B 0.6 (0.1) 0.61[0.57, 0.65] 0.57 [0.52, 0.61] 0.48 [0.41, 0.54] 0.65 [0.59, 0.70]
ρa B 0.5 (0.2) 0.75[0.69, 0.80] 0.80[0.75, 0.85] 0.71 [0.66, ] 0.76 0.83 [0.73, 0.92]
ρz B 0.5 (0.2) - - 0.88 [0.86, 0.90] -
ρθ B 0.5 (0.2) 0.08 [0.07, 0.10] - - 0.48 [0.20, 0.68]
ρξ B 0.5 (0.2) - 0.07 [0.01, 0.13] - 0.96 [0.92, 0.99]
ρ% B 0.5 (0.2) 0.36 [0.15, 0.57] 0.85 [0.79, 0.92] 0.85 [0.75, 0.95] 0.43 [0.26, 0.62]
ρg B 0.5 (0.2) 0.63 [0.50, 0.76] 0.61[0.47, 0.75] 0.66 [0.53, 0.80] 0.61 [0.46, 0.75]
ρw B 0.5 (0.2) 0.90 [0.85, 0.95] 0.12 [0.030.20] 0.93 [0.88, 0.97] 0.64 [0.28, 0.93]
ρp B 0.5 (0.2) 0.13 [0.02, 0.21] 0.98 [0.96, 0.99] 0.12 [0.10, 0.22] 0.47 [0.06, 0.81]
σi IG 0.1 (2) 0.22 [0.20, 0.24] 0.23[0.20, 0.25] 0.25 [0.22, 0.27] 0.21 [0.19, 0.22]
σa IG 0.1 (2) 0.47 [0.42, 0.51] 0.62[0.57, 0.68] 0.48 [0.44, 0.53] 0.47 [0.41, 0.52]
σz IG 0.1 (2) - - 2.07 [1.84, 2.29] -
σθ IG 0.5 (1) 2.26 [1.85, 2.69] - - 0.47 [0.23, 0.87]
σξ IG 0.1 (2) - 0.99[0.88, 1.09] - 0.11 [0.07, 0.15]
σ% IG 0.1 (2) 1.87 [1.15, 2.52] 0.87 [0.74, 1.01] 0.94 [0.76, 1.08] 1.27 [0.92, 1.62]
σg IG 0.1 (2) 1.70 [1.54, 1.84] 1.70 [1.54, 1.84] 1.71 [1.55, 1.86] 1.69 [1.55, 1.84]
σw IG 0.1 (2) 2.58 [1.68, 3.46] 5.92 [4.20, 7.61] 3.02 [2.02, 3.99] 0.69 [0.02, 1.86]
σp IG 0.1 (2) 0.73 [0.61, 0.86] 1.03 [0.86, 1.19] 0.82 [0.65, 1.00] 0.65 [0.47, 0.82]
σNME IG 0.1 (2) 0.08 [0.02, 0.16] 0.06 [0.02, 0.11] 0.07 [0.02, 0.12] 0.12 [0.03, 0.24]
b B 0.7 (0.1) 0.78 [0.69, 0.87] 0.43[0.36, 0.50] 0.49 [0.40, 0.57] 0.68 [0.59, 0.78]
η G 0.33 (0.15) 0.46 [0.20, 0.72] 0.34 [0.13, 0.54] 0.53 [0.23, 0.82] 0.31 [0.10, 0.51]
ζ G 7.2 (0.5) 6.96 [6.15, 7.76] 6.90 [6.08, 7.71] 7.02 [6.16, 7.82] 6.95 [6.13, 7.77]
τ G 1.73 (0.1) 1.50 [1.36, 1.64] 1.31 [1.19, 1.42] 1.60 [1.44, 1.76] 1.40 [1.26, 1.53]
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Table A8: Estimates from the model versions Mθ, Mξ, Mz,
and Mθ,ξ
φp B 0.5 (0.1) 0.70 [0.65, 0.75] 0.71 [0.68, 0.74] 0.72 [0.66, 0.77] 0.72 [0.66, 0.78]
φw B 0.5 (0.1) 0.72 [0.63, 0.80] 0.21[0.12, 0.29] 0.67 [0.55, 0.79] 0.52 [0.36, 0.66]
ζp B 0.5 (0.1) 0.44 [0.30, 0.59] 0.23[0.12, 0.33] 0.47 [0.32, 61] 0.27 [0.11, 0.46]
ζw B 0.5 (0.1) 0.58 [0.43, 0.74] 0.49 [0.32, 0.66] 0.50 [0.33, 0.66] 0.48 [0.32, 0.65]
φy N 0.125 (0.1) 0.13 [0.05, 0.21] 0.17[0.1, 0.24] 0.10 [0.03, 0.17] 0.25 [0.15, 0.35]
φpi N 1.70 (0.3) 1.86 [1.65, 2.05] 1.72[1.55, 1.89] 1.71 [1.54, 1.88] 1.64 [1.40, 1.88]
MDD -605.33 -713.23 -629.22 -593.20
Note: Posterior mean estimates for model Mθ, Mξ , Mz and Mξz are in column (4), (5) (6) and (7) respectively with 5 and 95 percentiles in square brackets.
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3.A.2 Model equations
Household and labour packer
Households’s optimal conditions:
λt =
%t
Ct − bCt−1 − βb
%t+1
Ct+1 − bCt , (A15)
λt = βλt+1Rt+1. (A16)
Define ratio of Lagrange multiplier as , Λt+1 =
λt+1
λt
and combining with Eq. (A16),
1 = βΛt+1Rt+1. (A17)
The employment agency bundles the heterogeneous labours together and sells to the
production firms. The competitive labour agency’s problem is to maximise profit,
Max
Nt(l)
WPt
 1ˆ
0
Nt(l)
w−1
w dl

w
w−1
−
1ˆ
0
Wt(l)Nt(l)dl. (A18)
The first order condition is
WPt
w
w − 1
 1ˆ
0
Nt(l)
w−1
w dl

w
w−1−1
w − 1
w
Nt(l)
w−1
w
−1 = Wt(l) (A19)
⇒ Nt(l)
 1ˆ
0
Nt(l)
w−1
w dl
−
w
w−1
=
(
Wt(l)
WPt
)−w
(A20)
⇒ Nt(l) =
(
Wt(l)
WPt
)−w
Nt. (A21)
Similarly, the aggregate wage index can be derived as,
WPt Nt =
1ˆ
0
Wt(l)Nt(l)dl =
1ˆ
0
Wt(l)
1−wW wt Ntdl
⇒ (WPt )1−w = 1ˆ
0
Wt(l)
1−wdl
⇒WPt =
 1ˆ
0
Wt(l)
1−wdl

1
1−w
. (A22)
In each period, we assume there is (1-φw) probability that a household can adjust its
wage. If it cannot, then it will index its wage to lagged inflation at ςw∈(0,1). At period
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t + s, the household that last adjusted its wage in period t, charges a nominal wage
W (l)t+s = Π
ςw
t−1,t+s−1Wt(l) where Πt is the gross inflation rate. In real term, this can be
written as
Wt+s(l)
Pt+s
=
Wt(l)
Pt+s
Πςwt−1,t+s−1 ⇒ wt+s(l) = wt(l)Π−1t,t+sΠςwt−1,t+s−1. (A23)
Now the household problem becomes dynamic and household disutility of labor will
be discounted by the factor (βφw)s. We can eliminate labor as a choice by plugging in
the demand for labor (Eq.(A21)) and replacing the real wage from (Eq.(A23)). Part of
Lagrangian of household’s optimisation problem for labour services is:
L = E0
∞∑
s=0
(βφw)
s [−%t+sψ
(
wt(l)Π
−1
t,t+sΠ
ζw
t−1,t+s−1
wt+s
)−w(1+η)
N1+ηt+s
1 + η
+ ..
..+ λt+s
wt(l)Π−1t,t+sΠζwt−1,t+s−1
(
wt(l)Π
−1
t,t+sΠ
ζw
t−1,t+s−1
wt+s
)−w
Nt+s
 . (A24)
The first order condition with respect to real wage, wt(l), is
wwt(l)
−w(1+η)−1
∞∑
s=0
(βφw)
s
%tψw
w(1+η)
t+s Π
w(1+η)
t,t+s Π
−ςww(1+η)
t−1,t+s−1 N
1+η
t+s
+ (1− w)wt(l)−w
∞∑
s=0
(βφw)
s
λt+sΠ
w−1
t,t+sΠ
ςw(1−w)
t−1,t+s−1w
w
t+sNt+s = 0. (A25)
From here, we can write the common reset wage
(
w#t
)
as
w#,1+wηt =
w
w − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 (βφw)
s %tψw
w(1+η)
t+s Π
w(1+η)
t,t+s Π
−ςww(1+η)
t−1,t+s−1 N
1+η
t+s
Et
∑∞
s=0 (βφw)
s λt+sΠ
w−1
t,t+sΠ
ςw(1−w)
t−1,t+s−1w
w
t+sNt+s
. (A26)
In the left hand side of Eq. (A26) nothing depends on l. We can write this recursively as,
w#,1+wηt = Mw,t
f1,t
f2,t
, (A27)
Mw,t =
w
w − 1µ
w
t . (A28)
f1,t = %tψw
w(1+η)
t N
1+η
t + βφwΠ
w(1+η)
t+1 Π
−ςww(1+η)
t f1,t+1, (A29)
f2,t = λtw
w
t Nt + βφwΠ
w−1
t+1 Π
ςw(1−w)
t f2,t+1. (A30)
Next, applying the properties of Calvo pricing to the aggregate nominal wage index we
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get,
(W pt )
1−w = (1− φw)W#,1−wt +
1ˆ
1−φw
(Πt−1)ζw(1−w)W (l)1−wt−1 dl. (A31)
Dividing both sides by P 1−wt gives the real wage as
(wt)
1−w = (1− φw)w#,1−wt + (Πt−1)ζw(1−w)(Πt)w−1φww1−wt−1 . (A32)
Financial intermediaries
Initial balance sheet condition is, QtSt = Bt+1 + Et. Terminal wealth that bankers max-
imise,
Vj,t = maxEt
∞∑
i=0
(1− θt+1) θitβi+1Λt,t+1+i (Ejt+1+i) . (A33)
Linear value function of wealth: Vj,t = νtQtSjt +HtEj,t of which,
νt = Et {(1− θt+1)βΛt,t+1(Rk,t+1 −Rt+1) + θt+1βΛt,t+1mt,t+1νt+1} , (A34)
Ht = Et {(1− θt+1)βΛt,t+1Rt+1 + βΛt,t+1θt+1jt+1Ht+1} , (A35)
mt,t+1 =
Qj,t+1Sj,t+1
QtSj,t
, (A36)
jt,t+1 =
Ejt+1
Ejt
. (A37)
If the constraint, Vj,t(Sj,t, Bj,t) ≥ λdQtSj,t, binds then
QtSj,t =
Ht
λd − νtEj,t = φtEj,t, (A38)
Dynamics of the net worth
Ej,t+1 = [Rt+1 + (Rk,t+1 −Rt+1)φt]Ej,t. (A39)
Then, mt,t+1 =
φt+1Ej,t+1
φtEj,t
= φt+1φt jt,t+1, and jt,t+1 = Rt+1 + (Rk,t+1−Rt+1)φt. Aggregating
across all banks we get,
QtSt = φtEt. (A40)
New bankers start up net worth is Ent = Ω1−θt (1− θt)QtSt−1 = ΩQtSt−1. Total net worth
in the banking sector,
Et = Eet + Ent = θt [(Rk,t −Rt)φt−1 +Rt]Et−1 + ΩQtSt−1. (A41)
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Production sector and the Retailers
Optimal conditions of intermediate goods producers:
Pm,t(1− α)Ym,t
Nt
= wt, (A42)
Pm,tα
Ym,t
Ut
= b1U
ζ
t ξtKt, (A43)
Rk,t+1 =
Pm,t+1α
Ym,t+1
Kt+1
+ (Qt+1 − δ(Ut+1)) ξt+1
Qt
. (A44)
Final output is a CES aggregate of all retailers output: Yt =
[´ 1
0 Y
p−1
p
ft
] p
p−1
and
aggregate price Pt =
[´ 1
0 P
1−p
ft df
] 1
1−p .
Max
< Pft >
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βφp)
s Λt+s
(
Π
ζp(1−p)
t−1,t+s−1P
1−p
ft P
p−1
t+s Yt+s − PmtΠ−ζppt−1,t+s−1P−pft P pt+sYt+s
)
.
(A45)
The first order condition is,
(1− p)P−pft Et
∞∑
s=0
(βφp)
s Λt+sΠ
ζp(1−p)
t−1,t+s−1P
p−1
t+s Yt+s
+pP
−p−1
ft Et
∞∑
s=0
(βφp)
s Λt+sΠ
−ζpp
t−1,t+s−1PmtP
p
t+sYt+s = 0,
which can be rearranged as
Pft =
p
p − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 (βφp)
s Λt+sΠ
−ζpp
t−1,t+s−1Pm,tP
p
t+sYt+s
Et
∑∞
s=0 (βφp)
s Λt+sΠ
ζp(1−p)
t−1,t+s−1P
p−1
t+s Yt+s
. (A46)
After recursively writing, we get the optimal reset price as,
P#t = Mp,t
X1,t
X2,t
, (A47)
Mp,t =
p
p − 1µ
p
t , (A48)
X1,t = Pm,tP
p
t Yt + φpβΛt+1(Πt)
−ζppX1,t+1, (A49)
X2,t = P
p−1
t Yt + φpβΛt+1(Πt)
ζp(1−p)X2,t+1. (A50)
After dividing Eq.(A49) by P pt and Eq.(A50) by P
p−1
t and defining
X1,t+1
P
p
t
= x1,t,
X2,t+1
P
p−1
t
=
x2,t and Π
#
t as the reset price inflation, we get
x1,t = Pm,tYt + φpβΛt+1(Πt)
−ζppΠpt+1x1,t+1, (A51)
x2,t = Yt + φpβΛt+1(Πt)
ζp(1−p)Π(p−1)t+1 x2,t+1, (A52)
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Π#t = Mp,t
x1,t
x2,t
Πt. (A53)
Capital goods producers
QtZt
[
1− τ
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
− τ
(
It
It−1
− 1
)
It
It−1
]
+βQt+1
λt+1
λt
Zt+1τ
(
It+1
It
− 1
)(
It+1
It
)2
= 1.
(A54)
Aggregation
The price dispersion, νpt , is,
νpt = φpν
p
t−1(Πt−1)
−ζppΠpt + (1− φp)
(
1− φpΠζp(1−φp)t−1 Πφp−1t
1− φp
)− p
1−φp
. (A55)
Evolution of aggregate price is (Pt)1−p = (1 − φp)P#,1−pt +
´ 1
1−φp(Πt−1)
ζp(1−p)P 1−pf,t−1df.
This can be written in terms of the inflation rate:
(Πt)
1−p = (1− φp)(Π#t )1−p + φp(Πt−1)ζp(1−p). (A56)
Fisher equation (the link between nominal and real interest rate) can be described as
1 + it = (Rt+1)(Πt+1).
3.A.3 Log-linearised equations
Household sector and labour market
λt =
−1
(1− b) (1− βb) [Ct − bCt−1 − βb (Ct+1 − bCt)− (1− b) (%t − βb%t+1)] ; (A57)
Λt+1 +Rt+1 = 0; (A58)
Λt+1 = λt+1 − λt; (A59)
(1 + wη)w
#
t = f1,t − f2,t + µwt ; (A60)
f1f1,t = ψw
w(1+η)N1+η [w (1 + η)wt + (1 + η)Nt + %t] (A61)
+φwβf1 [−ζww (1 + η) Πt + w (1 + η) Πt+1 + f1,t+1] ;
f2f2,t = w
wN.λ [λt + wwt +Nt] + φwβf2 [ζw (1− w) Πt + (w − 1) Πt+1 + f2,t+1] ;
(A62)
wt = (1− φw)w#t + φw (ζwΠt−1 −Πt + wt−1) . (A63)
Financial sector
ννˆt = (1− θ)β [(Rk −R) Λt+1 +RkRk,t+1 −RRt+1]− θβ (Rk −R) θt+1
+βθmν (Λt+1 + νt+1 +mt+1 + θt+1) ; (A64)
HHˆt = (1− θ)βR (Λt+1 +Rt+1)− βθRθt+1 + βθjH (Λt+1 + jt+1 +Ht+1 + θt+1) ; (A65)
λdφφt − φν (νt + φt) = HHt; (A66)
mt = φt+1 − φt + jt+1; (A67)
jjt = φφt−1 (Rk −R) + φ (RkRk,t −RRt) +RRt; (A68)
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Et =
Ee
E
Ee,t +
En
E
En,t; (A69)
Ee,t = jt + Et−1; (A70)
En,t = Qt + kt + ξt; (A71)
efpt+1 = Rkt+1 −Rt+1. (A72)
Intermediate goods sector
wt = Pm,t + Ym,t −Nt; (A73)
RkK (Rk,t+1 +Qt +Kt+1) = αYmPm (Pm,t+1 + Ym,t+1) +K (Qt+1 + ξt+1 +Kt+1)
−δK (δt+1 + ξt+1 +Kt+1) ; (A74)
Ym,t = At + αUt + αξt + αKt + (1− α)Nt; (A75)
δ
δ − δss δt = (1 + ζ)Ut; (A76)
Pm,t + Ym,t − Ut = ζUt + ξt +Kt. (A77)
Capital producer
Qt = τ (It − It−1)− βτ (It+1 − It)− zt; (A78)
KKt+1 = I (zt + It) +K (ξt +Kt)− δK (δ(U)t + ξt +Kt) . (A79)
Retail sector
Yt = Ym,t + ν
p
t ; (A80)
νpt = φp
(
νpt−1 − ζppΠt−1 + pΠt
)
+ p
φp
1− φp {(1− φp) ζpΠt−1 + (φp − 1) Πt} ; (A81)
x1x1,t = Y Pm (Yt + Pm,t) + βφpx1 [Λt+1 + x1,t+1 − ζppΠt + pΠt+1] ; (A82)
x2x2,t = Y Yt + βφpx2 [ζp (1− p) Πt + Λt+1 + x2,t+1 + (p − 1)Πt+1] ; (A83)
Π#t = x1,t − x2,t + Πt + µpt ; (A84)
Πt = φpζpΠt−1 + (1− φp) Π#t . (A85)
Government, monetary policy and others
Gt = ω
g
t + Yt; (A86)
Y Yt = CCt + IIt + 0.2Y (Yt + ω
g
t ) ; (A87)
it = Rt+1 + Πt+1; (A88)
it = ρiit−1 + (1− ρi) [φΠΠt + φY (Yt − Yt−1) + ei,t] ; (A89)
efpt = Rk,t+1 −Rt+1; (A90)
γγt = κ.efpt; (A91)
qt +Kt+1 = φc,t + Et; (A92)
φc,t + γt = φt. (A93)
3.A.4 Data construction
Details of the data construction to match with the model variables are as follows:
Output: Nominal GDP (Line 1, Table 1.1.5 BEA) is divided by civilian non-institutional
population (CNP) (BLS Series: LNU00000000) and GDP deflator (Line 1, Table 1.1.4
BEA ).
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Consumption: Personal consumption expenditure ( Line 5 &6, Table 1.1.5 BEA) including
non-durable goods and services divided by CNP and GDP deflator.
Investment: Non residential and residential fixed investment (Line 9, 12 , Table 1.1.5 BEA)
and consumption expenditure on durable goods (Line 4, Table 1.1.5 BEA) are considered
as investment which is then divided by CNP and GDP deflator.
Hours worked: Total hours worked in non-farm business sector (Series PRS85006033 BLS)
divided by CNP.
Inflation: Computed as log difference of the GDP deflator (Line 1, Table 1.1.4 BEA ).
Nominal interest rate: Effective Federal Funds Rate (Series FEDFUNDS, FRED database-
FED St.Louis) divided by four to make quarterly rate.
Spread: The proxy for spread or external finance premium is the difference between
Moody’s seasoned BAA corporate bond yield and the long term government bond yield
(FRED database-FED St.Louis).
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Chapter 4
Oligopolistic financial sector in a
small open economy
Abstract
The chapter constructs a small open-economy model with an oligopolistic banking sector.
Imperfect competition among banks is measured through mark ups in lending rates which
depend on the number of competing banks. The number of banks in turn is determined en-
dogenously. Using Australian data, the estimated model implies a countercyclical interest
mark-up that varies inversely with the number of banks. The market power of banks often
amplifies business cycles, depending on the type of shock. Such competition in the banking
sector has a distinct shock propagation mechanism that is worthy of serious consideration
by economists and policymakers.
4.1 Introduction
Financial sector is understudied in DSGE model with oligopolistic competition. Al-
though a number of studies discuss such competition effect for goods production sector
in business cycle literature, structural models with financial sector are often muted about
the strategic interaction between banks, endogeneity of the number of competitors and the
impact of new bank entry on the strategic interactions. These are particularly important
for countries where financial sector is highly concentrated.
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Figure 4.1: 5-bank asset concentration (1996-2014)
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Among OECD countries, the 5-Bank asset concentration ratio prrsented in Fig.4.1, shows
that five banks hold more than 80 percent of total bank assets in Australia, Canada,
New Zealand and in Euro area. In contrast, asset market is less concentrated in the
USA, UK and Japan. A highly concentrated and oligopolistic bank industry, through
strategic interaction between the banks, can affect loan pricing, volume and other non-
interest charges in a way that make banking services expensive and at suboptimal level.
An oligopolistic bank model with endogenous entry suggests a causality that an in-
creasing mass of banks leads to declining market shares of the existing banks. During
an economic boom, greater profit opportunities and lower entry costs may encourage new
banks to enter the market which in turn lowers the concentration ratio. Reduced market
share of each bank weakens a bank’s ability to charge high interest mark ups. This indic-
ates that the incumbent banks enjoy more market power in recessions as weaker banks exit
the market or are taken over by the big banks (e.g St. George bank being taken over by
Westpac bank in Australia in December 2008). In Australian data, although the number
of banks operating in the market is pro-cyclical, its correlation with output is not high as
shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Correlations between loan markup, banks and output
Mark up Output No. of banks
Mark up 1
Output -0.1516 1
No. of banks -0.2143 0.1199 1
Source: Author’s calculation from Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and Re-
serve Bank of Australia (RBA) statistics. Correlations are in de-trended data.
In Australia, the top four banks hold more than eighty percent of total deposits and
loans. Fig.4.2 shows, starting from 2004, that the top four banks’ shares were declining
slightly from 80 percent level and then rising steadily above 80 percent after September
2008.
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Figure 4.2: Market share of the big four banks* in Australia (2004-2016)
Source: Author’s calculation from Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) statistics. * The banks are ANZ Bank, Commonwealth Bank, National
Australia Bank, and Westpac Bank
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Given the growth condition before 2008, the growing entry of smaller banks facilitated the
decline in share of big four banks which was sharply reversed when the global financial
crisis unfolded. The trend is similar for total bank assets and liabilities. If more banks
enter the market, then existing banks’ ability to set higher interest mark ups is curbed.
Perfect competition assumption commonly held in DSGE models with financial frictions
can be inappropriate for some countries. High profitability of the oligopolistic banks ensures
large capital bases and strong balance sheet positions compared to the perfectly competitive
banks. Therefore, the roles of banks as accelerators and the endogenous bank balance sheet
constraint discussed in Chapter 3 may be different under oligopolistic competition. Also,
greater power in loan market may deter the incumbent banks from sufficiently responding
to monetary policy changes, making the ground difficult for monetary policy to influence
retail lending rates.
Different from the analysis of financial frictions in the literature (Bernanke et al. 1999a,
Gertler & Karadi 2011 and Gerali et al. 2010 for example), this chapter examines the
financial sector in terms of its market competition structure in a DSGE model. Hence, the
chapter is related to the literature of endogenous firm entry and imperfect competition,
mainly monopolistic competition, as in Ghironi & Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie et al. (2008).
Based on these studies, the work of Etro & Colciago (2010) analyses strategic interaction
and endogenous firm entry in terms of both Bertrand competition and Cournot competition
for goods production market. The contributions of oligopolistic models such as, Etro &
Colciago (2010), Faia (2012) and others feature supply side strategic complementarities in
which the dependence between mark up and the number of firms arises from oligopolistic
competition.
Influenced by the work of Etro & Colciago (2010) and others on the product market,
I bring such oligopolistic (Bertrand) competition in the finance sector where banks are
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able to set the prices (lending rates) of their products (i.e loans) based on their market
power. Although empirical studies investigate monopolistically competitive finance sector
(e.g Gerali et al. 2010), the literature (except Totzek 2011, to the best of my knowledge)
has not expanded much in the direction of a scenario where loan mark up depends inversely
on the number of competing banks. Totzek (2011) applies this theory to the bank sector
in a calibrated DSGE model where bank loans are created to finance wage bills. The
close economy model of Totzek (2011) has no capital accumulation, hence the model is not
suitable to investigate the role of oligopolistic bank competition on investment and capital
dynamics as well as impacts of financial shocks relating to the asset market.
Therefore, main objective of Chapter 4 is to construct a DSGE model to study the
oligopolistic bank sector from the macro perspective of a small open economy in which
bank loans are used to finance capital expenditures. To assess whether oligopolistic banks
amplify or neutralise foreign shock impacts, the model is expanded with standard open
economy features along the lines of Adolfson et al. (2007) for the Euro area and Jasskela
& Nimark (2011) for Australia. Then, a Bayesian estimation of the model is carried out
with Australian data as the country is characterised by such a bank sector. So, this study
contributes to the literature by answering following questions: whether frictions arising
from oligopolistic competition among banks are important in modelling an economy with
highly concentrated bank industry; and how such financial frictions affect the transmission
mechanisms of various real sector shocks arising in domestic and external economies? The
issues are also analysed by comparing these results with those from a competitive finance
sector case. From a modelling perspective, the departure point is the model described in
Chapter 3, which is reconstructed to capture the oligopolistic competition in the financial
sector. This is purely a supply side friction, similar to Gertler & Karadi (2011), but the
source of friction is market power of the banks rather than any agency problem between
depositors and bankers.
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The main contributions of this chapter are: it captures strategic interactions among
financial intermediaries in an estimated DSGE model and thereby studies the links between
the endogeneity of the intermediaries and the business cycles properties of an open eco-
nomy. Additionally, the chapter compares the role of oligopolistic bank sector to a perfectly
competitive case to filter out the imperfect competition effects. Second, the chapter re-
designs the firm entry condition in case of bank sector where a prospective bank requires
a fixed sunk entry cost (deposits or other household resources) and the overall entry cost
is inversely affected by the neutral technology shock. A positive technology shock is ex-
pected to reduce the costs of new entrants and thereby facilitates banks to enter into the
market. This is a novel feature of the model and thus, neutral technology shock is truly an
economy wide shock in the model. Third, the bank loan is linked to the real sector through
financing capital expenditures (including housing) instead of working capital (wage cost)
of domestic production. This allows us to study the impacts of oligopolistic banks on cap-
ital accumulation and investment dynamics, and shocks therein. Fourth, external shocks
are highly emphasised in open economy VAR based studies, hence, this chapter analyses
whether oligopolistic banks act as cushions or amplifiers to such shocks. Finally, given
that there are few estimation examples of endogenous firm entry models, the estimation
of the current study aims to help future research in this line. No study to date analyses
the imperfect competition of Australian bank sector from a macro perspective. The official
model of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) (Rees et al. 2016), contains a separate
resource sector but does not consider any financial sector in it.
The main results suggest that oligopolistic competition with endogenous bank entry
can produce empirically stylised facts such as counter cyclical mark ups in lending rates.
However, the response is estimated to be small for Australia. Second, financial sector may
act as an accelerator for some but not for every shock. Foreign shocks, along with domestic
shocks, are important for both output and employment variations while monetary policy
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has a smaller role.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 contains the model
description while Section 4.3 describes data and estimation details. Fit of the estimated
model is discussed in Section 4.4. Model applications and a comparison with competitive
bank sector are discussed in Section 4.5. The sensitivity of the baseline estimation is
presented in Section 4.6. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes the discussion.
4.2 Model
This section contains the construction of the model economy that has an oligopolist-
ically competitive financial sector. The model in built upon the model in Chapter 3 by
expanding it to two important dimensions: financial frictions due to oligopolistic compet-
ition, and trade and financial flows with the rest of the world. All model equations and
their log-linearized version are listed in the Appendix Section 4.A.
4.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households of measure unity and their characteristics, including
labour supply decisions, are similar to Chapter 3. Now, households save a fraction of their
income as domestic bank deposits (Bt) and in foreign bonds (B∗t ), pay taxes (Tt) and receive
transfers (net-transfer) from the ownerships of firms. Household’s consumption basket (Ct)
is a CES aggregate of domestic (Cd,t) and imported (Cm,t) consumption goods. Banks are
owned by households, so, they hold bank shares xt at value νt. The number of total banks
in any period is NhB,t = NB,t+NBE,t. Here, NB,t is the mass of banks that are in operation
and gives dividend income dt. Newly entrant banks, NBE,t, are assumed to take some time
to start banking operation after entering the market. Assuming δb as the probability that
a bank may die/exit, the evolution of banks occur as,
NB,t+1 =
(
1− δb
)
(NB,t +NBE,t) . (4.1)
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The household utility function is standard and consists of consumption with habit (b)
formation and labour supply as,
E
∞∑
s=0
βs%t+s
[
ln(Ct+s − bCt+s−1)− ψNt+s(l)
1+η
1 + η
]
. (4.2)
Households maximise utility subject to
Wt(l)
Pt
Nt(l) + (1 + it)
Bt
Pt
− Bt+1
Pt
+ (1 + i∗t ) Φ
(
˜fat,φ˜t
) StB∗t
Pt
− StB
∗
t+1
Pt
+
B∗t (St − St−1)
Pt
+ νtxt+1 + nettransfert − xt
(dt + νt)
− Pc,t
Pt
Ct − Tt = 0 (4.3)
and a downward sloping labour demand curve from the employment agency. Here, %t is
the inter-temporal preference shock that affects the marginal utility of consumption and
marginal dis-utility of labour and follows a mean zero AR(1) process, log%t = ρ%log%t−1 +
ε%,t with ε%,t:i.i.d(0, σ2%). Similar to Adolfson et al. (2007), Φ
(
˜fat,φ˜t
)
is a premium on
foreign bond holdings. The premium depends on the real aggregate net foreign asset
(
˜fat
)
position of the domestic economy, defined as fat ≡ StB
∗
t+1
Pt
, and on φ˜t which is a shock to
the risk premium. Here, Pt is the domestic production price and Pc,t is the consumer price
(CPI). Deposits earn net interest rate it in domestic market, whereas interest rate in the
foreign market is i∗t . Here, ψ is the coefficient of leisure and η is the inverse Frisch elasticity
parameter. In each period, there is (1 − φw) probability that a household can adjust its
wage. If it cannot, then it indexes the wage to the lagged inflation at rate ςw∈(0,1). The
optimal conditions are:
Pc,t
Pt
λt =
%t
Ct − bCt−1 − βb
%t+1
Ct+1 − bCt , (4.4)
λtνt = βλt+1
1
(dt+1 + νt+1)
, (4.5)
1 = βΛt+1Rt+1, (4.6)
λt
St
Pt
= βλt+1
St+1
Pt+1
(1 + i∗t ) Φ
(
˜fat,φ˜t
)
+ βλt+1
(St+1 − St)
Pt+1
, (4.7)
wwt(l)
−w(1+η)−1
∞∑
s=0
(βφw)
s %tψw
w(1+η)
t+s Π
w(1+η)
t,t+s Π
−ςww(1+η)
c,t−1,t+s−1N
1+η
t+s
+(1− w)wt(l)−w
∞∑
s=0
(βφw)
s λt+sΠ
w−1
t,t+sΠ
ςw(1−w)
c,t−1,t+s−1w
w
t+sNt+s = 0. (4.8)
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Here, I define Λt+1 =
λt+1
λt
in Eq.(4.6) and Rt is the real interest rate coming from
Fisher relation. Eq.(4.6) and Eq.(4.7) imply,
1 =
St+1
St
(1 + i∗t )
(1 + it)
Φ
(
˜fat,φ˜t
)
+
1
(1 + it)
(
St+1
St
− 1
)
. (4.9)
In Eq.(4.8), the model assumes a time varying wage mark-up, ww−1µ
w
t , similar to
Chapter 3 but now Πt is domestic producers price inflation and Πc,t is consumer price
inflation.
4.2.2 Financial intermediaries
Banks collect deposits from domestic households without facing any competition in deposit
collection and lend these funds to the intermediate production sector for acquiring capital
machineries (including housing etc. as in Chapter 3). Thus, market power is analysed
for the loan market only, not for deposits since Olivero (2010) and references therein find
little evidence for market power in deposit market. In the model, bank loan is connected
to the real sector’s need for financing capital expenditures, in order to find the impacts of
oligopolistic bank competition on capital accumulation directly for investment and capital
related shocks. This is different from the model of Totzek (2011) which has no capital
accumulation and bank loan is used to finance working capital loans. Here, banking sector
is assumed not directly to be connected to the rest of the world and activities are limited
within the domestic economy for simplicity. This is a reasonable assumption in case of
Australia, given that the Australian banks have smaller exposure to the international
financial market which is even shrinking recently (RBA April 2017). For simplicity, I
also assume there is no regulatory cash reserve requirement, hence, banks can use the
entire deposits and/or money market credits to make loans. Bank customers are loyal
and reluctant to switch to other banks frequently, which is a reasonable assumption for
Australia (see more on banking habit in Australia in Fear et al. 2010).
Higher profit opportunities during economic boom attract more banks to enter the
4.2. Model 119
market and increase the number of banks. This results in a decrease in the market share
of each single bank operating in the market and thereby decreases the power to charge
mark ups higher above the marginal costs of making loans. Reduced interest mark ups will
decrease the marginal costs of domestic production sector and may increase the demand
for capital machineries for more production activities. As a feedback effect, the increased
demand for capital increases the stock market price of capital which in turn improves
the bank balance sheet condition through collateral valuation channel. Improved balance
sheet condition tends to ease credit market condition further, accelerating the economic
boom. Therefore, increased demand for loans and greater profit opportunities in bank
sector indicate financial accelerator effects. In contrary, if barriers to entry is high in
terms of high entry costs, bigger profit opportunities can make existing oligopolistic banks
stronger in terms of balance sheet positions, compared to the competitive banks. It implies
greater financial stability under oligopolistic competition that goes in opposite direction of
the accelerator effect. However, financial stability is dependent on loan default probability
along with many other factors which the model does not deal with to maintain simplicity.
The linear loan production function of a particular bank j is, oj,t = Fj,t, where loan oj,t
is created out of funds Fj,t which consists of deposits and money market credits. Similar
to Hulsewig et al. (2009) and Totzek (2011) it is assumed that deposits (Bt) and money
market credit (mt) are perfect substitute and banks pay same return it for them. This
also implies that central bank’s policy rate (it) and money market rate
(
iMt
)
are equal:
it = i
M
t . So banks pay competitive rates in deposit market but act strategically in loan
market (with symmetric equilibria). If NB,t > 1 is the mass of banks in the market, then
real aggregate loan, Ot, using Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator is,
Ot =
[ˆ NB
0
o
b−1
b
j,t
] b
b−1
(4.10)
where, b > 1 is the intra-temporal elasticity between loans. Aggregate loan Ot = Qt−1Kt
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where, Qt−1 is the price of capital Kt. We assume, there are only few banks in the market,
therefore, each bank j can control the return rkj,t on its loans depending on its market
share. Therefore, aggregate loan rate (Rk,t) is,
Rk,t =
[ˆ NB
0
r1−bk,jt dj
] 1
1−b
. (4.11)
This results in a downward sloping loan demand function faced by an individual bank
j:
oj,t =
(
rk,jt
Rk,t
)−b
Ot. (4.12)
The individual bank j’s profit function per period can be written as
dj,t = rk,jtoj,t−(1 + it)Bj,t−
(
1 + iMt
)
mj,t = rk,jtoj,t−(1+it) (Bj,t +mj,t) = [rk,jt − (1 + it)] oj,t,
(4.13)
where, mj,t is the net position in the money market. Thus a bank maximises profit
Max.
rk,j,t
dj,t = [rk,jt − (1 + it)] oj,t (4.14)
subject to the loan demand Eq.(4.12). It is assumed that total lending is equalised
between banks by their customers and this is also perceived as given by the banks. Each
bank j chooses rk,jt to maximise its profit taken into account the rates of other banks. The
optimal condition with respect to rk,jt:
δdj,t
δrk,jt
= oj,t + rk,jt
δoj,t
δrk,jt
− (1 + it) δoj,t
δrk,jt
= 0. (4.15)
Under strategic rate setting, the effect of a change in lending rate on demand for loan
can be decomposed into:
δoj,t
δrk,jt
= −b 1
rk,jt
(
rk,jt
Rk,t
)−b
Ot + b
(
rk,jt
Rk,t
)−b 1
Rk,t
Ot
δRk,t
δrk,jt
(4.16)
where, δRk,tδrk,jt =
(
rk,jt
Rk,t
)−b
. Individual loan rate rkj,t affects the aggregate loan rate Rk,t
directly and thereby quantity of loan. This is in contrast to monopolistic competition.
Applying Eq.(4.12) we get the following:
δRk,t
δrk,jt
=
oj,t
Ot
. (4.17)
We can define the market share of an individual bank j as ςjt ≡ rk,jtoj,tRk,tOt and insert
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Eq.(4.17) into Eq.(4.16) to get how an individual loan rate affects the demand for loan:
δoj,t
δrk,jt
= b
oj,t
rk,jt
(ςjt − 1) . (4.18)
We can solve the first order condition (Eq.(4.15)) further using Eq.(4.18) as,
rk,jt =
(1− ςjt) b
(1− ςjt) b − 1 (1 + it) = µjt (1 + it) , (4.19)
where,
µjt =
(1− ςjt) b
(1− ςjt) b − 1 =
b
b − 1(1−ςjt)
. (4.20)
Eq.(4.20) suggests that mark up, µjt, of bank j depends on its market share (ςjt) and intra-
temporal elasticity (b). This mark up condition, Eq.(4.20), is similar to other studies in
oligopolistic competition and endogenous firm entry literature such as Faia (2012) for the
production sector and Totzek (2011) for the finance sector. As, ςjt → 0, then mark up
µjt → bb−1 which is a constant. If there are numerous banks in the market that each holding
very little market share, then mark up depends only on the elasticity (b), similar to the
monopolistic competition. Assuming symmetry between NB,t banks implies, oj,t = ot and
rkj,t = rk,t. Then Eq.(4.12) and Eq.(4.11) can be written as,
Ot = N
b
b−1
B,t ot, (4.21)
Rk,t = N
1
1−b
B,t rk,t. (4.22)
Eq.(4.21) and Eq.(4.22) suggest that if the mass of banks increases, aggregate loan in the
market increases too with a decrease in lending rate. Under symmetry between banks, the
definition of market share can also be expressed as ςjt = ςt =
rk,tot
Rk,tOt
= 1NB,t . This allows
us to write the mark up Eq.(4.20) and optimal condition Eq.(4.19) respectively as,
µt =
(NB,t − 1) b
(NB,t − 1) b −NB,t , (4.23)
rk,t =
(NB,t − 1) b
(NB,t − 1) b −NB,t (1 + it) = µt (1 + it) . (4.24)
Eq.(4.24) is the optimal condition with the assumption that banks face no adjustment
costs in changing loan rates. Alternatively, we can assume that banks face quadratic
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adjustment costs as in Rotemberg (1982) style, when changing loan rates:
Ω =
κb
2
(
rk,t
rk,t−1
− 1
)2
Ot, (4.25)
where, κb is the adjustment cost (e.g menu costs) parameter. If κb = 0, we end up with
the flexible rate case Eq.(4.24). Bank’s profit and optimal condition with such adjustment
cost change to
dj,t = [rk,jt − (1 + it)] oj,t − κb
2
(
rk,jt
rk,t−1
− 1
)2
Ot, (4.26)
rkj,t =
(1− ςjt) b
(1− ςjt) b − 1 (1 + it)−
κb
(1− ςjt) b − 1θj,t (4.27)
where,
θj,t =
(
rk,jt
rk,jt−1
− 1
)
rk,jt
rk,jt−1
Ot
oj,t
− βΛt+1
(
rk,jt+1
rk,jt
− 1
)
rk,jt+1
rk,jt
Ot+1
oj,t
. (4.28)
Bank entry
The endogenous bank entry condition relates to the firm entry model such as Etro &
Colciago (2010) and Bilbiie et al. (2008). The number of banks in the economy evolves
according to Eq.(4.1). The number of new banks entering each period, NBE,t, is determined
by an entry condition. It is assumed that entry requires a fixed cost of loan production in
units of deposits. The loan production function suggests that costs of one dollar loan is
it that earns a gross return Rk,t. So, a spending of 1 + it produces a gross loan including
return Rk,t. Normalising the deposit cost by lending rate gives the marginal cost of one
dollar gross loan, 1+itRk,t . Before entering the market, banks incur a fixed sunk cost, fe (as in
Bilbiie et al. 2012) which is proportional to the real marginal cost of its loan. Here, I assume
fe as fixed in the base line model. If the sunk cost is high, entry becomes difficult for new
entrants. I further assume that the neutral technology shock, At, affects the productivity
of the resources required to set up a bank, and therefore, affects the overall costs of entry
inversely. For example, a positive technology shock is likely to make the resources more
effective that reduces the required sunk costs, thus, facilitating bank entry. Hence, the
assumption that this shock affects the productivity of resources in the goods production
and also in bank creation appears reasonable. This makes neutral technology At a truly
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economy wide shock in this model. Hence, different from Totzek (2011), the bank entry
cost is defined as,
CostBE,t = fe.
1 + it
AtRk,t
. (4.29)
Bilbiie et al. (2012) describes entry costs as development and set-up cost for new firms.
Given the nature of the banking firms, the required fixed sunk cost is expected to be much
higher than that required in the goods production sector which should be reflected in the
calibration of the model. New banking firms want to enter the market if entry is profitable.
Entry condition dictates that new banks enter into the market until the value of a bank
(νt) is equal to the entry costs:
νt = fe.
1 + it
AtRk,t
. (4.30)
Applying Fisher equation and Eq.(4.19), bank entry condition reduces to
νt = fe
Rt+1Πc,t+1
Atrk,tN
1
1−b
B,t
= fe
Rt+1Πc,t+1
At (µt (1 + it))N
1
1−b
B,t
= fe
Rt+1Πc,t+1
At (µtRt+1Πc,t+1)N
1
1−b
B,t
= fe
N
1
b−1
B,t
Atµt
.
(4.31)
Here, the bank value νt is given by the Euler equation for bank share (Eq.(4.5)):
νt =
(
1− δb
)
βΛt+1
1
(dt+1 + νt+1)
. (4.32)
4.2.3 Domestic production sector
Domestic intermediate goods producers borrow from banks in a frictionless manner to
finance capital expenditures (QtKt+1) and pay interest rate Rk,t charged by the banks.
The production function is
Ym,t = At(utξtKt)
αN1−αt , (4.33)
where, ξt is a source of exogenous variations in the quality of capital as described in
Chapter 3. Although Gertler & Karadi (2011) introduced ξt to replicate the US housing
market collapse, the shock cannot distinguish between exogenous changes in asset price
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and physical destruction of capital (see Afrin 2017 for details). Nevertheless, it serves as
an important shock which has not been analysed for Australia. It is assumed that both At
and ξt follow AR(1) processes similar to Chapter 3. I keep the capital depreciation rate
(δt) variable with utilisation rate (ut), as in Born et al. (2013) :
δ (ut) = δ0 + δ1 (ut − 1) + δ2
2
(ut − 1)2 ; (4.34)
where δ0 is the steady state fixed depreciation rate. The intermediate goods sector is a
price taker in its output market. If output price is Pm,t then firm’s optimising behaviour
shows that the return to the capital is affected by the exogenous variation in quality of
capital:
Rk,t+1 =
Pm,t+1α
Ym,t+1
Kt+1
+ (Qt+1 − δ(ut+1)) ξt+1
Qt
. (4.35)
A separate retail sector, similar to Chapter 3 is considered to bring the nominal price ri-
gidities in the domestic output market. The optimal pricing condition of domestic retailers
in terms of re-set price inflation
(
Π#t
)
is in Appendix.
4.2.4 Capital goods producers
Domestic and foreign investment goods are related by CES aggregation:
It+s =
[
(1− ωi)
1
ηi I
ηi−1
ηi
d,t+s + ω
1
ηi
i I
ηi−1
ηi
m,t+s
] ηi
ηi−1
, (4.36)
where ωi is the share of imported investment in It and ηi is the elasticity of substitution
between them. Aggregate price for investment goods: Pi,t =
[
(1− ωi)P 1−ηit + ωiP 1−ηim,i,t
] 1
(1−ηi) .
The capital producing firms buy used capital from the intermediate sector and repair the
depreciated capital. Competitive capital producing firms also produce new capital goods
and sell the new and refurbished capital machinery to the intermediate firms. Aggregate
capital accumulation process can be described as,
Kt+1 = Zt
(
1− τ
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2)
It + ξt (1− δ (ut))Kt. (4.37)
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Here, Zt is the marginal efficiency of investment (MEI) or investment specific technology
shock that follow AR(1) process with parameterisation as in Chapter 3. Here, τ is the
inverse elasticity of net investment parameter in quadratic capital adjustment cost. Capital
price, Qt ≡ Q˜tPi,t , is determined by the optimising behaviour of the capital producing firms.
Capital producers maximise the following discounted profit in real term:
Max
< It >
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
λt+s
λt+s−1{
˜Qt+s
Pi,t+s
[
Zt+s
(
1− τ
2
(
It+s
It+s−1
− 1
)2)
It+s
]
− Pi,t+s
Pi,t+s
It+s − (
¯Qt+s −Qt+s)
Pt+s
Kt+s
}
.
(4.38)
The optimal condition is,
Q˜t
Pi,t
Zt
[
1− τ
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
− τ
(
It
It−1
− 1
)
It
It−1
]
+β
˜Qt+1
Pi,t+1
λt+1
λt
Zt+1τ
(
It+1
It
− 1
)(
It+1
It
)2
= 1.
(4.39)
4.2.5 Imports, Exports and Balance of Payments
The trade features of the model economy are standard and have conceptual similarities to
Adolfson et al. (2007), hence the detail description is skipped. One of the differences from
Adolfson et al. (2007) is that I do not incorporate any trend inflation in any of the sectors for
simplicity, hence, my model is stationary. Also the external sector is structural, not a VAR
specification. In addition, the assumptions relating to depreciation, capital utilisation,
and investment adjustment costs in previous subsections are different from Adolfson et al.
(2007). Importers of consumption (Cm,t) and investment (Im,t) goods are assumed to be
monopolistically competitive. Calvo price set up, similar to domestic retailers, is assumed.
There is a (1− φmc) probability that a consumption goods importer can change price in
a period. If it cannot, it indexes price to last year’s inflation. Thus, Pmc,t+1 = pi
ζmc
mc,tPmc,t.
The profit function of the consumption importer:
Max
< P jmc,t >
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βφmc)
s Λt+s
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[
pi
ζmc(1−mc)
mc,t−1,t+s−1P
j1−mc
mc,t P
mc−1
mc,t+sCm,t+s −mcmc,t+spi−ζcmmcmc,t−1,t+s−1P j
−mc
mc,t P
mc
mc,t+sCm,t+s
]
(4.40)
where, marginal cost mcmc,t+s =
P ∗t+sSt+s
Pmc,t+s
and foreign currency price P ∗t is multiplied
by the nominal exchange rate St. Here, mc is the elasticity of demand for Cm,t. The
reset price inflation
(
pi#mc,t
)
and aggregate inflation dynamics for imported consumption
are listed in the Appendix. Similarly, we can derive the reset price inflation
(
pi#mi,t
)
and
subsequent other equations for imported investment goods sector.
Export firms buy domestic final goods at domestic producers price Pt and after brand
naming sell them to foreign households. It is assumed that the export prices are sticky in
the foreign currency price, Px,t. This is applied using Calvo setup to allow for incomplete
exchange rate pass through. The linearized optimal condition of export firm is same as
in Adolfson et al. (2007), except that I do not model trend inflation for exports. Export
inflation equation is expressed in terms of mark up, not in terms of elasticities as in
import sectors. Since the home economy is small compared to rest of the world, foreign
demand for domestic consumption and investment goods are Cx,t =
[
Px,t
P ∗t
]−ηf
C∗t and
Ix,t =
[
Px,t
P ∗t
]−ηf
I∗t , where ηf is the foreign substitution elasticity. Thus, Cx,t + Ix,t =[
Px,t
P ∗t
]−ηf
Y ∗t .
Evolution of net foreign assets at aggregate level:
StB
∗
t+1 = StPx,t (Cx,t + Ix,t)−StP ∗t (Cm,t + Im,t) + (1 + i∗t )Φ
(
fat−1, ˜φt−1
)
StB
∗
t . (4.41)
Here, (1 + i∗t )Φ
(
fat−1, ˜φt−1
)
is the risk adjusted gross nominal interest rate. The
linearized net foreign asset equation can be expressed as,
ˆfat = Xˆt − Y ∗mcx,t+ (Cm + Im) γˆf,t + Cm
[
−ηc (1− ωc) γ−(1−ηc)cd γˆmcd,t + Cˆt
]
+Im
[
−ηi (1− ωi) γ−(1−ηi)id γˆmid,t + Iˆt
]
+R
(
fˆat−1
)
. (4.42)
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4.2.6 Government and the Monetary authority
Government finances its expenditures, Gt, by lump-sum tax, Tt. Thus, government budget
constraint is Gt = Tt. Government spending is assumed as an exogenous AR(1) process
and subject to stochastic shock εg,t. The central bank is responsible for monetary policy.
Monetary policy is described by the Taylor rule in linearized form as,
iˆt = ρiiˆt−1 + (1− ρi)
(
φpipic,t + φyYˆt
)
+ φdy(Yˆt − Yˆt−1) + φrS
(
ˆrSt − rSˆt−1
)
+ εi,t.
(4.43)
where, it is the net nominal interest rate, ρi is the interest smoothing parameter and
rSt ≡ StP
∗
t
Pc,t
is the real exchange rate. The monetary policy shock is εi,t:i.i.dN(0, 1).
4.2.7 Aggregation and price ratios
Aggregating across all retailer’s output and price,
Yt = Ym,tν
p
t . (4.44)
where, νpt is the price dispersion term. Goods market clearing can be written as,
Yt = Ct + It +Gt +Xt −Mt. (4.45)
The aggregate resource constraint of the economy can be written as,
Yt + νtNBE,t = wtNt +Rt+1Qt−1utKt +NBtdt. (4.46)
4.2.8 External sector
A structural foreign economy sector, similar to Rees et al. (2016) is considered. Hence, the
log-linearised equations are presented directly without detail discussion. Foreign inflation
Phillips curve, IS curve and monetary policy describe the external sector as,
pˆi∗t = βpˆi
∗
t+1 +
κ
100
Yˆ ∗t + pi∗t ; (4.47)
Y ∗t = Y
∗
t+1 + i
∗
t − pˆi∗t+1 + y∗,t+1 − y∗,t; (4.48)
iˆ∗t = ρi∗ iˆ
∗
t−1 + (1− ρi∗)
(
φpi∗ pˆi
∗
t + φY ∗ Yˆ
∗
t + φdY ∗
(
Yˆ ∗t − Yˆ ∗t−1
))
+ εi∗,t (4.49)
pi∗,t = ρpi∗pi∗,t−1 + εpi∗,t (4.50)
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y∗,t = ρpi∗y∗,t−1 + εy∗,t (4.51)
In Eq.(4.49), εi∗,t is an iid shock denoting foreign monetary policy shock. Eq.(4.50)
and Eq.(4.51) are two AR(1) processes where, εpi∗,t and εy∗,t represent the foreign inflation
and output shocks respectively.
4.3 Data and estimation
The model is estimated using quarterly Australian data over period 1993:Q1 -2015:Q4.
The observed domestic variables include non firm GDP, consumption, investment, CPI
inflation, cash rate, average lending rates (average of business and housing sector rates),
hours worked, exports, imports and trade weighted real exchange rates. Data used to es-
timate the foreign sector are weighted GDP of Australia’s major trading partners, federal
funds rate as foreign interest rate, and a weighted CPI inflation of major trade partners
as foreign inflation. Construction and description of these series are available in Appendix
4.A.4. Following literature such as Born & Pfeifer (2014), Jiang (2016), these series are
de-trended using the one-sided HP-filter before taking them into estimation. The filtering
ensures that all series are mean zero. By such transformation, we directly observe the
model variables, hence, specifying the observation equations will be redundant. I include
measurement errors in observation equations for Yt, Ct, It, Xt, Mt and pic,t. Measurement
error is also considered for observation equation of Nt as labour market data is inherently
noisy. The measurement errors appear in the observation equations only, hence, I do not
define any separate processes for them. The chapter follows the Bayesian estimation tech-
nique described by An & Schorfheide (2007) and Fernández-Villaverde (2009) to estimate
the non-calibrated parameters.
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4.3.1 Calibrated parameters
While a range of parameters is estimated, several parameters of the model are fixed. They
are listed in Table 4.2. The calibration is mostly based on two studies on Australia (Jasskela
& Nimark 2011 and Rees et al. 2016) and in some cases Adolfson et al. (2007) and sample
data. The discount factor (β) is calibrated closer to the sample average of real interest rate
and capital income share (α) is similar to Jasskela & Nimark (2011). Discount factor for
the foreign sector is assumed same as in the domestic sector. Labour dis-utility parameter
(ψ) is 7.5 which implies agents spend around 30 percent of their time to work in steady
state.
Table 4.2: Calibrated parameters
Description Parameters Value
Discount factor β 0.999
Capital income share α 0.29
Relative utility weight of labour ψ 7.5
Elasticity of substitution in goods market p 6
Elasticity of substitution in labour supply w 6
Intra-temporal loan elasticity b 3.5
Inverse of Frisch labour elasticity η 1
Death probability of a bank δb 0.01
Steady state fixed depreciation rate δ0 0.0175
G/Y ratio gr 0.2
Share of imports in C ωc 0.2
Share of imports in I ωi 0.5
Elasticity of imported C mc 6
Elasticity of imported I mi 6
Substitution elasticity C ηc 1.5
Substitution elasticity I ηi 1.5
Substitution elasticity foreign ηf 1.5
Ratio of K utilisation parameters δ2δ1 2
Some steady state ratios and targets
Capital utilisation uss 1
Loan mark up µss 1.675
Sunk cost of bank entry fess 6
Net foreign assets fass 0
Steady state gross inflation Πc 1
Mark up in imported I sector 1.2
Mark up in export sector 1
Mark up in imported C sector 1.2
Inverse of Frisch labour elasticity (η) is calibrated to a standard value in the literature and
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closer to estimates on Australian economy (Justiniano & Preston 2010).
Elasticity of substitution in domestic goods (p) market and in labour market (w) are
both set to 6 which imply steady state mark ups of 1.2. In addition, elasticities for the
import consumption (mc) and import investment (mi) are assumed to have the same
values as in the domestic goods sector, implying the same mark ups. The intra-temporal
elasticity of loan demand (b) is calibrated to have a lower value than the goods market.
Also, given the steady state interest mark up (µss) of 1.675 (from data), b is calibrated
in a way to have a steady state number of banks in between 3 to 4. The value of b in
this study is similar to Gerali et al. (2010) for loan to entrepreneurs. The death or exit
probability of bank
(
δb
)
is calibrated to be slightly smaller than the probability for the
US economy. Since no study on bank death rate for Australia is available, it is chosen in
a way to reflect a smaller probability. The fixed sunk cost (fess) value is set similar to
Totzek (2011), but higher than the value in Etro & Colciago (2010) for goods market, as
sunk cost for the financial sector is expected to be higher than for the goods market. Some
sensitivity analysis have been done with alternative values of δb and fess in Section 4.6.
The steady depreciation (δ0) and government expenditure to output ratio (gr) are based
on Australian data which are also similar to the two studies on Australian. Further, the
ratio of capital utilisation parameters
(
δ2
δ1
)
is set to 2 which is consistent to other literature.
The share of imports in total household consumption (ωc) and in total investment (ωc)
are chosen similar to Jasskela & Nimark (2011). Similar to Adolfson et al. (2007) and
unlike Jasskela & Nimark (2011), I choose to calibrate the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and imported consumption (ηc) to 1.5 which is a standard value in macroeconomic
literature (Chari et al. 2002 for example). I also calibrate the substitution elasticity of
investment goods (ηi) and foreign goods (ηf ) to 1.5 in the baseline estimations. Although
estimated ηc for Australian data doesn’t jump too high, as reported by Adolfson et al.
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(2007) for Euro area data in that study, it creates some shocks to jump to high values.
Also if I estimate all these three substitution elasticities, there are convergence problems
in MH stage for some parameters such as the risk premium shock, and import sector sticky
parameters (φmc and φmi). Hence, I choose to calibrate them in the baseline estimations.
The exercise that include estimation of these three substitution elasticities are reported in
the Appendix Table A9.
For convenience, the baseline model with flexible lending rate is denoted asMflex while
the baseline model with lending rate adjustment costs is denoted as Msticky.
4.3.2 Prior distribution of the estimated parameters
In order to avoid the common problem of over predicting variances by the estimated model,
following Christiano et al. (2011) I use endogenous prior (also see Del-Negro & Schorfheide
2008 for details ) which is motivated by sequential Bayesian learning. The process begins
with initial priors that are unrelated to the data and the standard deviations observed in
a ‘pre-sample’ are used to update the initial set of priors. The product of the initial priors
and the likelihood of standard deviations in the pre-sample forms the endogenous priors.
In practice, actual data is used to compute the standard deviations due to unavailability
of suitable data as ‘pre-sample’.
The initial prior distributions are presented in Table 4.3. The prior specifications largely
correspond to Adolfson et al. (2007) and Rees et al. (2016) and other related studies.
Parameters bounded between 0 and 1, such as shock persistences, habit, Calvo sticky
parameters, indexations and interest smoothing parameter in Taylor rule are specified
with Beta (B) distribution. Shocks that are allowed to be serially correlated have prior
mean 0.6 for autoregressive coefficients and are slightly higher than those in Rees et al.
(2016) and lower than in Adolfson et al. (2007).
The standard deviations of all shocks and the risk premium parameter are assumed
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to have Inverse Gamma (IG) distribution, as they are expected to be positive. The prior
mean of stationary technology shock is 0.7 while the prior mean of the interest rate shock
is 0.3. The estimation in Adolfson et al. (2007) assumes 0.15 as the prior mean of interest
rate shock. Rees et al. (2016) assumes 0.5 as prior mean for all shocks. Smaller prior
mean is chosen for risk premium shock (0.05) and risk premium parameter (0.01) based
on Adolfson et al. (2007) and Jasskela & Nimark (2011). The rest of the shocks have prior
mean 0.5. Shocks for which there are no clear guidance in the literature for Australia, such
as the bank value and capital quality, are set in line with the rest of the shocks. All shocks
are assigned with wide prior to account for greater uncertainty.
Among structural parameters, prior mean for consumption habit (b) is set to a standard
value in the macroeconomic literature. Investment adjustment cost (τ) has normal (N)
distribution with prior mean 1.5 and standard deviation 0.5. The prior mean of this
adjustment cost is chosen greater than 1 to account for higher model implied volatility
of aggregate investment. Following Gerali et al. (2010), in Msticky specification, the prior
mean for loan rate adjustment costs (κb) is set to 5 with a narrower standard deviation of
0.5. This value of κb implies a quick bank pass through. Both Calvo price (φp) and wage
stickiness (φw) parameters have prior mean 0.75 implying domestic goods price and wages
are adjusted in every 4 quarters on average.
The Calvo parameters in export (φx) and import sectors (φmc, φmi), however, have
slightly lower prior mean 0.5 to get reasonable exchange rate pass through. The prior
standard deviations of these trade stickiness parameters are twice as large as domestic
sectors assuming greater parameter uncertainties, similar to Adolfson et al. (2007).
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Table 4.3: Prior and Posteriors
Parameters Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Mflex Msticky
Distr Mean S.D Mean 90%
HPDI
Mean 90% HPDI
Shock persistence: Technology (ρa) B 0.6 0.1 0.729 [0.64, 0.82] 0.785 [0.76, 0.81]
MEI (ρz) B 0.6 0.1 0.406 [0.30, 0.51] 0.414 [0.32, 0.50]
Capital quality (ρξ) B 0.6 0.1 0.494 [0.37, 0.62] 0.520 [0.37, 0.67]
Preference (ρ%) B 0.6 0.1 0.546 [0.44, 0.65] 0.560 [0.46, 0.67]
Govt. expenditure (ρg) B 0.6 0.1 0.611 [0.45, 0.77] 0.606 [0.44, 0.77]
Wage mark up (ρw) B 0.6 0.1 0.583 [0.43, 0.75] 0.597 [0.44, 0.76]
Price mark up (ρp) B 0.6 0.1 0.501 [0.37, 0.63] 0.613 [0.47, 0.76]
Risk premium (ρrpf ) B 0.6 0.05 0.602 [0.52, 0.69] 0.601 [0.52, 0.68]
Import consumption mark up (ρmc) B 0.6 0.1 0.587 [0.43, 0.75] 0.607 [0.45, 0.77]
Import investment mark up (ρmi) B 0.6 0.1 0.548 [0.41, 0.68] 0.533 [0.40, 0.67]
Export mark up (ρX) B 0.6 0.1 0.585 [0.43, 0.74] 0.586 [0.43, 0.74]
S.D interest rate (σi) IG 0.15 2 0.039 [0.03, 0.05] 0.055 [0.04, 0.07]
S.D technology (σa) IG 0.2 2 0.043 [0.03, 0.05] 0.11 [0.1, 0.12]
S.D bank value (σb) IG 0.2 2 0.074 [0.06, 0.09] 0.13 [0.11, 0.15]
S.D MEI (σz) IG 0.2 2 2.45 [1.57, 3.30] 3.29 [2.36, 4.18]
S.D capital quality (σξ) IG 0.2 2 0.264 [0.19, 0.33] 0.15 [0.08, 0.21]
S.D preference (σ%) IG 0.2 2 0.992 [0.75, 1.23] 1.35 [1.01, 1.69]
S.D Govt. expenditure (σg) IG 0.2 2 0.215 [0.04, 0.46] 0.183 [0.04, 0.36]
S.D wage mark up (σw) IG 0.2 2 0.173 [0.05, 0.31] 0.16 [0.05, 0.29]
S.D price mark up (σp) IG 0.2 2 0.357 [0.23, 0.49] 0.162 [0.08, 0.24]
S.D foreign risk premium (σrpf ) IG 0.05 2 0.068 [0.01, 0.15] 0.084 [0.01, 0.24]
S.D import consumption (σmc) IG 0.3 2 0.219 [0.07, 0.40] 0.19 [0.07, 0.31]
S.D import investment (σmi) IG 0.3 2 3.369 [2.55, 4.16] 3.43 [2.60, 4.20]
S.D export (σX) IG 0.3 2 0.386 [0.08, 0.72] 0.26 [0.08, 0.46]
Habit (b) B 0.7 0.1 0.62 [0.52, 0.72] 0.68 [0.59, 0.76]
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Table 4.3: Prior and Posteriors
Investment adj. cost (τ) N 1.5 0.5 2.55 [1.95, 3.13] 3.07 [2.54, 3.64]
Loan rate adjustment costs (κb) G 5.0 0.5 - - 4.35 [3.59, 5.10]
Risk premium parameter (φa) IG 0.01 0.001 0.011 [0.01, 0.013] 0.011 [0.01, 0.012]
Calvo price probability (φp) B 0.75 0.05 0.745 [0.69, 0.81] 0.721 [0.67, 0.78]
Calvo wage (φw) B 0.75 0.05 0.71 [0.65, 0.76] 0.744 [0.79, 0.80]
Calvo Cm price (φmc) B 0.5 0.10 0.79 [0.68, 0.89] 0.639 [0.49, 0.80]
Calvo Im price (φmi) B 0.5 0.10 0.46 [0.33, 0.59] 0.467 [0.35, 0.69]
Calvo X price (φX) B 0.5 0.10 0.51 [0.36, 0.66] 0.548 [0.39, 0.71]
Domestic price indexation (ζp) B 0.5 0.10 0.34 [0.20, 0.48] 0.56 [0.42, 0.70]
Wage indexation (ζw) B 0.5 0.10 0.55 [0.39, 0.72] 0.47 [0.31, 0.65]
Cm price indexation (ζmc) B 0.5 0.15 0.439 [0.19, 0.69] 0.41 [0.18, 0.65]
Im price indexation (ζmi) B 0.5 0.15 0.49 [0.25, 0.73] 0.50 [0.26, 0.73]
Export price indexation (ζX) B 0.5 0.15 0.489 [0.25, 0.72] 0.493 [0.24, 0.75]
Interest rule (IR): interest smoothing (ρi) B 0.80 0.05 0.598 [0.55, 0.65] 0.568 [0.50, 0.64]
IR: inflation (φpi) N 1.70 0.10 1.11 [1.07, 1.14] 1.82 [1.65, 1.97]
IR: output (φy) N 0.125 0.05 0.028 [.013, 0.04] 0.011 [−0.04, 0.06]
IR: output growth (φdy) N 0.0001 0.025 0.049 [0.02, 0.08] 0.005 [−0.03, 0.04]
IR: real exchange rate growth (φrS) N 0.0001 0.05 -0.012 [−.013,−.01] -0.017 [−0.02,−0.015]
Measurement errors: Output (meY ) IG 0.1 2 0.27 [0.21, 0.33] 0.30 [0.23, 0.36]
: Consumption (meC) IG 0.1 2 0.11 [0.03, 0.17] 0.09 [0.03, 0.15]
: Investment (meI) IG 0.1 2 1.63 [1.38, 1.87] 1.64 [1.39, 1.89]
: Exports (meX) IG 0.1 2 1.26 [1.01, 1.52] 1.35 [1.09, 1.61]
: Imports (meM ) IG 0.1 2 0.17 [0.02, 0.46] 0.13 [0.02, 0.30]
: Hours worked (meN ) IG 0.1 2 0.72 [0.61, 0.82] 0.74 [0.64, 0.83]
: CPI inflation (meΠc) IG 0.1 2 0.40 [0.35, 0.44] 0.41 [0.37, 0.47]
Marginal data density* -977.52 -1049.72
Note: B denotes Beta, IG denotes Inverse Gamma, N denotes Normal, and G denotes Gamma distributions. S.D means standard deviation. *Modified
harmonic mean.
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Prior mean for all indexation parameters are 0.5, assuming same endogenous persistence in
all sectors. Prior standard deviations for imports (ζmc, ζmi) and exports (ζX) indexations
are slightly higher than those for domestic price and wages.
Except interest smoothing, monetary policy parameters follow normal distribution (N).
Reaction coefficients of output growth (φdY ) and real exchange rate growth (φrS) have
smaller prior mean, assuming from Rees et al. (2016) that monetary policy cares less
about output growth and exchange rate growth. The prior mean for central bank’s reaction
coefficients to inflation (φpi) and output (φy) are similar to Jasskela & Nimark (2011) for
Australia and Adolfson et al. (2007). In Taylor rule the coefficient of output of 0.125 per
quarter implies a standard response of 0.5 for annualised interest rate. Measurement errors
are included as exogenous shocks with prior mean 0.1 that implies 10% anomalies between
model variable and actual data, with prior standard deviations 2.
Table 4.4: Prior and the posterior estimates of the external sector
Parameters DistributionMean S.D Posterior
mean
90%
HPDI
Persistent of inflation shock (ρpi∗) B 0.5 0.1 0.45 [0.35, 0.54]
Persistent of output shock (ρY ∗) B 0.5 0.1 0.76 [0.68, 0.84]
Slope of Phillips curve (κ∗) G 1 0.8 0.96 [0.05, 1.82]
S.D inflation shock (σpi∗) IG 0.5 0.4 0.14 [0.11, 0.17]
S.D output shock (σY ∗) IG 0.5 0.4 0.503 [0.42, 0.58]
S.D Monetary policy shock (σi∗) IG 0.2 0.4 0.05 [0.04, 0.06]
S.D measurement error pi∗ (mepi∗) IG 0.1 0.4 0.66 [0.57, 0.76]
S.D measurement error Y ∗ (meY ∗) IG 0.1 0.4 0.06 [0.03, 0.09]
Taylor rule: interest smoothing
(ρi∗)
B 0.8 0.05 0.801 [0.76, 0.84]
Taylor rule: reaction inflation (φpi∗) N 1.50 0.10 1.48 [1.32, 1.64]
Taylor rule: reaction output (φY ∗) N 0.125 0.05 0.067 [0.014, 0.12]
Taylor rule: reaction output growth
(φdY ∗)
N 0.0001 0.025 0.0019 [−0.04, 0.04]
Note: B denotes Beta, IG denotes Inverse Gamma, N denotes Normal, and G denotes Gamma
distributions.
The foreign sector is only a representation of a group of countries important for Aus-
tralia and it is hard to set prior to a particular country level. Since I take the external
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block from Rees et al. (2016) and the time span of my baseline study is not substantially
different, I adopt prior specifications of the same study for the foreign block, presented in
Table 4.4.
4.3.3 Estimation and posterior distributions
The estimation is done in two stages: the foreign block is estimated first and these es-
timates are taken as calibrated parameters in the domestic block which is estimated in
the second stage. Before estimation, an identification test for parameters was done using
the identification routine available in Dynare program. Both the necessary and the suf-
ficient conditions for identification, as discussed by Iskrev (2010) are satisfied, implying
that all the parameters are identified in the model and in the moments for the entire prior
space. For brevity, I skip reporting this output. The results for external sector estima-
tion is presented in Table 4.4. In this block, I estimate 12 parameters for data over period
1997Q1-2015Q4. The estimated persistent parameter of output shock (ρY ∗) appears higher
than that of inflation shock. The rest of the estimates including foreign monetary policy
parameters are all plausible and consistent to the literature.
The domestic block estimation results are in the last four columns of Table 4.3. The
posterior mean and corresponding 90 percent Highest Posterior Density (HPD) obtained in
the Metropolis Hastings (MH) algorithm are reported for both Mflex and Msticky specific-
ations. The number of draws in MH algorithm is one million in each of the three chains.
Univariate convergence is achieved for all parameters in both specifications. Multivariate
convergence which is like a summary of univarite convergences is reported in Fig.A10. The
marginal data density appears to favour the model with flexible lending rate, Mflex, more.
In the baseline, I estimate 50 parameters in Mflex and one more parameter in Msticky
specifications. I estimate the measurement errors as exogenous shocks, unlike Rees et al.
(2016) which calibrates measurement errors. The estimated parameters in the current
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model are not exactly comparable to the estimates of Jasskela & Nimark (2011) and Rees
et al. (2016), because these literature include trend technology in model, hence their data
are non-stationary. In contrary, I remove the trend from the data since the model is a
stationary one.
Posterior mean of the several persistent parameters in the AR (1) processes appear high
such as neutral technology shock (ρa), government expenditures (ρg) and foreign sector re-
lated shocks such as risk premium shock. Also domestic price and import consumption
mark up shocks appear persistent in Msticky specifications. The estimated persistent coef-
ficients of MEI (ρz) and capital quality (ρξ) appear smaller than other shocks. Data does
not appear very informative for the autoregressive parameters of all shocks, because pos-
terior mean of some shocks are closer to the specified prior mean. Among posterior mean
of shock standard deviations, MEI shock (σz) and import investment shock (σmi) appear
highly volatile in both specifications. The posterior mean standard deviations for techno-
logy (σa) , bank value (σb) and monetary policy (σi) shocks are estimated to be higher in
Msticky than in Mflex.
For behavioural parameters, data appear more informative. Their is a substantial
degree of consumption inertia, as indicated by the posterior mean of habit (b) which is
slightly smaller than the estimates in Jasskela & Nimark (2011) and Rees et al. (2016).
The investment adjustment cost (τ) is much higher than the specified prior mean. Since
aggregate investment is a composite of imported (ωi = 0.5) and domestic (1−ωi) investment
goods and the elasticity (ηi) between them is calibrated as 1.5, τ is the only parameter
that captures the high volatility of investment and imports data by taking a larger value.
The high estimated value of τ indicates that the stock market effect of capital price can
be high. The estimate is higher than the same estimate of Rees et al. (2016) which does
not distinguish between domestic and imported investment goods. The posterior mean of
loan rate adjustment cost (κb) appears closer to the specified prior mean.
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Among the Calvo parameters, domestic price (φp) , wage (φw) and import consumption
(φmc) show high degree of stickiness. The estimated φp = 0.745 implies domestic producers
re-optimize prices of their products in around 4 quarters which is higher than Jasskela &
Nimark (2011) but lower than Rees et al. (2016). The estimated φw = 0.71 implies that
average duration of nominal wage contract lasts around 3.5 quarters which is around 4
quarters in Msticky. The stickiest sector is the import consumption sector (φmc = 0.79)
where price is re-optimized in 5 quarters approximately. The estimated stickiness in import
investment (φmi = 0.46) and export sector (φmc = 0.51) are relatively smaller, where prices
are re-optimized in every 2 quarters. Since the Calvo stickiness parameters are the only
source of incomplete exchange rate pass through in the model, these estimated parameters
imply that around 21% (55%) of an exchange rate movement is passed through to the
price of import consumption (investment) goods. The actual degree of exchange rate pass
through may vary depending on what type of shock hits the economy. These stickiness
parameters in import sectors with Australian data appear opposite of the findings of Ad-
olfson et al. (2007) for Euro area data where stickiness in import investment (4 quarters)
is higher than import consumption (2 quarters) sector.
The estimated domestic price and wage indexations in this study are slightly lower
than those in Jasskela & Nimark (2011) but closer to other studies such as Adolfson
et al. (2007). Indexation parameters in two imports and export sectors, in contrary, are
higher than those found in Jasskela & Nimark (2011) and consistent with other literature.
The higher indexation in wage setting (ζw = 0.55) compared to domestic price (ζp = 0.34)
implies that endogenous persistence in labour market is higher than in domestic goods
market.
The posterior mean of interest smoothing parameter in Taylor rule appears smaller than
the prior mean in both specifications and compared to the estimate in Rees et al. (2016).
The monetary policy’s reaction to inflation (φpi) is much higher in theMsticky specification
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than in the Mflex. The model does not find any strong reaction of monetary policy to
output and real exchange rate growth, especially for output in Msticky. Although quant-
itatively smaller, the fact that monetary policy response to output growth (φdY = 0.049)
is larger than output level (φY = 0.03) is similar to the findings of Justiniano & Preston
(2010) for Australia. Although Rees et al. (2016) find no response of monetary policy to
real exchange rate, the current study finds a smaller response (φrS = −0.012) of monetary
policy to real exchange rate growths. The sign and magnitude are consistent with the
findings of Adolfson et al. (2007).
4.4 Model fit
This section presents the ability of the model with oligopolistic banks to fit the actual
data. A common approach to check the fit of the estimated DSGE model is to compare the
theoretical moments of the estimated model to those of the actual data (An & Schorfheide
2007). This is the absolute fit of the model.
Table 4.5: Moments comparison: posterior predictive analysis
Variables S.Dflex S.Dsticky S.Da Relative
S.Dflex
Relative
S.Dsticky
Relative
S.Da
Output Yt 0.67 0.69 0.66 1.00 1.00 1.00
Consumption Ct 0.88 1.00 0.86 1.31 1.45 1.30
Investment It 4.61 5.31 4.34 6.88 7.70 6.53
CPI inflation pic,t 0.19 0.10 0.44 0.28 0.15 0.66
Cash rate it 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.30 0.32 0.27
Lending rate Rk,t 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.28 0.26 0.23
Hours worked Nt 0.66 0.73 0.90 0.99 1.06 1.36
Real exchange rates
rSt
6.75 8.39 5.47 10.08 12.17 8.24
Exports Xt 2.39 2.15 2.38 3.57 3.12 3.59
Imports Mt 5.50 5.98 4.10 8.20 8.68 6.18
Note: Standard deviations for flexible (S.Dflex) and sticky lending rates (S.Dsticky) models are
presented where the superscripts denote respective models and superscript a denotes the actual
data statistics. The moments are their median values. Relative S.D means S.D relative to output.
In Table 4.5, I present such posterior predictive analysis in which the standard devi-
ations in model generated artificial data are compared to those in actual data. The standard
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deviations (S.D) reported here are their median values and actual data moments for the
period 1993:Q1 - 2015:Q4. The last three columns of Table 4.5 provide S.Ds relative to
S.D of output. The model under-predicts the volatility of CPI inflation and hours worked
whereas slightly over-predicts the volatility of real exchange rate and imports. Model im-
plied volatilities for rest of the variables are quite close to the volatilities in actual data.
Overall, the predicted volatilities are fairly close to those in data, hence, we can rely on the
applications of the model such as variance decompositions and impulse response functions.
Comparing two model specifications, the flexible lending rate model provides better fit for
some variables.
4.5 Application of the model
This section contains various applications of the estimated models to analyse the im-
pacts of oligopolistic banks on growth and dynamics of the economy. This is done in four
ways. First, the variance decomposition analysis which tells us the driving forces of busi-
ness cycles. Second, plots of Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) that depict transmission
of shocks and adjustment dynamics of the economy towards steady state. Third, com-
parisons of IRFs between the oligopolistic bank model and a perfectly competitive bank
model. Fourth, historical decompositions to show contributions of shocks to movements of
Australian output and employment.
4.5.1 Drivers of business cycles: variance decomposition analysis
Table 4.6 contains the conditional forecast error variance decompositions (in %) for output
(Yt), investment (It), exports (Xt) , real exchange rates (rSt) and hours worked (Nt) over
the horizons of one quarter, one year, two and five years for the model with flexible loan
rate. Thus, factors driving business cycles in short (1 to 4 quarters), medium (8 quarters)
and long (20 quarters) runs can be analysed. The unconditional or stationary variance
(UV) decompositions are also reported in the last row for each of the variables. The sixteen
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shocks are categorised into seven groups as: monetary policy (interest rate) shock, supply
side or mark up (domestic price, wage, import consumption, import investment and export
mark ups) shocks, two finance based shocks such as bank value and capital quality (asset
side) shocks, demand side (preference and government expenditure) shocks, technology
(stationary technology and marginal efficiency of investment) shocks, and foreign (risk
premium, world inflation, interest rate and output ) shocks.
For evolution of output (Yt) in the short run, demand shocks explain 37-27% of vari-
ations whereas supply side or mark up shocks explain 21-25% of variations. The substantial
contribution by the demand side in short run output variations is empirically consistent
as these shocks are expected to be short lived compared to the supply and technology
shocks. From medium to long run, technology shocks explain more than 19-24% and mark
up shocks explain around 21-18% of output variations. Gradually, demand shocks become
weaker and technology shocks become stronger. In terms of unconditional variance (UV),
the role of demand side is smaller and the role of mark ups is bigger compared to the
findings of Rees et al. (2016) for Yt variations. A smaller role of monetary policy in output
dynamics in this study is similar to the finding of Jasskela & Nimark (2011), Justiniano &
Preston (2010) and Rees et al. (2016). Interestingly, this study finds that foreign shocks
explain a substantial part of output variations (32-22% from short to long run) which is
similar to Jasskela & Nimark (2011) but in contrast to Justiniano & Preston (2010) and
Rees et al. (2016). This study supports the findings of VAR based literature on small open
economy (Dungey & Pagan 2009b, Liu 2010 for example) which usually find larger role of
external shocks to variations of macro variables.
For investment (It), the technology shock group appears as the single most important
factor in short run, explaining 95-86% of variations. More specifically, MEI shock is the
most important factor contributing to It dynamics. However, external sector also influences
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investment substantially over time in this study. In the long run, external sector shocks
contribute more than 35% of Australian investment variations whereas technology shock
group is still the dominating factor explaining 48% of the variations.
Table 4.6: Variance decomposition (in percent)
Shocks Interest
rate
Mark
ups
Bank
value
Capital
quality
Demand Technology Foreign
Yt 1 1.14 20.50 0.09 1.01 36.75 8.54 31.96
4 1.37 24.58 0.38 3.67 27.33 13.61 29.05
8 1.22 21.12 0.37 9.06 22.26 19.23 26.75
20 1.00 17.53 0.31 16.12 19.04 23.80 22.20
UV 0.87 15.30 0.27 20.68 17.21 24.18 21.48
It 1 0.30 1.06 0.16 0.50 1.50 94.79 1.69
4 0.32 1.55 0.17 0.52 3.86 86.20 7.37
8 0.27 1.42 0.15 0.44 5.84 71.79 20.09
20 0.20 1.32 0.11 3.04 5.97 54.25 35.13
UV 0.17 1.19 0.09 10.15 5.20 47.94 35.26
Xt 1 0.24 30.81 0.01 0.0 0.04 0.08 68.82
4 0.35 41.55 0.08 0.07 0.15 0.42 57.38
8 0.32 39.95 0.08 0.35 0.22 1.11 57.95
20 0.25 33.05 0.07 0.62 0.18 2.75 63.08
UV 0.23 31.33 0.06 0.75 0.18 3.35 64.09
rSt 1 7.89 10.52 53.39 7.57 1.05 18.78 0.79
4 7.87 10.50 52.99 7.51 1.05 18.65 1.43
8 7.85 10.51 52.89 7.51 1.05 18.64 1.56
20 7.83 10.52 52.77 7.5 1.04 18.67 1.65
UV 7.81 10.49 52.64 7.49 1.04 18.66 1.85
Nt 1 1.27 22.31 0.37 7.63 25.18 12.90 30.34
4 1.46 25.74 0.40 0.34 30.28 9.86 31.90
8 1.44 24.83 0.42 0.37 28.11 12.10 32.72
20 1.39 24.24 0.41 1.76 27.09 12.38 32.73
UV 1.09 9.96 0.43 12.9 40.84 10.45 24.32
Note: The reported variances are the mean responses of unconditional or stationary variances (UV)
and the conditional variances at horizons 1, 4, 8 and 20 quarters.
In terms of the UV decomposition, the findings are more similar to Rees et al. (2016)
which finds technology shock (91%) is the single most important driver of It variations. In
contrary, Jasskela & Nimark (2011) reports external and mark up shocks are the two most
important drivers of Australian investment. In UV decomposition, capital quality shock
also influences It dynamics substantially in the current study.
As a commodity exporting country, the fact that the largest part (69-58% from short
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to medium run) of Australian export (Xt) variations explained by shocks developed in ex-
ternal sector is not surprising. This is because commodity markets are largely independent
of the developments in the individual exporting countries (Chen et al. 2010, Jasskela &
Nimark 2011). Mark up shocks, predominantly the export mark up shock, also appear
very important (42-33%) for Xt variations. Interestingly the work of Rees et al. (2016),
in its multi sector model, finds resource price shock explains only 6% and world shocks
explain only 7% of export variations different from the current study.
For real exchange rate (rSt) movements, monetary policy appears to have considerable
amount of contributions (around 8%). The higher contributions of bank value shock and
lower contributions of foreign shocks appear puzzling. Chen et al. (2010) states that
exchange rate-commodity price linkage can operate through the asset markets and portfolio
channel. For example, higher commodity price can attract funds into commodity exporting
countries implying an additional empirical relationship between equity market behaviour
and world commodity price. Since the current model does not design separate commodity
exporting sector, the shock to the stock market value of bank firms may capture this fact to
explain greater variations in rSt. Technology and mark up shocks also explain substantial
part of exchange rate variations in the current study.
For hours worked (Nt) variations, foreign shocks, and demand and supply side shocks
are dominant which is of no surprise. External shocks can explain around 30-34% of
variations in Nt, highlighting the importance of the developments in rest of the world for
Australian labour market emphasised by the VAR based literature. The demand shocks
explain more than 25% of short run variations and 28% of medium and long run variations
in Nt. Consumption preference shock, in particular from the demand side, is the most
important contributor to employment dynamics. Mark up shocks have explanatory power
closer to the demand shocks for Nt variations. The bigger role of mark up shock group in
the current study is similar to Jasskela & Nimark (2011) in which mark up shock is the
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single most important driver of employment variations.
4.5.2 Impulse responses
The Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) show the future paths of the endogenous variables
of the model in response to an exogenous shock occurring at period one. The transmis-
sion mechanisms of various real sector shocks and dynamics of the economy in presence
of strategic bank behaviour can be observed from the plots of IRFs of the endogenous
variables. The solid (black) lines are the IRFs of Mflex specification and the surrounding
dotted lines are 95% posterior density intervals. The broken (blue) lines are the IRFs of
Msticky specifications.
4.5.2.1 Impulse responses to Monetary policy shock
Fig.4.3 contains IRFs to a positive (contractionary) monetary policy shock. Output (Yt),
investment (It) , inflation (pic,t) and hours worked (Nt) —all show anticipated negative
responses. However, the responses of the real sector variables are smaller in magnitudes.
The real wage (wt) also decreases but the response is not significant in Mflex. When
monetary policy is contractionary, the model suggests that the entry cost of prospective
bank firm increases due to an increase in the marginal costs of funds. Thus, bank entry
channel implies a gradual drop in the mass of banks (NB,t) in a hump shape manner. Then,
the market share under control of surviving banks increases and thereby greater market
power leads them to charge higher interest mark ups (µt). Thus, oligopolistic banks with
endogenous entry suggest a new channel that produces countercyclical movements in mark
up.
The gross commercial lending rate, Rk,t, increases by 0.06 percentage points. This
reduces the demand for loans. Lending rate increases for two reasons - first is the rise in
deposit costs and second is the rise in µt due to increased market power of existing banks.
If banks face rate adjustment costs, Rk,t increases but not instantly. In this situation, the
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decline in Yt and Nt are slightly less than the flexible rate case. The tighter condition in
the credit market is reflected by a drop in asset price Qt.
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Figure 4.3: Interest rate shock
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Figure 4.4: Stationary technology shock
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Note: The black (solid) lines are mean IRFs of Mflex specification and area within dotted lines are their 95 % posterior density interval. The blue (broken) lines
are IRFs of Msticky specification.
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We see that aggregate exports (Xt) also decrease in response to a monetary tightening.
The depreciation of real exchange rate (rSt) is not counter intuitive, rather suggests a
strong stock market effect (see open economy model of Gavin 1989 for detail). If the link
between stock market price and aggregate demand is important enough, the impact of
monetary policy on real exchange rate can be reversed. When the stock market effect is
very strong, the negative relation between it and Qt implies a reverse over-shooting, hence,
rSt depreciates. This depreciation improves trade balance and moderates the conractionary
effect of monetary policy on aggregate demand.
The extent of maximum responses of the real sector variables in the current study are
smaller than those found in Jasskela & Nimark (2011). But this is similar to the findings
of Dungey & Pagan (2009b) which finds smaller responses of real variables compared to
the earlier study Dungey & Pagan (2000b). Comparing with Jasskela & Nimark (2011), we
see that adjustment process in the current study is slower. It takes almost 3 years for the
output to return to the steady state whereas it takes only 5 quarters in Jasskela & Nimark
(2011). Introducing adjustment costs in retail lending rate does not produce substantially
different IRFs to a monetary policy shock.
4.5.2.2 Impulse responses to technology shock
In response to a positive neutral technology shock in Fig.4.4, both Yt and It increase as
anticipated and the responses are persistent. Higher productivity in the labour market
increases real wage (wt). Hence, hours worked (Nt) decrease initially. But increased
economic activity in the supply side gradually increases the demand for labour, hence, Nt
increases. Increase in wt is much higher in Msticky model. CPI inflation, pic,t, decreases
rapidly and remains below the steady state level for a considerable period of time inMflex.
Ideally, monetary policy would not respond to technology shock but, as stated in Dungey
& Pagan (2009b), it is hard for monetary authority to separate out technology shocks from
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demand induced rises in output. The estimated parameters in the study suggest that the
monetary authority places less emphasis on output fluctuations than inflation. In response
to a technology shock, a transitory rise in cash rate (it) is soon followed by a drop to reach
below the steady state. Then it takes 10 quarters to return.
The technology shock is expected to be transmitted through the financial sector to the
real economy in two ways. First, through the bank entry channel by facilitating new entry
and thereby, reducing bank sector concentration and mark ups. The model generates
a positive response for NB,t but the magnitude is small in Mflex. In contrary, lending
rate stickiness implies that immediately after the shock, the banking sector profitability
remains much higher in Msticky specification than in Mflex. Higher profitability attracts
more banks in the market. Therefore, the bank entry channel is stronger under sticky
lending rate case, amplifying the overall shock impacts more on the real economy. Second,
through the balance sheet channel due to change in collateral valuation. As resources
become more profitable and production activities increases, Qt increases. Increase in Qt is
a gain to bank balance sheets through gain in collateral valuations. However, the second
effect is expected not to be higher than that in case of perfectly competitive banks. This
finding is consistent with the empirical observation on Australian banking industry.
The big four banks in Australia are dominating the market for more than a decade and,
given the regulatory regime, the shocks are quantitatively not large enough to guarantee
new entry that can take over substantial market shares from the existing big four banks. In
practice there are entry and exit of small local banks and foreign banks with limited market
exposures which are small enough to make substantial differences in market concentration.
The decrease in µt results in a drop in lending rates by 0.06 percentage points inMflex and
the drop is slightly more in Msticky. The decrease in borrowing costs increases the demand
for capital machineries leading to a surge in capital price (Qt) as depicted in Fig.4.4.
The falling price in the domestic goods market due to positive technology shock in-
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creases exports (Xt) as domestic goods become cheaper in the world market. Here, rSt
appreciates instantly, similar to the findings of Dungey & Pagan (2000b) in which shocks
are transitory. However, the finding is opposite to Dungey & Pagan (2009b) in which
shocks are permanent. Bringing stickiness in the lending rate adjustment produces similar
IRFs but the magnitudes of procyclicality are greater for some variables than those found
in Mflex specification. So, the oligopolistic competition among banks appears to amplify
the effects when a technology shock hits the economy.
4.5.2.3 Impulse responses to investment specific technology (MEI) shock
The MEI shock appears to play a large role in Yt and It dynamics in both specifications.
In response to a negative MEI shock, in the first two rows of Fig.4.5, Yt decreases by 0.12%
and investment decreases by 1.5% at the maximum impact. As this is a negative shock to
the production process of capital, Qt rises instantly and returns to the steady state only
gradually, displaying a persistent impact of the shock. The high stock market price of
capital leads to an appreciation of rSt. Here, we see rSt remains at an appreciating stage
for a considerable period of time and the initial transitory depreciation is not significant.
This has negative consequences on exports. Xt declines by more than 0.1% at the maximum
impact.
A rise in Qt improves the bank balance sheet condition and thereby, reduces spread or
markup (µt) in a competitive bank industry as shown in Chapter 3. Given the strategic
bank behaviour in this study, µt still shows anticipated negative response but the magnitude
is too small to have sizeable impacts on It and Yt. Since, investment specific technology
shock has no direct impact on entry costs, the bank entry channel is less effective. This
implies that balance sheet effect of change in Qt on mark up is weaker under oligopolistic
competition, leaving a larger role for MEI shock as emphasised by Justiniano et al. (2010).
Here, MEI shock has strong negative and persistent effects on Yt and It, different from the
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findings of Afrin (2017) for the US where bank industry is more competitive.
Figure 4.5: MEI and capital quality shocks
Note: The black (solid) lines are mean IRFs of Mflex specification and shaded regions are their
95% posterior density interval. The blue (broken) lines are IRFs of Msticky specification. The first
variable contains the name of the shock for the entire row.
The price of domestic goods rises as domestic production is negatively affected by
the shock. Although currency appreciation reduces import costs, inflation rises because
domestic goods are the largest part in the consumption basket. Since monetary policy
places more importance on inflation stability, cash rate (it) rises following the dynamics
of pic,t. The dampening production activity reduces both Nt and wt but adjustments in
Nt is quicker than wt which displays a sluggish adjustment toward steady state. Overall
the responses are consistent with the IRFs in Adolfson et al. (2007). The IRFs in sticky
loan rate model are qualitatively similar and quantitatively different only marginally. The
maximum decrease in µt is smaller in Msticky than that in Mflex. The overall impact on
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Yt is not substantially different between the two specifications.
4.5.2.4 Impulse responses to capital quality shock
IRFs to a negative capital quality shock are depicted in the last two rows of Fig.4.5.
After the shock, Yt decreases and starts to move upward after 8 quarters. With the same
specification, It decreases for a short time. Fast adjustment leads It to cross the steady
state line by 8 quarters and remains over it for a considerable period of time. The reason
for high persistence of the impact on Yt can be due to the fact that investment requires
time to build and replenish the capital stock to the steady state level. Capital price Qt
declines sharply by 0.2% which returns to the steady state in 10 quarters. The maximum
impacts on Yt, It, pic,t and µt are higher in the flexible specification than in Msticky.
It is interesting to compare the results to the estimates of Gertler & Karadi (2011)’s
financial friction model for the US in Afrin (2017) where loss in collateral valuation leads
to deterioration of bank balance sheet and net worth. The loss of bank equity in turn raises
interest spread due to endogenous balance sheet constraint and shrinks credit availability.
In contrary, under oligopolistic set up in which banks do not face the endogenous balance
sheet constraints, mark up (µt) declines. The declining mark up fuels investment and
mitigates the fall in output. Since oligopolistic banks are likely to have high retained
profits and capital, the negative balance sheet effects of a capital quality shock on the real
economy are anticipated to be less severe. Financial sector responds to the loss of capital
or valuation of capital by providing more investment. Capital quality shock is less likely to
be amplified under oligopolistic set up where banks are unlikely to face endogenous balance
sheet constraint that competitive banks face. Although is not explicit in the current model,
. Thus, oligopolistic banks may not always act as accelerators to shocks originating in the
real sector.
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4.5.2.5 Impulse responses to other shocks
IRFs for rest of the shocks are presented in Section 4.A. In response to an export markup
shock in Fig.A11, Yt and pic,t decline and rSt shows the anticipated negative response (de-
preciation). There is no significant response from the mass of banks or interest mark up to
export mark up shock. In Fig.A12 in response to a positive consumption preference shock,
Yt increases due to a surge in consumption and It decreases due to households’ increased
preferences towards consumption. Consequently, both Nt and pic,t increase. Reduced de-
mand for It results in a decrease in interest mark up (µt). The rest of the variables show
theoretically and empirically intuitive responses similar to Adolfson et al. (2007). IRFs to a
positive risk premium shock in Fig.A13 appear qualitatively consistent to Rees et al. (2016)
and other Australian studies. However, the impacts are quantitatively smaller, similar to
the findings of Justiniano & Preston (2010).
Foreign shocks can be seen in Fig.4.7 in Subsection 4.5.3. Foreign inflation shock has
positive impacts on domestic Yt and It and as a consequence Nt increases. In contrary,
a negative shock to foreign output has negative impacts on domestic Yt, and It. For a
contractionary foreign monetary policy shock, domestic Yt appears fluctuating but both It
and Qt rise.
Overall, the IRFs derived from the estimated models are theoretically sensible and
similar to many empirical studies qualitatively, but the response quantities vary. The
models of empirical studies that have been used to compare the results with are not exactly
nested to the oligopolistic bank model of this study. We should not put much emphasis
on quantity comparison also because the estimation in this study uses de-trended data.
These facts are to be be kept in mind when comparing the IRFs to other studies.
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4.5.3 Comparison with a benchmark of no oligopolistic competition
In order to highlight the impacts of oligopolistic competition further, results of the baseline
estimates are compared to those of a benchmark model in which banks are perfectly com-
petitive. This is a purely hypothetical financial sector for the sake of comparison only and
to filter out the oligopolistic competition effects. The benchmark model implies that there
are numerous banks in the industry and they are normalized to one (NB,t = 1). Each
bank’s market share is too small to influence its lending rate. There is no interest mark
up, hence, rk,t = Rk,t = it. This competitive benchmark model is estimated with the same
prior as the baseline models.
Figure 4.6: Comparison to benchmark model for domestic shocks
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Note: The red (solid) lines are mean IRFs of the benchmark model with perfectly competitive
banks and the black and blue (broken) lines are mean IRFs of the Mflex and Msticky specifications
in the baseline respectively.
The first row in Fig.4.6 shows comparison of IRFs to a negative MEI shock. The
impacts of MEI shock is larger under oligopolistic banks compared to the benchmark
model. Although asset price rises more in the baseline models, balance sheet channel is
less effective in reducing lending rates due to strategic behaviour among banks, already
depicted in Fig.4.5. The effect of positive collateral valuation on µt is weakened also by the
bank entry channel. The bank entry channel, although not directly affected by the MEI
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shock, implies that the mass of banks may decrease and existing banks may gain more
market power that deter them to reduce lending rates sufficiently to compensate the fall
in It. The moderate increase in Qt in the benchmark model is due to a greater increase in
nominal interest rate compared to the baseline specifications. Hence, the behaviour of it
has a critical role to play.
For positive technology shock, in Fig.4.6, Yt and It increase more when banks are
oligopolistic with sticky loan rate, compared to the benchmark case. It implies that the
imperfect bank pass through in oligopolistic set up plays an important role in accelerating
shock effects through the bank entry channel.
The comparison for monetary policy shock is presented in the last row of Fig.4.6.
The drop in Qt to a rise in cash rate is much higher in the baseline models than in the
benchmark model. It implies that the stock market effect can be very strong in aggregate
demand through its effect on real exchange rates in oligopolistic models. Although mark
up in lending rate rises which amplifies monetary policy effect but the stock market effect
is strong enough to moderate the fall in Yt. This is consistent with the findings of Gavin
(1989)’s model that share price in the stock market substitutes for the real interest rate
in the determination of aggregate demand. For Australian data, the stock market effect is
much stronger in presence of oligopolistic banks which nullifies the other - counter cyclical
mark up - effect of monetary policy. Thus, Yt and It decline more to a contractionary
monetary policy in benchmark model than in the oligopolistic bank models.
Therefore, this study finds a different transmission mechanism of monetary policy under
oligopolistic banks. This also suggests that when monetary policy wishes to be more
accommodative, the existence of a highly concentrated bank sector makes it difficult to
achieve the monetary policy goals.
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Figure 4.7: Foreign inflation, output and interest rate shocks for benchmark and baseline
models
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Note: The red (solid) lines are IRFs of the benchmark model with perfectly competitive banks and
the black and blue (broken) lines are IRFs of the Mflex and Msticky specifications respectively.
Fig.4.7 shows the impulse responses of real economy to foreign inflation, foreign output,
and foreign monetary policy shocks when the domestic banking sector is oligopolistic and
when it is not. Oligopolistic banks mostly accelerate the external shock impacts on the
real economy. The responses are not much different between flexible and sticky lending
rates specifications. However, in response to a foreign inflation shock, domestic It rises
initially, while they decrease in the benchmark model with perfectly competitive banks.
The response of Yt to a rise in foreign interest rate is fluctuating in oligopolistic bank
models while it is rising after a transitory drop in the benchmark model.
Overall, the comparisons of domestic and foreign shocks imply that oligopolistic bank-
ing sector may not necessarily act as accelerator to all shocks rather it depends on which
shock hits the economy.
4.5.4 Australian output and employment: historical decompositions
Historical shock decompositions for output (Yt) and hours worked (Nt) are presented in
Fig.4.8 and Fig.4.9 to analyse the sources of Australian business cycles, over the inflation
targeting era. These figures show the contributions of various shocks to output and em-
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ployment deviations from their steady states over time. I apply same shock groupings as
in the variance decomposition analysis to make the figures easily interpretable. According
to the business cycles dating by Melbourne Institute, Australian economy went through
expansionary phases in mid and late 1990s (peaks October 1994, December 1997), and
mid 2000s (peaks November 2002, May 2007) within the time frame of this study. The
contractionary phases are identified as early 2000s and during the Global Financial Crisis
(troughs July 1996, November 2001, June 2003 and May 2009).
The model replicates the empirical peaks and troughs very well and identifies demand
side, technology, capital quality and foreign shocks as the main contributing factors to
the evolution of output. The expansionary phase during 1994 was driven by positive
technology, especially the investment specific technology shocks and the positive demand
side shocks. The economic booms during late 1997 and early 1998 on the other hand are
driven by positive variations in the quality of capital (including housing). House price
boom of 1996-2003, one of the four house booms between 1973-2003 identified by Abelson
et al. (2005) for Australia, suggests the dominance of capital quality shock in recovering
output during this period.
The large positive capital quality shock after 1996 along with the positive external
factors helped the economy came out of the depression and reached a peak in the end of
1997. The model attributes the expansion in mid 2000s (first half of both 2004 and 2007 in
particular) to positive demand shocks and positive external shocks. Since the model does
not include resource price separately, the household preference shock in the demand side
may capture some part of the resource price boom as increased household expenditures.
Monetary policy seems to have some contribution in the downturn of the economy after
the expansion phase in 1994. In order to put a limit on an anticipated rise in inflation,
RBA increased interest rates by 275 basis points between August and December 1994 (Rees
et al. 2016).
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Figure 4.8: Output, Yt: historical shock decomposition (group
wise) based on Mflex.
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Figure 4.9: Hours worked, Nt: historical shock decomposi-
tion (group wise) based on Mflex.
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Largely negative demand, and also supply shocks resulted in the depressed economic con-
dition until it reached a trough in the second half of 1996. For the downturn in the early
2000s, the model identifies large negative technology shock, investment shock in particular,
as the main factor. These shocks were associated by negative mark up shocks implied by
the model. These negative domestic shocks offset the positive external sector shocks in
early 2000s. Introduction of goods and service tax in July 2000 may be captured to some
extent by the mark up shocks and by the negative demand shocks in between 2001-2002.
The work of Rees et al. (2016) stated that the dominance of investment shocks together
with this tax are responsible for the contraction of this period and indicated this fact as
a model misspecification. The authors suggest that the tax induced huge building invest-
ment to be brought forward in the first half of 2000 and consequent reduction in the second
half of that year. As the model of this chapter does not feature any tax other than lump
sum tax, it assigns the tax effects to the investment shocks, being unable to account for
the tax explicitly.
The downturn during the GFC was mainly caused more by the domestic factors rather
than by the global factors themselves. The downfall was initiated by large negative demand
and then by negative technology shocks. These findings are consistent with the observation
that the consumer confidence was dropped by the bad news from other economies and
economic regions that time. This fact is captured by the demand and investment shocks
by the model. Post GFC recovery was fuelled by demand and technology shocks. If we look
at the recent years after 2013, the growth is slowed down by falling technology (investment)
and capital quality shocks. Hours worked (Nt) also follow the cyclical patterns of output.
Demand side, technology and foreign shocks contribute most to the evolution of hours
worked over different times.
4.6. Sensitivity analysis 159
4.6 Sensitivity analysis
A list of sensitivity analysis has been done to check the robustness of the findings
in baseline estimations. Here, the findings are analysed in terms of Mflex specification.
For brevity, Table 4.7 contains the marginal data densities (MDD) based on modified
harmonic mean (MHM) estimator of the various estimated models along with the MDD
of the baseline estimation for comparison. However, we should not put much emphasis on
the marginal likelihood as they can be very sensitive to prior specifications. The estimated
results do not appear much different than the baseline case.
Table 4.7: Sensitivity to fixed sunk cost and bank exit rate.
Mflex specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sensitivity to fess = 4 fess = 8 Baseline (Mflex) δb = 0.0125
Marginal Data Density (MDD*) -1010.98 -974.60 -977.52 -977.20
Note: Modified harmonic mean MDD based on Mflex specification.
The fixed sunk cost (fess) associated with bank entry and the bank exit rate
(
δb
)
affect the steady state of the model. Since there is no guide in the literature for these
parameters in the context of Australia, I re-estimate Mflex with a lower (fess = 4) and a
higher (fess = 8) values of sunk entry costs than the baseline to check the sensitivity of the
baseline results. From column (1) and (2) of Table 4.7, we see that overall, marginal data
densities are not substantially different and models with higher sunk costs are preferred
only slightly. However, estimation with fess = 4 creates convergence problem in MH stage
for several parameters, although model dynamics remain similar to the baseline case. The
values of fess as or above the baseline can solve this problem. This finding, therefore,
validates the choice of fess in this study.
Next, I re-estimate the model with slightly higher bank death/exit rate δb = 0.0125.
The MDD of the estimated model in column (4) of Table 4.7 suggests that this choice is
not more favoured than the baseline case. The estimated results are not reported here but
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the higher exit rate does not produce much different parameter estimates, at least with
this much increase in δb.
In Table 4.8 I report posterior mean of select parameters from the estimated models
with two different assumptions to check the sensitivity of baseline results. The first ro-
bustness check I have performed is the assumption regarding correlated bank value shock
(εb). This is specified as uncorrelated in the baseline specifications. I check whether correl-
ated bank value shock has any substantial impacts on the remaining parameter estimates.
Columns (2) in Table 4.8 has posterior mean from the model with correlated bank value
shock. The estimates are not very different from the baseline Mflex estimates. The auto-
correlation coefficient of bank value (ρb) shock does not appear much persistent.
Table 4.8: Correlated bank value shock model, and modified bank entry condition model:
select posterior mean.
Parameters Correlated
shock εb
No At in
bank entry
Parameters Correlated
shock εb
No At in
bank entry
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
ρa 0.74 0.68 σa 0.044 0.43
ρb 0.14 - σb 0.081 0.082
ρz 0.42 0.44 σz 2.30 2.24
ρξ 0.45 0.53 σξ 0.29 0.26
ρrpf 0.59 0.61 σrpf 0.15 0.29
φp 0.73 0.80 ζp 0.34 0.22
φw 0.72 0.72 ζw 0.52 0.49
φmc 0.81 0.84 ζmc 0.44 0.44
φmi 0.49 0.49 ζmi 0.45 0.45
φX 0.54 0.53 ζX 0.48 0.45
Marginal Data Density (MDD): -1000.97 -932.61
Next, the entry condition assumption that stationary technology shock does not enter
into the bank entry costs is tested. This assumption is similar to the calibrated model
Totzek (2011). Column (3) of Table 4.8 contains posterior mean estimates for this exper-
iment. The posterior mean of key parameters are not substantially different compared to
the results in Table 4.3. In this experiment, the model dynamics is mostly similar to the
baseline case, however, the impulse response of µt to a stationary technology shock is no
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longer countercyclical and the magnitude of response is very small. The estimation result
ofMflex specification when all parameter are estimated is reported in Table A9. The MDD
of this estimation is not much different than the MDD of the baseline model.
Overall, various sensitivity analysis validate the results of the baseline specification of
the study.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I have analysed the role of financial frictions arising from the oligopolistic
competition in the finance sector by implications of various shocks and frictions in an
estimated DSGE model, motivated by the highly concentrated banking industry in some
countries. So, the chapter is an application of imperfect competition and endogenous firm
entry theory within the class of general equilibrium model for finance sector, estimated with
Australian data. The model consists of standard open economy features and analyses the
role of oligopolistic banks to external shocks as external shocks are important for a small
open economy like Australia. I constructed a modified bank entry condition to endogenize
the number of banks. The proposed model considers strategic bank behaviour for loan
market only and measures this imperfect competition through mark up in lending rate.
The estimated model produces countercyclical interest mark ups, however, the mag-
nitudes of cyclical responses to some shocks are smaller for Australian data. The coun-
tercyclical movements in interest mark ups amplify some shocks originating in domestic
economy and in the external sector. Monetary policy shock appears to have smaller role
in output fluctuations in presence of oligopolistic banks. The oligopolistic bank model
finds higher stock market responses to shocks when comparing with the competitive bank
sector case. Also MEI shock impacts on output appears higher under oligopolistic set up
in contrast to the findings of Chapter 3 for MEI shock. Strategic behaviour among banks
and absence of endogenous balance sheet constraint, leave a larger room for MEI shock
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to affect output and employment. Demand side shocks, technology shocks, particularly
investment specific technology shock, and foreign shocks appear as important drivers of
Australian output and employment fluctuations during the period of this study. Oligopol-
istic competition among banks play an amplification role for some real sector shocks but
act as better shock absorber for finance sector shocks such as capital quality shock.
Therefore, the study finds distinct shock propagation mechanisms arising from the
strategic behaviour and endogenous entry of banks with important implications for poli-
cymakers. The findings of this chapter highlight the importance of incorporating financial
frictions arising from oligopolistic competition among banks while modelling an economy
with highly concentrated financial sector. The next chapter summarises policy implications
implied by the findings of Chapter 2 to 4. In addition, the next chapter discusses future
research possibilities and extensions of the models in previous chapters.
4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Output
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Table A9: Sensitivity: estimation of all substitution elasticities in Mflex
ParametersPost.
mean
90% HPDI ParametersPost.
mean
90% HPDI
ρa 0.76 [0.69, 0.84] σa 0.041 [0.03, 0.05]
ρz 0.40 [0.30, 0.50] σz 2.42 [1.61, 3.24]
ρξ 0.48 [0.35, 0.61] σξ 0.30 [0.22, 0.38]
ρ% 0.52 [0.41, 0.62] σ% 1.10 [0.83, 1.35]
ρrpf 0.60 [0.53, 0.68] σrpf 0.17 [0.01, 0.58]
ρmc 0.61 [0.45, 0.77] σmc 0.23 [0.07, 0.41]
ρmi 0.54 [0.40, 0.68] σmi 5.60 [1.46, 9.49]
ρX 0.60 [0.45, 0.75] σX 0.38 [0.08, 0.71]
φp 0.76 [0.71, 0.81] ζp 0.34 [0.19, 0.48]
φw 0.70 [0.64, 0.76] ζw 0.54 [0.38, 0.71]
φmc 0.74 [0.60, 0.89] ζmc 0.32 [0.11, 0.52]
φmi 0.47 [0.34, 0.60] ζmi 0.50 [0.25, 0.74]
φX 0.53 [0.39, 0.68] ζX 0.48 [0.23, 0.72]
ηc 0.75 [0.35, 1.14] ρi 0.60 [0.55, 0.65]
ηi 1.17 [0.37, 1.92] φpi 1.20 [1.13, 1.28]
ηf 0.81 [0.53, 1.08] φy 0.05 [0.03, 0.07]
b 0.65 [0.56, 0.74] φdy 0.04 [0.01, 0.06]
φa 0.01 [0.01, 0.012] φrS -0.012 [−0.013,−0.01]
τ 2.35 [1.72, 2.95] σi 0.04 [0.03, 0.05]
δ2
δ1
3.90 [2.60, 5.16]
MDD: -971.17
Figure A10: Brooks and Gelman’s multivariate convergence diagnostics for Mflex.
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Figure A11: Export mark up shock in model Mflex.
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Figure A12: Bank value and preference shocks in Mflex. Figure A13: Government exp. and risk premium shocks in Mflex.
Note: For every row in Fig.A12 and Fig.A13, the first variable contains the name of the shock for that row.
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4.A.2 Model equations
Households
Household’s aggregate consumption, similar to Adolfson et al. (2007) is,
Ct =
[
(1− ωc)1/ηc C
ηc−1
ηc
d,t + ω
1/ηc
c C
ηc−1
ηc
m,t
] ηc
ηc−1
. (A52)
Households maximise Eq.(A52) subject to PtCd,t + Pmc,tCm,t = Pc,tCt. This implies
the optimal demand for domestic consumption and imported consumption. Household’s
lifetime utility maximization implies the following optimal conditions:
δL
δCt
=
Pc,t
Pt
λt − %t
Ct − bCt−1 − βb
%t+1
Ct+1 − bCt = 0;⇒ γcd,tλt =
%t
Ct − bCt−1 − βb
%t+1
Ct+1 − bCt .
(A53)
δL
δBt+1
=
λt
Pt
− β λt+1
Pt+1
(1 + it) = 0⇒ 1 = βΛt+1 1 + it
Πt+1
⇒ 1 = βΛt+1Rt+1. (A54)
δL
δB∗t+1
= λt
St
Pt
− βλt+1St+1
Pt+1
(1 + i∗t ) Φ
(
˜fat,φ˜t
)
− βλt+1 (St+1 − St)
Pt+1
= 0
⇒ 1 = St+1
St
(1 + i∗t )
(1 + it)
Φ
(
˜fat,φ˜t
)
+
1
(1 + it)
(
St+1
St
− 1
)
. (A55)
δL
δxt+1
= β
λt+1 (dt+1 + νt+1)
Pt+1
NB,t+1 − λt νt
Pt
Nht = 0⇒ λtνt = βλt+1 1
(dt+1 + νt+1)
. (A56)
CPI is a CES aggregate of domestic price (Pt) and imported consumption price (Pmc,t):
Pc,t =
[
(1− ωc)P 1−ηct + ωcP 1−ηcmc,t
] 1
1−ηc . (A57)
In wage setting, if households cannot re-optimize a new wage level, it simply indexes to
previous periods CPI inflation as follows:
Wt+s(l)
Pt+s
=
Wt(l)
Pt
Πςwc,t−1,t+s−1 ⇒ wt+s (l) = wt (l) Π−1t,t+sΠςwc,t−1,t+s−1. (A58)
Therefore the first order condition becomes:
δL
δwt(l)
= 0⇒wwt(l)−w(1+η)−1
∞∑
s=0
(βφw)
s
%tψw
w(1+η)
t+s Π
w(1+η)
t,t+s Π
−ςww(1+η)
c,t−1,t+s−1N
1+η
t+s
+ (1− w)wt(l)−w
∞∑
s=0
(βφw)
s
λt+sΠ
w−1
t,t+sΠ
ςw(1−w)
c,t−1,t+s−1w
w
t+sNt+s = 0. (A59)
From first order condition of w(l) we can write the common reset wage
(
w#t
)
as
w#,1+wηt =
w
w − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 (βφw)
s %tψw
w(1+η)
t+s Π
w(1+η)
t,t+s Π
−ςww(1+η)
c,t−1,t+s−1N
1+η
t+s
Et
∑∞
s=0 (βφw)
s λt+sΠ
w−1
t,t+sΠ
ςw(1−w)
c,t−1,t+s−1w
w
t+sNt+s
. (A60)
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w#,1+wηt = Mw,t
f1,t
f2,t
, (A61)
Mw,t =
w
w − 1µ
w
t . (A62)
f1,t = %tψw
w(1+η)
t N
1+η
t + βφwΠ
w(1+η)
t+1 Π
−ςww(1+η)
c,t f1,t+1, (A63)
f2,t = λtw
w
t Nt + βφwΠ
w−1
t+1 Π
ςw(1−w)
c,t f2,t+1. (A64)
Applying the properties of Calvo pricing to the aggregate nominal wage index and dividing
both sides by P 1−wt gives the real wage as
(wt)
1−w = (1− φw)w#,1−wt + (Πc,t−1)ζw(1−w)(Πt)w−1φww1−wt−1 . (A65)
Domestic intermediate production
Optimal conditions of intermediate goods producers:
Pm,t(1− α)Ym,t
Nt
= wt, (A66)
Pm,tα
Ym,t
Ut
= b1u
ζ
t ξtKt, (A67)
Rk,t+1 =
Pm,t+1α
Ym,t+1
Kt+1
+ (Qt+1 − δ(ut+1)) ξt+1
Qt
. (A68)
Retailers in domestic production
Final output is a CES aggregate of all retailers output: Yt =
[´ 1
0 Y
p−1
p
ft
] p
p−1
and aggregate
price Pt =
[´ 1
0 P
1−p
ft df
] 1
1−p . The retailers objective:
Max
< Pft >
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βφp)
s Λt+s
(
Π
ζp(1−p)
t−1,t+s−1P
1−p
ft P
p−1
t+s Yt+s − PmtΠ−ζppt−1,t+s−1P−pft P pt+sYt+s
)
.
(A69)
The first order condition is,
(1− p)P−pft Et
∞∑
s=0
(βφp)
s Λt+sΠ
ζp(1−p)
t−1,t+s−1P
p−1
t+s Yt+s
+ pP
−p−1
ft Et
∞∑
s=0
(βφp)
s Λt+sΠ
−ζpp
t−1,t+s−1PmtP
p
t+sYt+s = 0, (A70)
Pft =
p
p − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 (βφp)
s Λt+sΠ
−ζpp
t−1,t+s−1Pm,tP
p
t+sYt+s
Et
∑∞
s=0 (βφp)
s Λt+sΠ
ζp(1−p)
t−1,t+s−1P
p−1
t+s Yt+s
. (A71)
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After recursively writing, we get the optimal reset price as,
P#t = Mp,t
X1,t
X2,t
, (A72)
Mp,t =
p
p − 1µ
p
t , (A73)
X1,t = Pm,tP
p
t Yt + φpβΛt+1(Πt)
−ζppX1,t+1, (A74)
X2,t = P
p−1
t Yt + φpβΛt+1(Πt)
ζp(1−p)X2,t+1. (A75)
After dividing Eq.(A74) by P pt and Eq.(A75) by P
p−1
t and defining
X1,t+1
P
p
t
= x1,t,
X2,t+1
P
p−1
t
=
x2,t and Π
#
t as the reset price inflation, we
x1,t = Pm,tYt + φpβΛt+1(Πt)
−ζppΠpt+1x1,t+1, (A76)
x2,t = Yt + φpβΛt+1(Πt)
ζp(1−p)Π(p−1)t+1 x2,t+1, (A77)
Π#t = Mp,t
x1,t
x2,t
Πt. (A78)
Capital Producers
After defining Qt ≡ Q˜tPi,t , capital goods producer’s optimal condition is,
QtZt
[
1− τ
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
− τ
(
It
It−1
− 1
)
It
It−1
]
+βQt+1
λt+1
λt
Zt+1τ
(
It+1
It
− 1
)(
It+1
It
)2
= 1.
(A79)
Importers
Optimal condition of consumption goods importers:
(1− mc)P j
−mc
mc,t
∑
(βφmc)
s Λt+1pi
ζmc(1−mc)
mc,t P
mc−1
mc,t Cm,t+s
+ mcP
j−mc−1
mc,t
∑
(βφmc)
s Λt+1mcmc,t+spi
−ζcmmc
mc,t P
mc
mc,t+sCm,t+s = 0 (A80)
⇒ P jmc,t =
mc
mc − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 (βφmc)
s Λt+sΠ
−ζmcmc
mc,t−1,t+s−1mcmc,t+sP
mc
mc,t+sCmc,t+s
Et
∑∞
s=0 (βφmc)
s Λt+sΠ
ζmc(1−mc)
mc,t−1,t+s−1P
mc−1
mc,t+sCm,t+s
. (A81)
Following steps similar to domestic retailers, we express the re-set price inflation
(
pi#mc,t
)
of consumption imports as,
pi#mc,t =
mc
mc − 1µmc,t
x1mc,t
x2mc,t
pimc,t = Mmc,t
x1mc,t
x2mc,t
pimc,t, (A82)
where Mmc,t = mcmc−1µmc,t is the time varying mark-up and µmc,t is an AR(1) process
and
x1mc,t = mcmc,tCm,t + φmcβΛt+1pi
−ζmcmc
mc,t pi
mc
mc,t+1x1mc,t+1, (A83)
x2mc,t = Cm,t + φmcβΛt+1pi
ζmc(1−mc)
mc,t pi
mc−1
mc,t+1x2mc,t+1. (A84)
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Aggregate import consumption inflation:
pi1−mcmc,t = (1− φmc)pi#,1−mcmc,t + φmcpiζmc(1−mc)mc,t−1 . (A85)
Similarly we can define the equations for imported investment goods where mc in the
subscript for import consumption is to be read with mi for import investment. For brevity,
I skip listing them. Evolution of net foreign assets :
StB
∗
t+1 = StPx,t (Cx,t + Ix,t)−StP ∗t (Cm,t + Im,t) + (1 + i∗t )Φ
(
fat−1, ˜φt−1
)
StB
∗
t . (A86)
Exporters
Export demand faced by individual exporter j is, X˜j,t =
(
Pjx,t
Px,t
)−x
X˜t where, Pjx,t is the
price in foreign currency term or, export market’s local currency faced by the individual
exporter. The marginal cost of export is domestic production price, Pt. Price is sticky in
export (foreign) market. Thus, Px,t+s = pi
ζx
x,tPx,t. The export sector Phillips curve is same
as in Adolfson et al. (2007), except there is no trend inflation in export price inflation.
Aggregation
The domestic price dispersion νpt is,
νpt = φpν
p
t−1(Πt−1)
−ζppΠpt + (1− φp)
(
1− φpΠζp(1−φp)t−1 Πφp−1t
1− φp
)− p
1−φp
. (A87)
Evolution of aggregate domestic producer price:
(Pt)
1−p = (1− φp)P#,1−pt +
1ˆ
1−φp
(Πt−1)ζp(1−p)P
1−p
f,t−1df, (A88)
which can be written in terms of inflation rate:
(Πt)
1−p = (1− φp)(Π#t )1−p + φp(Πt−1)ζp(1−p). (A89)
Fisher equation (the link between nominal and real interest rate) is 1 + it = (Rt+1)(Πt+1).
In addition, the model uses some important price ratios that are defined as follows:
γcd,t ≡ Pc,tPt , γi,dt ≡
Pi,t
Pt
, γ∗x,t ≡ Px,tP ∗t , γmc,dt ≡
Pmc,t
Pt
, γmi,dt ≡ Pmi,tPt , γf,t ≡ PtStP ∗t ,
γcmc,t ≡ Pc,tPmc,t , γimi,t ≡
Pi,t
Pmi,t
.
Also define, Πmc,t =
Pmc,t
Pmc,t−1 , and ΠX,t =
PX,t
PX,t−1 . Marginal cost of export is defined as,
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mcx,t =
Pt
StPx,t
. From Eq.(A57),
γcd,t ≡ Pc,t
Pt
=
[
(1− ωc) + ωc
(
Pmc,t
Pt
)1−ηc] 11−ηc
=
[
(1− ωc) + ωc (γmc,dt)1−ηc
] 1
1−ηc ;
(A90)
γcmc,t ≡ Pc,t
Pmc,t
=
[
(1− ωc)
(
Pt
Pmc,t
)1−ηc
+ ωc
] 1
1−ηc
. (A91)
Similarly we can derive γmi,dt and γimi,t. More price equations:
γf,t ≡ Pt
StP ∗t
=
PtPx,t
StP ∗t Px,t
=
(
Pt
StPx,t
)(
Px,t
P ∗t
)
= mcx,tγ
∗
x,t; (A92)
γmc,dt =
Πmc,tγmc,dt−1
Πt
; (A93)
γmi,dt =
Πmi,tγmi,dt−1
Πt
; (A94)
γ∗x,t =
ΠX,tγ
∗
x,t−1
Π∗t
; (A95)
mcx,t = Πtmcx,t−1
1
ΠX,t
St−1
St
; (A96)
mcmc,t =
1
mcx,tγ∗x,tγmc,dt
; (A97)
mcmi,t =
1
mcx,tγ∗x,tγmi,dt
. (A98)
Marginal costs in both consumption and investment imports if j = c, i:
mcmj,t ≡ P
∗
t St
Pmj,t
=
(
StP
∗
t
Pt
)(
Pt
Pmj,t
)
=
1
γf,t
1
γmjd,t
=
1
mcx,tγ∗x,t
1
γmjd,t
. (A99)
4.A.3 Log-linearised equations
Household sector and labour market
λt =
−1
(1− b) (1− βb) [Ct − bCt−1 − βb (Ct+1 − bCt)− (1− b) (%t − βb%t+1)]− γcd,t;
(A100)
Λt+1 +Rt+1 = 0; (A101)
Λt+1 = λt+1 − λt; (A102)
(1 + wη)w
#
t = f1,t − f2,t + µwt ; (A103)
f1f1,t = ψw
w(1+η)N1+η [w (1 + η)wt + (1 + η)Nt + %t]
+φwβf1 [−ζww (1 + η) Πc,t + w (1 + η) Πt+1 + f1,t+1] ; (A104)
f2f2,t = w
wN.λ [λt + wwt +Nt] + φwβf2 [ζw (1− w) Πc,t + (w − 1) Πt+1 + f2,t+1] ;
(A105)
wt = (1− φw)w#t + φw (ζwΠc,t−1 −Πt + wt−1) . (A106)
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Financial sector
νt = −At + 1
b − 1NB,t − µt; (A107)
νt = Λt+1 +
1
d+ ν
(ddt+1 + ννt+1) + εb; (A108)
dt =
1
rk −R (rkrk,t −Rit) +
b
1− bNB,t +Ot; (A109)
Ot = Qt−1 +Kt; (A110)
Dt = NB,t + dt; (A111)
rk,t = µt + it; or, (A112)
rkrk,t = µR (it + µt)− κbNB
(NB − 1) b −NB θt; (A113)
µt =
NB
(NB − 1)NB,t −
NB (b − 1)
(NB − 1) b −NBNB,t; (A114)
NB,t =
1
NB +NBE
(NBNB,t−1 +NBENB,t−1) ; (A115)
Rk,t =
1
1− bNB,t + rk,t. (A116)
Intermediate goods sector
wt = Pm,t + Ym,t −Nt; (A117)
RkK (Rk,t+1 +Qt +Kt+1) = αYmPm (Pm,t+1 + Ym,t+1) ;
+K (Qt+1 + ξt+1 +Kt+1)− δK (δt+1 + ξt+1 +Kt+1) ; (A118)
Ym,t = At + αut + αξt + αKt + (1− α)Nt; (A119)
δ0δ (ut) = δ1ut; (A120)
Pm,t + Ym,t − ut = δ2
δ1
ut + ξt +Kt. (A121)
Capital producer
Qt = τ (It − It−1)− βτ (It+1 − It)− zt; (A122)
KKt+1 = I (zt + It) +K (ξt +Kt)− δK (δ(U)t + ξt +Kt) . (A123)
Retail sector
Yt = Ym,t + ν
p
t ; (A124)
νpt = φp
(
νpt−1 − ζppΠt−1 + pΠt
)
+ p
φp
1− φp {(1− φp) ζpΠt−1 + (φp − 1) Πt} ; (A125)
x1x1,t = Y Pm (Yt + Pm,t) + βφpx1 [Λt+1 + x1,t+1 − ζppΠt + pΠt+1] ; (A126)
x2x2,t = Y Yt + βφpx2 [ζp (1− p) Πt + Λt+1 + x2,t+1 + (p − 1)Πt+1] ; (A127)
Π#t = x1,t − x2,t + Πt + µpt ; (A128)
Πt = φpζpΠt−1 + (1− φp) Π#t . (A129)
Imports and export sectors
x1mcx1mc,t = Cmmcmc (Cm,t +mcmc,t) + βφmcx1mc
[Λt+1 + x1mc,t+1 − ζmcmcΠmc,t + mcΠmc,t+1] ; (A130)
x2mcx2mc,t = Cm (Cm,t) + βφmcx2mc
[Λt+1 + x2mc,t+1 + ζmc (1− mc) Πmc,t − (1− mc) Πmc,t+1] ; (A131)
Π#mc,t = x1mc,t − x2mc,t + Πmc,t + µmc,t; (A132)
Πmc,t = φmcζmcΠmc,t−1 + (1− φmc) Π#mc,t; (A133)
x1mix1mi,t = Immcmi (Im,t +mcmi,t) + βφmix1mi
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[Λt+1 + x1mi,t+1 − ζmimiΠmi,t + miΠmi,t+1] ; (A134)
x2mix2mi,t = Im (Im,t) + βφmix2mi
[Λt+1 + x2mi,t+1 + ζmi (1− mi) Πmi,t − (1− mi) Πmi,t+1] ; (A135)
Π#mi,t = x1mi,t − x2mi,t + Πmi,t + µmi,t; (A136)
Πmi,t = φmiζmiΠmi,t−1 + (1− φmi) Π#mi,t; (A137)
Πx,t =
β
(1 + ζxβ)
Πx,t+1 +
ζx
(1 + ζxβ)
Πx,t−1 +
(1− φx) (1− φxβ)
φx (1 + ζxβ)
mcx,t +Mx,t; (A138)
Cm,t = −ηc (1− ωc) γ−(1−ηc)cd γmcd,t + Ct; (A139)
Im,t = −ηi (1− ωi) γ−(1−ηi)id γmid,t + It; (A140)
Mt = Cm,t + Im,t. (A141)
Monetary policy and others
it = ρiit−1 + (1− ρi) [φΠΠc,t + φY Yt] + φdY (Yt − Yt−1) + φrS (rSt − rSt−1) + ei,t;
(A142)
Πc,t = (1− ωc) γηc−1cd Πt + ωcγηc−1cmc Πmc,t; (A143)
Xt = −ηfγ∗x,t + Y ∗t ; (A144)
rSt = −mcx,t − γ∗x,t − ωcγηc−1cmc γmcd,t; (A145)
Y = (1− ωc) γηccd
C
Y
(Ct + ηcγcd,t) + (1− ωi) γηiid
I
Y
(It + ηiγid,t) +
G
Y
Gt − Y
∗
Y
(
ηfγ
∗
x,t − Y ∗t
)
;
(A146)
Y Yt + νNBE (νt +NBE,t) = wN (wt +Nt) +NBd (NB,t + dt) +KRQ (Kt +Qt−1 +Rt+1 + ut) .
(A147)
Price ratios
γmcd,t = pimc,t + γmcd,t−1 − pit; (A148)
γmid,t = pimi,t + γmid,t−1 − pit; (A149)
γ∗x,t = piX,t + γ
∗
x,t−1 − pi∗t ; (A150)
mcx,t = pit +mcx,t−1 − piX,t − dSt; (A151)
γf,t = mcx,t + γ
∗
x,t; (A152)
γcd,t = ωc (γcmc)
−(1−ηc) γmcd,t; (A153)
γid,t = ωi (γimi)
−(1−ηi) γmid,t; (A154)
mcmc,t = −mcx,t − γ∗x,t − γmcd,t; (A155)
mcmi,t = −mcx,t − γ∗x,t − γmid,t. (A156)
External sector
pˆi∗t = βpˆi
∗
t+1 +
κ
100
Yˆ ∗t + pi∗t ; (A157)
Y ∗t = Y
∗
t+1 +R
∗
t − pˆi∗t+1 + y,t+1 − y,t; (A158)
Rˆ∗t = ρR∗Rˆ
∗
t−1 + (1− ρR∗)
(
φpi∗ pˆi
∗
t + φY ∗ Yˆ
∗
t + φdY ∗
(
Yˆ ∗t − Yˆ ∗t−1
))
+ εR∗,t; (A159)
pi∗,t = ρpi∗pi∗,t−1 + εpi∗,t; (A160)
Y ∗,t = ρpi∗Y ∗,t−1 + εY ∗,t. (A161)
AR(1) shock processes
At = ρaAt−1 + ea,t; (A162)
%t = ρ%%t−1 + e%,t; (A163)
φ˜t = ρφ˜
˜φt−1 + eφ˜,t; (A164)
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µwt = ρwµ
w
t−1 + ew,t; (A165)
µpt = ρpµ
p
t−1 + ep,t; (A166)
zt = ρzzt−1 + ez,t; (A167)
ξt = ρξξt−1 + eξ,t; (A168)
Gt = ρgGt−1 + eg,t; (A169)
Mx,t = ρxMt−1 + ex,t; (A170)
µmc,t = ρmcµmc,t−1 + emc,t; (A171)
µmi,t = ρmiµmi,t−1 + emi,t. (A172)
4.A.4 Data construction
Unless otherwise stated all data are collected from Australian Bureau of Statistics in
quarterly frequency from 1993Q1 to 2015Q4.
Population: Estimated resident population (ERP) for age group 16 to 65 and over is used
to make relevant data in AUD per capita term.
Output: Non-farm gross domestic product, chain volume measures, seasonally adjusted,
(Series ID: A2302589X ).
Consumption: Households final consumption expenditure, seasonally adjusted, (Series ID:
A2304081W).
Investment: Private gross fixed capital formation, seasonally adjusted, (Series ID: A2304100T
).
Exports: Exports of goods and services, seasonally adjusted, (Series ID: A2304114F ).
Imports: Imports of goods and services, seasonally adjusted, (Series ID: A2304115J ).
Hours worked: Quarterly hours worked in all jobs, seasonally adjusted, (Series ID: A84426298K
).
CPI inflation: Consumer price index: all groups, Index 2011/12=100, quarterly, Reserve
Bank of Australia (RBA), Statistical table G1, (Series ID: GCPIAG ).
Real exchange rate: AUD trade-weighted exchange rate index, adjusted for relative con-
sumer price levels, Index, March 1995 = 100, quarterly, RBA, (Series ID: FRERTWI ).
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Nominal interest rate: Cash rate target in percent, Statistical table A2, RBA, (Series ID:
ARBAMPCNCRT ).
Lending rate: Average of the two lending rates: Large business loan; weighted-average rate
on credit outstanding; variable, (Series ID: FILRLBWAV) and lending rates in housing
loans, variable, owner occupied, standard (Series ID: FILRHLBVS ) from RBA statistical
table F5. Average of the end of quarter rates have been considered.
Total mass of banks: : Quarterly ADI performance of banks statistics, Australian Pruden-
tial Regulatory Authority (APRA). The back series are from RBA statistical table J1
-number of banks that reported their asset-liability positions.
Foreign GDP: Export weighted real GDP index of Australia’s major trading partners, Base
March 2005 = 100, Quarterly, RBA’s own calculation by aggregating 17 economies plus
the Euro area (36), starting from 1997Q1.
Foreign inflation: Weighted average Consumer Price Index (CPI) of 14 countries: Hong
Kong, China, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, UK and US. Quarterly CPI indices are collected from In-
ternational Financial Statistics (IFS) database. Trade weights are calculated from annual
goods and service trade data of Australia with these 14 countries from Trade and Invest-
ment statistics of Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Weights are annual, hence,
the four quarters a year have same weights.
Foreign interest rate: Effective Federal Funds Rate, St. Louis FED- FRED Database,
(Series ID: FEDFUNDS).
Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Summary and implications
The orientation of the thesis is towards investigating monetary policy and various other
shock transmissions in presence of financial frictions. To do this I construct appropriate
models based on the gaps in the literature and analyse implications of various estimated
models in terms of shock impacts and the roles of various nominal and real frictions in
their transmission processes. The research questions addressed in Chapters 2-4 of the
thesis contribute to the literature in empirically and theoretically important ways for both
developing and developed country issues.
In Chapter 2 the thesis has investigated monetary policy transmission channels with
especial emphasis on the lending channel, in addition to analysing credit boom and external
shock impacts, during the period of market based monetary policy instruments and floating
exchange rates. An economy wide SVAR model for Bangladesh was constructed and the
identification scheme of the SVAR model incorporated the Exchange Rate Pass Through
(ERPT) literature along with the monetary policy literature. This is to reflect the practice
of pursuing a separate foreign exchange policy apart from monetary policy by the central
bank. In addition, the block exogeneity restriction ensures that the domestic economy
is affected by the developments in the rest of the world but not the other way around.
The estimated model finds that the responses of macro aggregates to monetary policy
shock are similar to empirical regularities. The current monetary aggregates targeting
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policy regime is able to affect the price level of the country significantly. The fact that
targeting a monetary aggregate is able to influence price is consistent with the observation
that financial sector advancement is an ongoing process and the variation of money is
less complicated in Bangladesh. Exchange rate channel of monetary policy appears less
effective, as expected, due to frequent interventions of Bangladesh Bank in foreign exchange
market. Credit booms are inflationary and external shocks are found to be important.
The findings of Chapter 2 suggest a non-trivial but moderate existence of bank lending
channel and indicate a greater attention from prudential regulations are needed to remove
existing impediments in the channel to make it even more functional. Particular attention
needs to be paid to remove the factors, discussed in Chapter 2, that create stickiness in
rates in the loan market and deter monetary policy rates to be translated to commercial
lending rates effectively. Second, frequent interventions in foreign exchange market reduce
monetary policy effectiveness by weakening the exchange rate channel. Continuation of
the tendency of exchange rate undervaluation for long time to promote exports can have
negative impacts on the economy by creating inefficiencies in domestic production. In order
for monetary policy to be effective, the central bank should cut its level and frequency of
intervention in the foreign exchange market and allow market forces to determine exchange
rates. Third, to bring greater amount of financial transactions under the formal financial
system, financial services should be made cheaper and easily available particularly in the
rural areas. If larger number of economic activities are accounted for by the banking
system, then scope of the monetary policy will increase and transmission mechanism will
be clearer and more effective.
In Chapter 3 the thesis extended the financial friction DSGE model of Gertler & Karadi
(2011) to incorporate various nominal and real frictions to analyse the the role of marginal
efficiency of investment shock in business cycles. In addition, the chapter conducted exper-
iments with financial shocks such as those originating in the finance sector (bank net worth
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shock) and in the real sector (capital quality shock) and discussed the issues of separate
identification of them. The main findings are that although price and wage rigidities in the
model enhances the effects of marginal efficiency of investment shock, financial frictions
largely replace the shock impacts. Under the assumption of perfectly competitive banking
sector, while determining the lending rates, financial frictions work through the balance
sheet effects of changes in collateral valuations, caused by changes in stock market price of
capital. In addition, the chapter emphasises that financial shocks are important in business
cycles in their own capacity, not just because financial sector amplifies shocks of the real
sector.
The findings of Chapter 3 have important modelling and policy implications. Consid-
ering a bank net worth shock rather than capital quality shock as finance based shock can
improve the fit of the model. Since capital quality shock cannot rule out the possibility
of physical destruction of capital, the shock may not be a good representation of financial
shock. In case of physical destruction of capital, there can be greater need for investment,
and banks can make additional profits from making new investment. So, in the case of this
liability side financial friction, including a purely finance based shock such as the bank net
worth shock is useful to improve fit of the model and to draw accurate inferences about
financial shocks. The results also highlight the importance of incorporating nominal wage
and price stickiness for the US economy, supporting micro founded evidence on the US.
In a highly competitive financial environment, as assumed in Chapter 3, the bank net
worth shock plays an important role and has huge repercussions not just for the financial
sector but also for the real sector through credit market. Bank capital response is much
higher and prolonged to a net worth shock than to capital quality (asset side) shocks. This
indicates the way policy makers should respond to different financial shocks. In response
to exogenous events creating variations in bank net worth, policymakers should focus
on the ways to replenish bank net worth which will automatically be reflected in easing
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credit conditions. This highlights the importance of stress testing and increased prudential
supervisions and regulations to check the health of the financial intermediaries on a regular
basis in addition to having sufficient regulatory capital. In contrary, if the financial shocks
belong to the asset side, then instant measures should be taken to reduce the interest
spread in the loan market. Overall, financial sector amplifies impacts of negative real
sector shocks by raising interest spread which is observed in both Chapter 3 and Chapter
4. So, any policy stance that can mitigate the upward trend in spread can be an effective
way to deal with a crisis.
Considering the highly concentrated financial sector in some countries and limited
studies deal with the issue in estimated general equilibrium models, Chapter 4 has analysed
the role of an oligopolistic financial sector in the context of a small open economy. The
chapter is an application of oligopolistic competition and endogenous firm entry model in
case of financial sector where imperfect competition is measured through mark up. Taking
Australia as an example of such a country, the DSGE model of Chapter 3 was augmented
with standard trade features and estimated with Australian data following the Bayesian
estimation technique. One of the main results from the model is the counter cyclical
movements in the interest mark up or spread in the credit market, similar to Chapter 3.
For example, a negative technology shock increases the interest mark up through the bank
entry channel and thereby amplifies the shock impacts.
The results of Chapter 4 imply that oligopolistic competition in financial market affects
the dynamics of output and investment in important ways. Ignoring this feature of financial
market in the model may lead monetary policy and other shocks to have their impacts on
the real economy overestimated or under estimated. For example monetary policy in
Chapter 4 is found to be less effective, similar to some other studies. And the chapter
also demonstrates the way an oligopolistic banking sector interact with stock market price
which makes monetary policy less effective. Although bank entry channel tends to amplify
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the effect of a contractionary monetary policy, a strong stock market effect of exchange
rate works in the opposite direction to reduce the amplifying effect. For various technology
shocks and foreign shocks, the oligopolistic banks work as amplifiers in the model in most
of the cases.
Second, since the friction in the finance market in Chapter 4 arises due to the strategic
behaviour among banks, the results provide important insights for policymakers to shape
the competition structure in financial sector. Further merger and acquisition in the finan-
cial sector can be detrimental to the economy, validating the current policy of prohibiting
further merger and acquisition among the big four banks in Australia.
Third, the bank entry condition implies that relevant authority should facilitate redu-
cing the entry costs to attract new domestic and foreign banks in the market. Increased
competition can decrease loan mark ups and make banking products less costly.
However, oligopolistic banks can be too strong to fail due to huge capital base, out of
their high profit margins (e.g Australian banks), compared to the competitive banks. So,
greater stability within the financial sector is expected in an oligopolistic set-up, although
high market power may enhance fluctuations in the real economy by charging higher costs
on financial services in the events of negative domestic and foreign shocks.
The thesis conducted a wide arrays of sensitivity analysis and other forms of estimations
in each of the three self contained chapters to check whether results in the baseline models
are robust. Overall, these additional estimations usually validated the claims or findings
of the main models.
5.2 Outlook
As in most economics research the chapters of this thesis have revealed some further
questions to be addressed in subsequent research. The model for Bangladesh economy
in Chapter 2 is estimated with monthly data due to unavailability of quarterly national
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income account data, particularly GDP data which is available only with annual frequency
for the entire period of study. This leaded the study to use industrial production instead
of GDP. When sufficient data in quarterly frequency1 becomes available the model can be
re-estimated with GDP data instead of industrial production index to get better insights
of the output dynamics and adjustment timing towards steady state after a shock. Data
limitations such as import and export price indices in required frequency also constrained
the study to focus more on trade issue, although this is an important feature to be included
in the SVAR model of Bangladesh. Monetary policy response to fiscal risks can be another
important dimension in the model which is particularly important for countries with fiscal
sector dominance.
The benefits of separating asset and liability side financial shocks in Chapter 3 arise
because of the construction of capital quality shock. In order to assess a deterioration of
asset market, a shock can be designed in a way that represents only exogenous change in
capital price so that the shock represents only change in valuation rather than any physical
destruction of capital. Another interesting question that arise out of Chapter 3 is: how
strong does the endogenous balance sheet constraint remain when banks are open to collect
deposits from households in rest of the world, rather than from the domestic economy only.
Similarly, households can have the opportunity to invest money in the rest of the world.
In this connection, the elaborate open economy features in Chapter 4 can be incorporated
into Chapter 3 and estimated to see what changes they bring compared to the findings of
Chapter 3.
For simplicity the financial sector in Chapter 4 assumes no information asymmetry
between borrowers and bankers. The mark up charged on loan rate is entirely due to
strategic behaviour among banks. Unlike goods production sector, information asymmetry
is very common and important phenomenon in financial sector and banks charge mark ups
1Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics recently calculates quarterly GDP.
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to cover borrower default risks. Thus, an explicit modelling of default risks based on
borrowers net worth in spirit of Bernanke et al. (1999b) is a natural extension of Chapter
4. Another interesting avenue of future research of this chapter is allowing foreign deposits
and lending into bank balance sheet. This is particularly important for countries that have
high exposures in international financial markets. For commodity exporting countries like
Australia, a separate commodity exporting sector can be introduced due to the special
nature of commodity exporting sectors, as in Jasskela & Nimark (2011) for example.
The findings of the thesis in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 together indicate very interesting
avenues for future research. Is the financial frictions proposed by Gertler & Karadi (2011)
valid or effective in countries where financial sector is not as much competitive as in the
US? Alternatively, which type of the friction will provide better fit and hence should be
included in the model? Chapter 4 implicitly assumes that in an imperfectly competitive
markets the moral hazard problem described in Gertler & Karadi (2011) is less likely
to occur. Hence, the balance sheet constraint on the bank’s leverage is less likely to be
effective because households have only few banks to deposit savings and receive banking
services from. This assumption can be tested by estimating both models with the same
data for countries with highly concentrated banking sectors.
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